Regional Context

Latin America is experiencing a period of exceptional turbulence, with an increase in protests and demonstrations coupled with an outbreak of widespread violence. Although it is often characterized as a peaceful region due to low levels of interstate conflict, Latin America has seen an increase in conflicts within the region over the past few years.

Regionalism in Latin America has not disappeared, but the actors leading it have evolved, with civil society organizations becoming its main defenders. This implies that there is still a sense of unity behind the idea of belonging to Latin America as a region, a concept largely promoted by civil society. Using the approaches proposed below, it is possible to confront and control current, and prevent further, turbulence in the region.

With this context in mind, it is possible to identify common trends between many countries in the region. To begin with, various protests have occurred throughout the region, irrespective of the ideology of ruling political parties. Over the past decade, Latin America witnessed an extraordinary economic boom under progressive governments, referred to by some authors as the “marea rosa,” or pink tide, during which many took advantage of low commodity prices. This phenomenon initially reduced levels of inequality and poverty and increased expectations of the middle class. Today, however, slowed economic growth and increased inequality have turned these expectations into disappointment, causing many to channel their dissatisfaction through discontent

This Readout & Recommendations reflects the contributions and discussions during the Fifth Regional Responses Workshop held December 12–13, 2019, in São Paulo, Brazil. The workshop was jointly organized by the Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales (CRIES) and the Stanley Center for Peace and Security. The workshop was structured into six sessions: (1) regional context, (2) militarization of security, (3) Venezuelan migration and gender issues, (4) Central America, (5) Red Convergencia (the convergence network), and (6) Venezuela and the International Criminal Count. Below are the main conclusions of each session along with a series of policy recommendations developed by participants throughout the workshop as compiled by Constanza Boettger and Lucía Belén Rossi, Program Officers, CRIES.
with political elites. In turn, this situation has discredited many political elites and set back democracy.

In 2019, the region faced many challenges related to electoral processes, including a continued transition toward right-wing governments and the creation of new integration initiatives, such as the Forum for the Progress of South America (Prosur). Despite this, two situations temporarily eased tensions. The first involved a speech given by the president of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, announcing an end to the neoliberal model in the region and expressing the need for a more inclusive model that responds to current dynamics. The second involved two democratic breakdowns in Peru: (1) the arbitration against the Odebrecht construction company that led to the resignation of President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in 2018, and (2) the dissolution of the National Congress by his successor, Martín Vizcarra, in September 2019. Another challenge occurred when Bolivian President Evo Morales attempted to override the will of the people in violation of the National Constitution, damaging the country’s institutional foundations. A wave of demonstrations spread to Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador), and Paraguay, all of which were facing political, institutional, and social crises.

Despite the particulars of each case, common threads connect these regional issues:

- Widespread discontent with the prevailing model, irrespective of political ideology.
- The collapse of hopeful expectations for the future.
- The persistence of authoritarianism (i.e., the reemergence of the military as a political actor). Because there is currently no ability to manage these crises, the question has become whether the military should be the guarantor of democracy and institutionalism in the region. This, however, echoes periods of democratic disruption in Latin America and is therefore rejected by many, causing domestic conflicts to escalate.
- The threat of corruption, which is pervasive in the region and has created a culture of impunity for political and social actors.
- Inequality-sparked violence among increasingly younger groups. These outbreaks of violence lack clear leadership and accountability, as they include actors from different social and political sectors.

Militarization of Security

Militarization has been a standard feature in Latin America. Although there have been periods when the armed forces were barred from engaging in domestic security issues, they have remained constantly present at the regional level. For this reason, we cannot say that the region is returning to a time when the military is regaining its role in public security but rather that it never actually abandoned these tasks.

The involvement of the military in public-security operations has been a common feature in Latin America since the 19th century, accentuated by political interventionism during the 20th century. There were periods following World War II that increased securitization, as regional coordination mechanisms were reshaped based on hemispheric and national security doctrines created by the United States.

Beginning in the 1970s, the military’s involvement in domestic security issues escalated, driven by the war on drugs (in connection with counterinsurgency and counternarcotics operations). Although these processes of militarization of security forces more often refer to the armed forces, securitized methods are not limited to their actions. For example, other militarized approaches include the use of military police forces, special battalions, death squads, militias, and criminal gangs.

The armed forces were originally created to support the structure of the state and handle national security issues. Today, the region faces new threats that transcend traditional state issues, leading the military to abandon its original role of waging interstate wars, which are infrequent in Latin America.

At the same time, at the regional level there is popular support for heavy-handed policies deeply rooted in a punitive culture. This translates into higher arrest rates, harsher punishments, and tolerance or even support for extrajudicial killings. Furthermore, there is a growing assumption that militarized control of social protests is the best way to maintain domestic order, a belief that has gained support in some sectors of civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, there is still some difficulty in defining the role of the military in postconflict or postdictatorship situations. Moreover, the use of military forces to address problems or situations beyond the traditional scope of the armed forces means they are not governed by the rules of armed conflict, leading to excess use of force and human rights violations. This further jeopardizes the rule of law and democracy.

Given this blurred role of the armed forces in public security, how do we explain the participation of the military on the political stage? In the context of political crises, the reduction of civic space explains the strong presence of the military. This is reflected in the diminished role of civil society organizations and the increased presence of armies on the streets in countries such as Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, the Northern Triangle, and Venezuela. This, however, is not the only explanation. Growing insecurity, increased crime rates, and a widespread belief in an institutional deficit has influenced the popularity of militarized policies.

This has led governments with opposing political ideologies, such as those of Mexico and Brazil in 2006, to develop similar strategies for combating threats such as drug trafficking or crime. However, the militarization of security often brings about two problems: (1)
the armed forces could find themselves in the middle of conflicts between political parties and factions over their failure or success in controlling crime, and (2) these interventions can spark or fuel social unrest and lead to the criminalization of social protest (as is the case of Colombia with the antiriot squad).

In Venezuela, one-third of all deaths are caused by public security forces, and 98 percent of these victims are 18 to 30 years old. In the case of Acapulco in the early 2010s, disorganized criminal gangs partnered with larger groups, triggering a regional dispute. In response, former Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto militarized the security forces in the city. This decision worsened the situation and made Acapulco rise in the ranking of the 50 most dangerous cities in the world (in 2010, Acapulco was not even ranked, in 2011 it rose to the fourth position, and in 2012 it was number two). It is often the case that rather than decreasing criminality or lethality, these policies displace violence toward peripheral areas, while tourist and high-income areas remain protected by the military’s presence.

The growing involvement of the military in public security poses several problems and challenges for reducing crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. The first challenge is to create medium and long-term strategies that effectively control the increasing crime rates, which in many cases may require reforming existing institutions and providing specialized training to professionalize forces, as well as reshaping strategies to prevent and control crime. New strategies are necessary to address the constantly changing nature of organized crime, in terms of technological and operational developments, because traditional strategies are failing to respond effectively. Furthermore, it is possible to build on the advances of other countries by applying lessons learned from these contexts as a reference in other situations and locations. There is also opportunity to build monitoring systems that can inform a larger learning process still at an early stage.

Gender and Migration out of Venezuela

To understand the phenomenon of migration in the context of gender, it is necessary to employ an intersectional analysis. Furthermore, it is important to take the following into account:

- **Sexual orientation and gender inclusivity**: Diverse perspectives must be considered when creating a sexuality- and gender-based analysis. This encompasses cissgender and heterosexual women and men, as well as people who are nonbinary and those who identify as LGBTQI.

- **Feminization of migration**: People who identify as LGBTQI tend to migrate with limited resources, including legal, social, symbolic, cultural, or political resources. When migrating, these groups, which are often considered difficult-to-employ populations, often take on jobs that are perceived as feminine and are precarious, exploitative, and high risk. They are subjected to a continuum of violence that precedes their migration—violence that stems from systems that perpetuate gender-based, ideological, political, economic, and cultural discrimination.

- **Global care chains and (trans)national care networks**: These chains consist of migrant women (usually from southern countries) covering the care deficit (generally in northern countries). This deficit is associated with a “care drain” phenomenon in terms of skills and available jobs. For example, unpaid work accounts for about 20 percent of overall gross domestic product in Colombia, where 16 percent of unpaid work is carried out by women.1 Also to keep in mind is the issue of existing gendered and racial division of labor. Most migrant women work in caretaker positions involving physical, psycho-social, economic, and chemical occupational risks because of the continued existence of a colonial gender system.

- **Migration phenomena such as human trafficking, internally and transborder displaced people, individuals in exile, refugees, asylum seekers, and uprooted people**: These groups suffer different types of structural damage. On the one hand, the homonacionalismo ideology presents migrants as the public enemy, encouraging hate speech and xenophobia. On the other hand, this population is also strongly impacted by human trafficking, sexual exploitation, and/or servitude. For example, 32.5 percent of sex workers in Bogota, Colombia, are Venezuelan women. This also increases instances of sexual violence, disappearances, torture, and isolation, in addition to making them vulnerable to legal and illegal armed groups.

Roraima clearly illustrates all these issues. Roraima is a Brazilian state whose capital city, Boa Vista, is 260 kilometers (approximately 160 miles) from the Venezuelan border. Between 600 and 800 migrants arrive in Roraima every day. This is not an alarming number compared to other countries, but Roraima is an isolated state with low numbers of flights and inadequate road infrastructure. This means the social impact is greater and more visible than in states with more-developed infrastructure.

The Brazilian government has responded to this migration by militarizing the immigration process. This includes over 3,000 military personnel sent to 16 shelters in the north, two indigenous shelters, and four registration centers over the course of one year. Furthermore, there is a government initiative to relocate migrants to other areas of the country, with 14,643 migrants already relocated to 263 cities. In 2018, Roraima reported the highest population growth and birth rates in Brazil (it should be noted that 47 percent of migrants are women, most of them single mothers). In 2019, 11,502 births were recorded in Roraima, 40 percent of which were to Venezuelan mothers. Many of these women migrate during their pregnancy to flee conditions in Venezuela—only to face inadequate prenatal and postnatal care, as well as a lack of protection against domestic violence.

Women who arrive in Roraima suffer occupational hazards such as harassment and even sexual abuse because of their gender. Additionally, they are at risk of contracting diseases because of the absence of adequate infrastructure for personal hygiene.
Moreover, they must cope with stigma and discrimination related to the idea that they might be engaged in prostitution and/or crime. The situation is worsened by insufficient social and institutional response, in particular for victims of trafficking and sexual and gender-based violence. In order to receive the necessary care and support, women as well as all victims of these forms of violence must report their cases to local judicial systems, which frequently revictimize survivors through either action or inaction, increasing the need to closely monitor the situation.

Central America

Central America is in permanent crisis. Ninety percent of the drugs trafficked to the United States are moved through Central America, and the region is marked by the circulation and expulsion of migrants.

Integration efforts in Central America have focused on economic growth, but these measures have increased the conflict’s accelerators: inequality, exclusion, deprivation, and social precarity. In turn, these risk factors increased forced displacement.

Domestic economic measures are generally considered procyclical, as they have followed fluctuations in the economic cycle. This has created two recurring scenarios: in times of economic growth, public spending rises and taxes are cut. Conversely, economic recessions are generally characterized by increased taxes and reduced public spending. Tax increases generally cause economic slowdowns (resulting in business closures and rising unemployment), greater fiscal deficits, and rise in poverty and forced displacement. In 2018, at least 210,000 Nicaraguan people fell below the poverty line. This means that 23.5 percent of the total population, or approximately 1.5 million people, were living in poverty.

Other phenomena present in the region include the deterioration of democratic processes, the weakening of the rule of law, and the increase in institutional fragility that, in the case of Nicaragua, has moved the country toward an authoritarian regime. Moreover, de facto powers are prevalent in Honduras and Nicaragua, and the region as a whole has been militarized by use of force, paramilitarism, and other forms of group violence. This is worsened by a lack of judicial independence and high levels of corruption. Faced with this democratic deficit, Central America suffers serious human rights violations. In Nicaragua, for example, at least 325 murders were identified as crimes against humanity in 2019. The situation is further aggravated by organized crime and drug-trafficking organizations that threaten governance structures.

Central America’s ranking on the Corruption Perceptions Index deteriorates year by year, with various consequences. To begin with, there has been an increase in femicides. In 2018, 973 women were murdered in Guatemala, El Salvador reported the murder of 400 women, and Nicaragua reported extrajudicial killings of 24 peasants. Honduras has also experienced forced disappearances, kidnappings, and extortion.

These issues are evident at the regional as well as national levels. According to the Global Peace Index, Honduras is one of the most violent countries in the world, followed closely by Nicaragua. Both countries face political and social crises with a convergence of military powers that contribute to the context of violence. In Nicaragua, for example, the sociopolitical crisis had a major impact on the economy, which contributed to economic slowdowns in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama.

Agreements created thus far have failed to develop a legal framework that spurs concrete action. In relation to safeguards for refugees, measures in Brazil’s 2014 Plan of Action have proven difficult to implement. Similarly, countries continue to challenge proposed accelerated processes in migration pacts. The situation is further complicated by the geopolitical pressure placed on Mexico regarding threatened tariffs to fund a wall along the southern border. Additionally, safe country agreements have been signed by Northern Triangle countries, which lack the resources and conditions necessary to be “safe countries.” This has created additional opportunities for the situation to be manipulated.

All these regional factors impact violence in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and result in forced displacement. For example, organized crime committed by gangs, as well as the actions of armed forces and police, contributes to displacement in cantons, communities, and neighborhoods. Such heavy-handed policies and responses from armed or police forces should not be overlooked by civil society.

Red Convergencia

The Red Convergencia (Convergence Network) initiative emerged from the IV Regional Responses to the Venezuelan Crisis Workshop, held in Cucuta, Colombia, from April 24–26, 2019. The network was created in response to the needs of the civil society forum member organizations, with the aim of organizing joint actions to increase capacity and influence over actors and the reality of the situation, beginning with organizations and initiatives specifically working on the Venezuelan crisis and its relationship with Colombia.

At present, the participating organizations are forum members who expressed the strongest interest in the issue and have major initiatives that have furthered the analysis of the situation. Initially this Interest Group for Venezuela found it valuable to promote dialogue and the exchange of opinions. After its initial establishment, Socorro Ramirez took over as the network’s coordinator and suggested a model that goes beyond a single unit of analysis to promote greater reach using a citizen diplomacy, with the aim of influencing Colombia’s approach assisting Venezuela through a peaceful and negotiated solution.

Between April and October 2019, a series of meetings was held with participants from different universities and organizations, as well as individuals who attended in their personal capacities. The participating entities were the Centro de Estudios Sociales, Universidad Nacional de Colombia; Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo; and the Stanley Center for Peace and Security.
Educarción Popular; Dejusticia; Diakonía; Fundación Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung de Colombia; Instituto Pensar; Universidad Javeriana; La Línea del Medio; Observatorio de Venezuela, Universidad del Rosario; Fundación Paz y Reconciliación; Planeta Paz; Red de Programas de Desarrollo y Paz (Redprodepaz); and Servicio Jesuita de Refugiados.

The essence of Red Convergencia and the pillars of its discussions and initiatives are:

- Prevent the use of force and foster a peaceful solution to the crisis and a democratic transition in Venezuela.
- Address the serious humanitarian, economic, and border-security issues affecting Venezuela.
- Direct attention to the Venezuelan exodus and the return of Colombians with binational families.
- Strengthen positive connections that help normalize Colombian-Venezuelan relations.

The operations committee analyzes and finalizes recommended initiatives and proposals to drive the team’s efforts. This committee consists of Marta Márquez of Instituto Pensar, Gerardo Ardila of the Center for Social Studies at the National University of Colombia, Luz Helena Sarmiento, León Valencia, Ramón Jimeno, Naryi Vargas, and Socorro Ramírez.

The communications committee is charged with building and leading a strategy aimed at strengthening Red Convergencia’s influence on public opinion. The network has chosen a communication strategy that engages mass and social media to broaden its reach and impact.

The first Diálogo Ciudadano Binacional (Binational Citizen Dialogue) was November 13 and 14, 2019. The first day of meetings took place on a closed-door basis and focused on logistical and operational matters. The second day of meetings was open to the public and members of the media, and featured five panels on these topics:

1. Colombia-Venezuela Panel: need to rebuild binational relations.

Red Convergencia gathers organizations, programs, and individuals whose initiatives converge based on their background and current work on those matters. It seeks to build and implement joint citizen diplomacy efforts that enable dialogue and provide a deeper and informed analysis of the complex situation of Venezuela, its borders, and its bilateral relations with Colombia. Therefore, it is neither a mediator nor a political movement. It is not a platform for individual initiatives or a think tank. Its message and action are not directed solely at governments or policymakers but also at the general public to inform opinion in both countries and across their borders.

**Venezuela and the International Criminal Court**

A preliminary investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the case of Venezuela is based on the country's economic, social, and political crisis. Venezuela faces a humanitarian emergency that has led the people to demonstrate and protest for their rights and basic services.

The scenario is concerning because, although there is no underlying domestic or interstate conflict, there is a dictatorial authoritarian regime that ignores democratic standards. Between 2014 and 2019 in Venezuela, systematic human rights violations led to the detainment of 15,045 individuals and injured over 15,000 more across the nation. Moreover, 284 deaths were reported during three demonstrations. Venezuela has been a state party to the Rome Statute since its creation July 1, 2002. The purpose of the ongoing preliminary examination is to analyze the creditability of the collected data and to continue to receive additional information from the state, nongovernmental organizations, and any other relevant sources.

The preliminary examination consists of four phases (Venezuela is currently in phase 2):

1. Initial and confidential assessment.
2. Verification of jurisdiction, including temporal, territorial, or national, and material jurisdiction.
3. Admissibility, addressing the principles of complementarity and gravity.
4. Interests of justice.

On February 8, 2018, ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced the beginning of the preliminary examination into the case of Venezuela, investigating crimes committed since April 2017 in the context of public demonstrations and the underlying political situation. It especially seeks to address allegations that state forces have frequently used excessive force to disperse and repress demonstrations and detain opposition members (some of whom were subjected to mistreatment and abuse).

On May 29, 2018, the general secretariat of the Organization of American States issued a report that found reasonable evidence of crimes against humanity in Venezuela, which was then submitted as evidence to the ICC. In September 2018, six ICC state parties—Argentina, Chile, Canada, Paraguay, Peru, and Colombia—referred the case to prosecutor Bensouda. This was the first time ICC member states sought an investigation into alleged crimes occurring entirely on another state’s territory. This referral
facilitated the opening of the case of Venezuela, as it allowed Bensouda to begin investigating without receiving authorization from the ICC’s pretrial chamber. Additionally, the referral may encourage other countries to continue submitting information about Venezuela to the ICC.

Among civil society members, there is a belief that crimes against humanity have been committed, including murder, incarceration, torture, sexual violence, and persecution, as regulated by Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

A crime against humanity includes any act committed (1) as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of these crimes, requiring both a large number of victims and a connection between the different acts perpetrated, and (2) pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy. 8

In light of the presented documentation, there is quantitative and qualitative data indicating that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Presented data includes the characterization of the victims (name, sex, education, etc.); characterization of the perpetrators (rank, attributes); details of the events (day, time, place, type of injury, witnesses, public declarations, etc.); domestic criminal proceedings; assistance offered to the victims; and designated officers. The existence of a state policy or plan directed against the population is evidenced by official declarations, judgments, and government orders, such as actions of the civilian military; the Ministry of Defense’s Resolution 8610; the launch of Operación de Liberación del Pueblo in 2015; and the creation of Special Action Forces in 2017.

Recommendations

To improve coordination between government, civil society, and international organizations:

- Establish common denominators to develop a shared regional approach for addressing current problems and compiling the lessons learned.
- Establish a shared methodology for working and recording information.
- Foster two-way communication and awareness raising. Encourage interaction between security forces, the general public, and decision makers to improve civilian-military relations.
- Create a common methodology and establish data-exchange mechanisms among civil society organizations, local governments, and international organizations on formal and informal migration flows to obtain figures that more accurately reflect the current conditions.

- Strengthen regional mechanisms for coordination and information exchange on internally displaced persons and the search for people who go missing in situations of migration.
- Facilitate access to information on migrant and refugee status, migration, and differences between residency and refugee status, including the benefits and opportunities associated with each.

For national governments:

- Engage in actions that strengthen democratic institutions with commitment to representative, legitimate, and effective institutions. Encourage states to comply with their international commitments.
- Facilitate an abandonment of discourse and language that provokes polarization, stigmatization, and hate, by providing comprehensive training that assists in overcoming these destabilizing factors at the local, regional, and international levels.
- Encourage the establishment of permanent training programs on gender and gender-based violence for those involved in humanitarian response.
- Create safe spaces, including shelters for women and persons who identify as LGBTQI.
- Facilitate access to mental health care and encourage the development of data studies that may help create strategies to better support vulnerable populations.
- Promote economic empowerment and leadership policies for women, especially single mothers.
- Implement reporting mechanisms for cases of sexual abuse and exploitation, including those committed by humanitarian actors against populations they serve.
- Set up zero-tolerance policies for cases of sexual abuse, exploitation, and any other gender-based violations of rights.
- Prepare and disseminate gender-specific reports in the countries hosting migratory flows from Venezuela.
- Foster structural reforms to guarantee an independent and effective judicial system capable of implementing and maintaining efforts to fight impunity and corruption.
- Offer security guarantees for victims who provide testimony, ensuring survivors feel safe and trusted, and avoiding revictimization.

To improve daily work and collaboration between civil society organizations:

- Avoid any duplication of efforts or resource competition, and redouble efforts to create coordination mechanisms among
organizations working on similar issues to guarantee long-term sustainability.

- Create connections and promote collaboration between civil society organizations to build networks that prevent the suspension of activities due to reduced civic spaces, persecution, and revocation of their legal status.

- Work on informal migratory flows, considering the story behind official numbers.

- Demand comprehensive and transparent accountability processes from host states of migrants and refugees to ensure access to justice, truth, and redress for victims of human rights violations.

- Develop consensus from civil society in preparing documentation, systematizing efforts.

- Assist with identifying lawyers and criminal-law subject-matter experts and facilitate the inclusion of their expertise in the daily work of organizations to establish common legal frameworks and jurisprudence.

- Foster the identification of gender focal points and subject-matter experts to build gender-inclusive perspectives into the daily work of organizations.

- Ensure organizations working on the ground support and provide information to migrants on requirements for residency or refugee status applications.

- Promote comparative studies with common methods and metrics and disseminate results among political decision makers to demonstrate the effects of militarization, raise awareness, and avoid repeating past experiences.

- Sponsor observatories to analyze risk factors, possibly under the leadership of educational institutions, to leverage their know-how and infrastructure. Additionally, support inter-university projects to allow for epistemological/conceptual discussions.

To strengthen communication strategies:

- Include members of the media, whether traditional or not, when talking about civil society stakeholders, as they can contribute to and broaden the discussion and enrich the approaches to dialogue. Challenge the ways civil society actors communicate and members of academia educate (e.g., Red Convergencia’s innovative education strategies).

- Increase media presence by encouraging experts to contribute to newspaper columns, online media, and research, clarifying the effects of militarization and its impact on civil population.

- Work on the dissemination of information created by scientific research, ensuring the language is accessible and available in more-intuitive and media-friendly formats.

This Readout & Recommendations summarizes the primary findings of the workshop as interpreted by the organizers. It should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all of its recommendations, observations, and conclusions.
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Endnotes