Strategy Consultation on Mass Violence and Atrocity Prevention
Discussion Paper
September 2020
Informing policy and action that builds resilience to mass violence and atrocities by working across the globe with governments, civil society, and the private sector—for the last three years, this has been the focus of the Stanley Center for Peace and Security’s programming efforts to address global conflict and violence.

As part of the development of its programming strategies, the center has, in past years, held in-person consultations with a diverse group of trusted partners and key thought leaders to reflect on the policy gaps and opportunities in the field. The consultation is part of a larger process in which the center assesses its past programming and scopes future opportunities with the goal of increasing its impact with future programming. This year, because of COVID-19 travel restrictions on in-person meetings, the center is looking to engage with experts and stakeholders virtually for its strategy consultation.

This discussion paper serves as the starting point for the strategy consultation—a conversation on the mass violence and atrocity prevention field, specifically designed to focus on early or upstream prevention and building societal resilience. The paper’s content is divided into two parts:

1. **Background**, which includes a brief overview of the state of the field from the center’s vantage point, the evolution of the center’s work on mass violence and atrocity prevention, and the center’s working definitions.

2. **Nine headline assumptions** that we have extracted from our work, surveys, and various other mappings and analyses.

### I. BACKGROUND

#### State of the Field

Although interstate conflict has diminished, violent conflict is at a 30-year high, with the increasing proliferation of nonstate armed actors, rebel groups, and criminal gangs, as well as state-sponsored violence against civilians. Proxy wars between regional and global powers have drawn new battlegrounds in third-party countries, resulting in unimaginable suffering of the most innocent and vulnerable. The retreat by governments and nonstate groups from adhering to international humanitarian law, combined with a breakdown in respect for human rights law, has resulted in the alarming proliferation of atrocity crimes. Conflict, persecution, and mass violence have led to a staggering 79.5 million people forcibly displaced in every region of the world. And there are signs that the long-term effects of COVID-19 will result in growing economic inequality, increased movement of peoples, rising hate speech, and more violence against women and girls—all of which are risk factors and accelerators of mass violence and atrocities.

Additionally, there has been a backtracking of support for and a growing distrust of multilateralism (both the endeavor and the institutions) over the past decade. The paralysis of the UN Security Council to act in a meaningful way to respond to ongoing atrocities in so many parts of the world has only increased frustrations toward international institutions. This is coupled with the parallel rise in nationalist and populist movements that are bolstered by demagogic leaders that use incendiary, xenophobic language against the most vulnerable groups. Many of these governments are cracking down on civic space, enforcing restrictions on civil society, peaceful protest movements, and press freedom.

This paints a bleak picture, not just for the prospects of greater peace and resilience but also for multilateral cooperation and global governance. It is difficult to understate the enormity of these challenges. However, there is reason to be optimistic, and there are opportunities for progress. Calls for greater inclusion and equity from the movements for racial justice, aid decolonization, and gender equality (#Metoo, #Aidtoo) are pushing for the dismantlement of social and economic structures that have long benefited those with power and privilege. These challenging and uncomfortable realities also feature within the broader peace and security field—whether civil society, academia, the funding community, or international institutions—and are forcing internal discussions on the role each actor plays in furthering and entrenching unequal power dynamics.

At the same time, political leaders and global institutions have recognized the need to move away from crisis prevention and reactive response and toward prioritizing upstream prevention and earlier action. Apart from the moral, human case for prevention, the economic costs of conflict and violence are staggering. As 2018 figures from the Institute for Economics and Peace show, violent conflict costs the global economy $14.7 billion a year. Conflict and instability stunts economic development: business and enterprise cannot flourish, investments in conflict countries and their neighbors are fewer, and governments can make little progress toward building their economy and institutions. The 2018 flagship joint UN-World Bank Pathways for Peace study concludes that instead of late-stage response to crises, investing in prevention would save between “$5 billion and $70 billion per year.” The calls are getting louder: invest, collaborate, and act earlier to prevent mass violence and save lives.

#### The Center’s Mass Violence and Atrocities Programming

For many years, the center has focused its programmatic work to address global conflict and violence on areas where it is best placed to further policy progress and collective action. Through a series of consultations and lessons-learned processes, the center made the strategic decision three years ago to refine and adjust its work in the following ways:

- **Broadening its scope to include the prevention of mass violence**, rather than just the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities (widespread and systematic war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing).
Incorporating a resilience framing, which recognizes that all societies have the ability to withstand triggers for mass violence and atrocities through their policies, mechanisms, and institutions.

Pushing for greater coordination and cooperation among actors, across fields, and between governance levels, with recognition that no one group of stakeholders can (nor should) define and determine policy development or action.

Drawing on the experience and effectiveness of efforts at the regional, national, and local levels to inform joint strategies for the prevention of mass violence and atrocities while also recognizing the specific context in any given situation.

In addition, the center continues to retain the following aspects in its programming strategy:

While violence prevention is important in every stage of the conflict cycle, when considering the full continuum of mass violence and atrocity prevention strategies—including preventing them from ever occurring (upstream prevention), preventing further acceleration in the midst of violence (midstream or proximate prevention), and preventing future mass violence following its occurrence (downstream prevention)—the center chooses to focus on upstream prevention efforts.

The center focuses on building the capacities of regional mechanisms and institutions (both formal and informal, as well as government or civil-society-led), and cross-national networks rather than on national implementation or exclusively United Nations-related processes or efforts.

The center has worked to advance three medium-term policy goals since mid-2017:

Goal 1: Prevention-focused regional networks support effective policy action at the national, regional, and international levels to build resilience.

This work has included cofacilitating the government-led Latin America Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocities Prevention with the Auschwitz Institute for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, the Latin America and Caribbean Civil Society Forum for the Prevention of Mass Violence and Atrocities with Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales (CRIES), and collaborative efforts to bridge the two groups.

Goal 2: Different policy sectors work effectively together to develop and promote a resilience agenda.

Some examples of this work include the “Peace in Our Cities” initiative, which engages cities and their leaders on reducing urban violence and bridging violence and atrocity prevention techniques; partnering with Peace Direct on a series of events that brought together practitioners in the fields of mass atrocity prevention and peacebuilding; efforts on the role of the private sector and atrocity prevention, including understanding the business case for building resilience and pursuing peace with the Institute for Economics and Peace, as well as the comparative regional view of the private sector and prevention agenda with the Auschwitz Institute and the Social Science Research Council; and, with Protection Approaches, identifying gaps and opportunities for coordinated and systematized integration of prevention, drawing on the knowledge and capacity of local, national, and international stakeholders.

Goal 3: Evidence of “what works” in building societal resilience at the regional, national, and local levels is fed into policy processes.

Following on the center’s October 2017 Strategy for Peace Conference, where experts considered the state of research on prevention, the center cofounded Impact:Peace, an initiative based at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice at the University of San Diego. The center has also worked to bolster research and recommendations on how prevention can be applied within local contexts, including through the policy briefs that shape and inform the Latin American civil society forum with CRIES.

To further advance the three medium-term policy goals, the center’s journalism and media programming team organized events, discussions, and workshops focused on the role of media in strengthening societal resilience and preventing mass violence and atrocities. Work from 2017–2020 included a journalist-led discussion at the 2017 Positive Peace Conference on the role of free and independent media in peaceful societies; the War Stories Peace Stories Symposium attended by more than 300 journalists and peacebuilders exploring peace, conflict, and the media; peace and conflict journalism workshops as part of the Pulitzer Center’s Beyond War Conference; and inviting journalists to participate in the center’s policy discussions.

Working Definitions

In 2017, the center set out the following working definitions for use in programming efforts under the three medium-term policy goals.

Mass violence

Large-scale and systematic violence used against civilians by those with power for their own strategic objectives.

Atrocities

Three legally defined international crimes: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The definition of atrocity crimes is generally understood to include ethnic cleansing, even though this class of crimes does not have legal standing under international law.
Upstream prevention or building societal resilience for mass violence and atrocities

The measures, systems, and actions that a society, its neighbors, and the global community can take to lower the risks for mass violence and atrocities. It is an incremental and generational endeavor.

In a 2016 policy analysis brief published by the center, Professor Alex Bellamy outlines five dimensions for structural or upstream prevention: supporting the resilience of states and societies in the constructive management of diversity; legitimate and capable authority; security of livelihoods; vibrant civil society and active private sectors; and guarantees of nonrecurrence. Please see the Annex for risks related to each of the five dimensions and correlating resiliencies.

The United Nations' Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention identifies relevant risk factors for atrocity crimes and the measures necessary to build national resilience, noting “prevention is an ongoing process that requires sustained efforts to build the resilience of societies to atrocity crimes by ensuring” that they:
- Respect the rule of law and protect human rights, without discrimination.
- Establish legitimate and accountable national institutions.
- Eliminate corruption.
- Manage diversity constructively.
- Support a strong and diverse civil society and a pluralistic media.

II. ASSUMPTIONS

Over the past three years, nearly a dozen mappings, participatory consultations, and strategic analyses have looked at civil society partnerships and capacities and identified gaps in action, partnership, and funding. These include several developed or coorganized by the center itself.

In October 2018, the center partnered with Protection Approaches and Wilton Park, of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, for a workshop on “Preventing Mass Violence and Atrocities.” In November 2019, the center partnered with the Auschwitz Institute and the George and Irina Schaeffer Center for the Study of Genocide to bring together international, regional, and local leaders from academia and civil society with government leaders in prevention to discuss integrative mass violence prevention initiatives and the associated challenges, gaps, and opportunities for further progress. Also in 2019, the center surveyed 300 practitioners and experts to assess real-world progress toward its medium-term policy goals and get feedback on the opportunities for future action.

In terms of other processes, FAS Research's report Mapping Change Agents and Influencers in the Field of Peacebuilding (December 2019) assessed the global peacebuilding sector, with recommendations for the broader field, including for funders on steps they could take over the next twelve months. Earlier this year, the Alliance for Peacebuilding launched its Eirene Peacebuilding Database, which provides a comprehensive list of what organizations are doing to seek specific peacebuilding outcomes and measure progress. Recent initiatives such as Conducive Space for Peace and Impact:Peace are attempting to address long-time systemic gaps in the field, including the need to strengthen local approaches and solutions to, and funding for, peacebuilding and the need to leverage and build an evidence base for prevention to influence change processes.

Global and regional networks such as Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes (GAAMAC), the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), and the newly launched +Peace coalition have convened their partners to map the field, share lessons learned, and explore collective action. Finally, individual nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Life and Peace Institute have looked across the field to assess outstanding gaps and challenges, including the structural inequalities within the localization agenda and the connections between the global policy space and local peacebuilders.

From all of these efforts, we've identified within the findings and recommendations some common themes—or assumptions—for the purposes of our consultation. The following analysis is not intended to be exhaustive; the goal is to identify outstanding gaps and opportunities for policy progress and action, and serve as a starting point for discussion during the consultation.

ASSUMPTION 1: Recognize That Labels Are Not as Important as the Work Itself.

The strategies, activities, and initiatives undertaken to prevent mass violence and atrocities are similar to those in other fields—including preventing violent conflict, peacebuilding, and human rights—as well as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Across these policy sectors, actors use a range of tactics to build societies where governance structures uphold global norms; include diverse voices, identities, and interests; support civil society and an open media; and promote respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Although labels may affect how and what public and private donors decide to fund or how governments orient their bureaucracies, for populations living in fragile and conflict-affected societies, they matter little as long as the actual work gets done. As Peace Direct's 2018 report Atrocity Prevention and Peacebuilding notes, “local peacebuilders have worked to prevent genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing long before these terminologies existed.”

The evolving mosaic of views on the best way to build strong, inclusive societies has enriched and strengthened policy and advocacy, expanded understanding of how mass violence and atrocities prevention are linked to other global agendas, and increased opportunities for diversifying policy solutions. There is a growing recognition of and adaptation by international actors to the full cycle of violence, and how interconnected development, human rights, and peace and security (and now climate impacts) are when seeking a comprehensive response to addressing violent conflict.

Effective responses also require a whole-of-society approach, which means engaging a range of stakeholders, including global and regional intergovernmental institutions; the private sector; executive-level government officials; parliamentarians; civil society organizations, community groups, and networks at all levels; media and journalists; grassroots organizations; social movements; and funders. We need to engage and include youth, women, LGBTQ individuals, and other marginalized or minority groups, who are key stakeholders and agents of change. Finally, we know the importance of supporting grassroots action and connecting the prevention and peacebuilding communities to other movements that are tackling structural power dynamics, such as women’s rights, climate disruption, social justice, and antiracism.

Each of these actors has a role to play, whether working with communities in conflict-affected countries to bridge division, mediate conflict, and maintain social cohesion; sharing information and building rapport; influencing, crafting, and implementing policy; lobbying or advocating at every level; holding decision makers accountable through coercive pressure, like boycotts and strikes; or developing research and expert academic analysis to inform action.

Finally, effective collaborative communication strategies for policy outcomes require sustained global, national, and subnational political attention; a public-facing central metanarrative; a media strategy that includes local voices; evidence gathering (data, research/analysis, and storytelling) that informs policy; and stronger, wider-ranging financial support.

ASSUMPTION 3: Recognize and Embrace Local Approaches, Ownership, and Leadership.

There is growing recognition that local communities and their leaders must participate in and lead program design, decision making, and policy development and implementation. Top-down interventions have repeatedly failed to acknowledge or incorporate local realities; when there is no input or buy-in from those most affected, the chance of a particular initiative’s success diminishes exponentially.

Local communities better predict and more quickly respond to mass violence and atrocity risks because they possess context-specific knowledge and are well connected to community-protection networks. Policy solutions need to be relevant and responsive to local realities. These solutions are more effective when local leaders are engaged, survivors and victims of violence are included, and participation is expanded beyond the local elite.

Another factor is recognizing that international NGOs, funders, and other actors can further entrench long-held power inequalities and hinder local solutions. As reflected in the Life and Peace Institute’s July 2020 report Global Peacebuilding Policy: Analyzing Local to Global Engagement, advocates should consider how they can better challenge and change existing power dynamics by ensuring meaningful and equitable local participation; preventing overreliance on global frameworks and metrics that fail to integrate local realities; reducing language that upholds colonial legacies or exclusionary jargon; legitimizing lived experience as evidence and promoting locally generated evidence; and encouraging flexible funding mechanisms that support local leadership and engagement.

ASSUMPTION 4: Prioritize Prevention and Build Political Will for Early Action.

In recent years, global institutions and national political leaders—particularly in North America and Western Europe—have recognized the shortcomings of reactive crisis response and the need to incorporate effective upstream prevention of conflict and mass violence, as well as early action.

The United Nations has made numerous commitments to conflict prevention over the years, though its performance has been spotty at best. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1991 Agenda for Peace sought to elevate the UN prevention and peacebuilding tools, emphasizing the importance of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. Though welcome, these tools were often employed after a crisis had already broken out. The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission after the 2005 World Summit sought to prevent the recurrence of conflict with the aim of achieving sustainable peace. World leaders also agreed at the 2005 World Summit to recognize the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a commitment to prevent and respond to the worst crimes—genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. While R2P is often misconceptualized as justifying late-stage, primarily militarized, international responses, pillars 1, 2, and 3 outline peaceful opportunities for states to fulfill their responsibility to prevent these crimes through upstream prevention, early warning, and early response.

In 2015, high-level UN reviews of peacekeeping reform, peacebuilding architecture, and women, peace, and security reprioritized upstream prevention. Inspired by the 2030 agenda and the SDGs, UN member states supported the call for greater collaboration among the three pillars of development, humanitarianism, and peace. In 2016, the UN General
Assembly and the Security Council adopted twin resolutions on “Sustaining Peace,” which were described as “a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account, which encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development.” Current Secretary-General Antonio Guterres later called for a comprehensive reform of the UN peace and security architecture and development system so as to fully harness the capabilities and resources of the UN system for prevention and peace.

For over a decade, civil society networks such as the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict have called for a global shift from reacting to violent conflict to preventing it. Their members have influenced regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States, the Organization of American States, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to build early prevention tools and measures. EPLO, a platform of NGOs, networks, and think tanks, has worked to push the European Union to strengthen its policies, capacities, and funding for prevention, peacebuilding, and sustainable development. Individual organizations, such as the Auschwitz Institute and its national partners, have worked with regional entities and governments in the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to prioritize the identification of risks, root causes, and other factors that can lead to mass violence.

**ASSUMPTION 5: Develop Rigorous Evidence to Inform Decision- and Policymaking.**

Although it is widely accepted that preventing violence and building resilient societies must be rooted in robust evidence gathering, real challenges and gaps in collection and analysis remain.

A wide range of research demonstrates that when governments allocate greater resources to their military and security sectors, it leads to greater violence toward and repression of nonviolent action. The nature of available, immediate policy responses to signals of violence reinforces a focus on short-term, reactionary action that neglects more-structural issues included in positive peace. Moreover, negative peace indicators (e.g., absence of violence, reduced oppression) often take precedence in policymaking because of available and measurable data. And while many peacebuilding and prevention efforts may develop out of a rich analysis of data as these projects continue, data is not always further analyzed through project implementation and evaluation steps.

In response to these realities, several organizations and academic institutions have sought to develop evidence-generating and collating platforms to show what does and does not work in prevention and peacebuilding. Alliance for Peacebuilding’s Eirene Peacebuilding Database compiles more than 3,000 key peacebuilding indicators from thousands of publicly available peacebuilding resources to better assess the work of peacebuilding groups to measure impact. Design, Monitoring & Evaluation for Peace convenes a “global community of practitioners, evaluators, and academics that share best and emerging practices on how to design, monitor and evaluate peacebuilding programs,” thereby increasing peacebuilding effectiveness and improving collaboration and transparency.

The need to improve evidence gathering has also been the focus of convenings of stakeholders. When the center partnered with the Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice to help launch Impact:Peace, the expert working group identified three types of evidence to drive change: (1) evidence about approaches, including specific interventions, comparing interventions, and articulating a specific strategy, (2) evidence to fight apathy, showing an outcome is possible and highlighting potential benefits/consequences, and (3) evidence to create engagement, which evokes empathy and removes barriers for engagement.

Integrative research studies and analyses also have sought to connect major indicators to evidence for transformation in prevention and peacebuilding policy. In 2018, a UN-World Bank report, *Pathways for Peace*, compiled an analysis of different countries’ and institutions’ approaches to examine what works in contributing to peace. Since 2017, *Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies* has maintained a regularly updated *Roadmap for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies* in order to promote the accelerated implementation of the SDG targets for peace, justice, and inclusion (SDG16+). The *SDG16+ Progress Report from the Institute for Economics and Peace* regularly updates and analyzes evidence on indicators for progress in achieving SDG16. And, most recently, One Earth Future and the Alliance for Peacebuilding have undertaken an extensive look at understanding perceptions of what “evidence-based practice” is in peacebuilding, including what evidence is defined as and the level of rigorous evidence that exists for nuanced elements of peacebuilding.

Donors both influence—through the projects they fund—and consume—through monitoring and evaluation of those projects—evidence-based approaches. As a result, there is frequently an emphasis on the value of collecting/collating evidence to guide and inform donor funding. The Better Evidence Project, launched in early 2020 at George Mason University, has sought to “improve the evidence available to donors, policy makers, practitioners, and scholars in the peacebuilding community,” recognizing clear audience identification as an important first step.

Finally, policymakers are also key consumers of evidence. Success stories, including case studies of effective prevention, can compel policymakers to support upstream prevention. Interpeace’s “resilience for peace” research is one example of this: three case studies (Liberia, Guatemala, and Timor Leste) show what building societal resilience in the context of peacebuilding and conflict actually means.

No society is immune to the risk and occurrence of mass violence and atrocities; every country should treat prevention as a top priority at home as well as abroad. As noted in a 2019 Protection Approaches report, “The world faces a prevention crisis. ... The rise in deliberate, systematic, and widespread violence against civilians, the globalization of hate-based networks, and the growing polarization in democratic politics have upended the belief that the prevention of identity-based violence is only required in some parts of the world but not others.”

Some governments are now reflecting and acting on the potential risks of atrocities domestically, as well as within their region and subregion. The Global Network of R2P Focal Points, a coalition of more than 60 government officials, has recognized the importance of domestic prevention policy. Similarly, the Latin America Network for Genocide and Atrocity Prevention, which brings together governmental focal points from Central and South America, has identified national and regional opportunities to strengthen atrocity prevention. Some countries have also developed national mechanisms focused on preventing genocide and mass atrocities.¹

The Black Lives Matter and decolonizing aid movements have prompted advocates to more closely examine dysfunctional systems and institutions that perpetuate extreme economic inequality, injustice, human rights violations, and mass violence. The global spread and growth of identity-based violence also has prompted a recognition that what all too often was seen as a problem “over there” is in fact one “here” as well.

There is also a growing recognition of the interconnectedness of war and other forms of violence—as well as the fact that violence does not respect borders. This is apparent most vividly as a consequence of violence and atrocities that have driven millions from their homes in Syria, Yemen, Myanmar, Venezuela, and throughout Central America. Too often, we find governments that are unprepared, ill-equipped, or disinterested in protecting vulnerable populations seeking protection and support.

Simultaneously, climate impacts, resource scarcity, inequality, urbanization, technology, and global pandemics are exposing existing vulnerabilities and changing the risks for violence in ways that are not yet fully understood. These pressures are also not responsive to national borders, further proving the need to see the prevention of mass violence as a global issue, and a priority at the national level for every country.


While there is no international legal definition for hate speech, it is commonly understood as language that targets individuals or groups because of their ethnicity, religion, race, gender, nationality, economic status, sexual orientation, or other identity factors.² Hate speech is designed to demonize and dehumanize targeted groups as outsiders or “others,” inflaming latent tensions and inciting violence. As noted in the UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, it can contribute to creating an “environment conducive to the perpetration of mass atrocities.”³

Violence incited by hate speech can happen within a country’s borders, such as in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, or Myanmar, or across boundaries. State and nonstate actors can perpetrate hate speech, transmitting it via every available communication platform, including traditional print and broadcast (television and radio) media; advertisements; political rallies; and social media and video sharing. Extremist groups and online trolls increasingly are using sites such as Reddit, Facebook, and Twitter to exploit existing differences, build distrust, stoke fear, and incite violence. Hate speech can spread in democratic societies, putting them at risk of mass violence. A growing number of world leaders are using nationalist, xenophobic, and identity-focused language to fuel discontent and divide societies. These tensions increase with growing economic, health, and social insecurity and inequality.

With ever-growing hostility toward and restrictions on the media, some elected officials are regularly branding media reports as dishonest or fake, reinforcing an “us verus them” mentality. They are also using allied media to amplify that mentality.

In 2019, Secretary-General Guterres tasked the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect with developing a new global strategy to combat hate speech. The UN Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech provides guidance for national governments and international leadership, as well as for UN field presences—crucial actors who have a role in addressing the “root causes and drivers of hate speech, as well as its impact on victims and societies more broadly.”

The private sector also has an important role to play. Social media companies, while initially slow to acknowledge the role of their platforms in spreading hate online, have begun to engage with governments and civil society to design and implement responses to hate speech online, including engaging with fact-checking initiatives and sponsoring research on how to search for and remove terms in real time.

Civil society organizations such as Over Zero are conducting innovative research and training local organizations, digital citizens, and educators about online hate speech. PeaceTech Lab, a project begun under the US Institute for Peace, has produced hate speech lexicons, which identify the contextual information that makes speech inflammatory and offer alternative words and phrases to stop the spread of online hate speech in over ten countries. The Dangerous Speech Project conducts and sponsors research about speech that catalyzes intergroup violence—“dangerous speech”—and helps develop “counter speech” narratives and programming to combat hate speech online.

Finally, there is a continued need for the media to call out and counter this type of speech. Media companies, networks, and journalism-support organizations are employing a variety of strategies...
to combat and effectively report hate speech. Examples include training initiatives for journalists, such as the Ethical Journalism Network’s Turning the Page of Hate campaign, which offers newsrooms a five-point test for journalists to identify and ethically cover hate speech. Other examples include campaigns such as the European Federation of Journalists’ #MediaAgainstHate effort and the United Nations Association of Civilization’s #SpreadNoHate initiative, which bring together coalitions of media and civil society organizations to counter hate speech and discrimination in the media, both on and offline, while maintaining respect for freedom of expression and the free flow of information.

ASSUMPTION 8: There is a Growing Loss of Respect for and Trust in Multilateral Approaches.

We know there is an increasing global deterioration of respect for and trust in international cooperative approaches to prevent and halt mass violence and atrocities, in large part because global and regional institutions, mechanisms, and processes have repeatedly fallen short during recent crises. The UN Security Council, the principal intergovernmental body for maintaining peace and security, has consistently failed to act when countries face mass violence and atrocities, in large part because it is paralyzed by geopolitics, proxy conflicts, and underlying disputes.

We also know that nationalism and populism are on the rise globally and that respect for and adherence to democratic values is declining. A growing number of governments are calling for a “my country first” foreign policy, unwilling to yield sovereignty to multilateral institutions, regional groupings of states, or international treaty mechanisms and other cooperative arrangements. The lack of cooperation at the global level has produced a profound gap in accountability and justice.

There are growing calls for leadership to come from every level of governance (global to local) and every part of society (individual to government). As Rachel Kleinfeld and Robert Muggah argue, to fight state violence and crime, “the role of international actors must always be focused on empowering active citizens (and citizenship), while incentivizing states to listen to their own people.” Unfortunately, as participants at a November 2019 Stanley Center convening concluded, there is a distinct lack of political will to create links and alliances: national governments need to be persuaded to take more-active roles and cooperate more with civil society actors to work across sectors, networks, agendas, and locations. In addition, the formal systems of the United Nations and other multilateral institutions continue to be inaccessible to and unrepresentative of the needs of communities in conflict-affected countries.

In response, alternative global and regional multilateral frameworks to promote and secure greater cooperation on violence reduction have been established. Examples include global, regional, national, and city-based governmental and nongovernmental networks for mass violence and genocide prevention, all of which have sought to diversify and expand those stakeholders who are working on prevention and the policies they seek to implement. This approach resonates with conclusions by Conducive Space for Peace, which found that even with widespread agreement on what a future peacebuilding system should look like, there remains a wide range of opinions on how change should happen: should it come from within existing international institutions, outside of these systems, or through hybrid spaces for collaboration between actors at the country level and/or global level?

Finally, there are several initiatives—with a growing number of civil society and government champions—to reform the United Nations’ capacity to prevent and respond to mass violence and atrocities. Whether older ideas about restraint of the Security Council veto in situations of mass atrocities, or more recent ones under the UN@75 umbrella (such as establishing a Peacebuilding Council or a UN–Civil Society focal point), there is growing momentum for transforming the UN system.

ASSUMPTION 9: Funders Need to Do More to Foster Collaboration, Not Competition.

We know that the effective funding of prevention is directly or indirectly tied to the other assumptions identified above. There is growing demand for the donor community, governments, foundations, and high-net-worth individuals to recognize their role as a driver of unhelpful trends and as a key stakeholder in reversing them. Some of these trends include:

- Siloed sectors, stakeholder groups, conversations, and policy solutions.
- A lack of trust in local actors’ capacity to identify priorities, take action, and manage financial resources (see, for example, the Peace Direct report Atrocity Prevention and Peacebuilding).
- Overly cumbersome reporting requirements or demand for evidence of success.
- Resource competition that undermines collaboration and pushes grantees to bend their missions to “feed into a cycle of ‘trends’ and ‘hot topics’ in international financing” (see the Pathfinders report A Review of the Evidence and a Global Strategy for Violence Prevention).
- The politicization of funding.
- A lack of coordination among donors.

There is also growing recognition of how to improve funding, including:

- By providing direct, flexible funding—rapid response and sustainable—of local efforts (see the Peace Direct report Radical Flexibility: Strategic Funding for the Age of Local Activism).
- By considering how to better encourage collaboration and shared learning across sectors and among stakeholders.
- Through better coordination among funders as a stakeholder group to create context-specific funding responses.
Certainly many, if not all, of the above measures to build societal resilience are included under Sustainable Development Goals, namely Goal 16 on “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions”, which were agreed to in 2015 by all UN member states as part of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and now have constituencies of civil society, national policymakers, and international leaders working to translate the goals into action:

- Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development.
- Provide access to justice for all.
- Build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

See also Interpeace’s 2016 Assessing Resilience for Peace: A Guidance Note for a comprehensive overview of the distinctions between the resilience for conflict and “Resilience for Peace” framing, as well as guidance for conducting context-specific analysis that identifies key conflict risks and stressors: social cohesion; legacy of the past; economic resources; information and communication; safety and justice; and leadership, governance, and politics.

Such as peacebuilding and sustaining peace; women, peace, and security; human rights and good governance; youth peace and security; climate and conflict; small arms and light weapons; rule of law; and the SDGs.

The United States, for instance, developed the Atrocity Prevention Board (APB) in 2011 to establish an interagency process focused on identifying countries with high risk for atrocities and orienting US government policy around preventing their onset. The APB recognizes atrocity prevention as a core national security issue, however its focus remains entirely outward looking.

Various states define such speech in statute.

Through Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) signatories agree that “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”

As noted above, the center has directed its programmatic work on mass violence and atrocities in areas where it is best placed to contribute to policy progress: regional mechanisms and institutions (both formal and informal, as well as government or civil-society led), and cross-national networks, rather than exclusively United Nations-related processes or efforts.
### Annex

#### Constructive Management of Diversity

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<tr>
<td>Horizontal inequalities</td>
<td>Consensual modes of governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislative (including constitutional) protections for human and group rights</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent judiciaries</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong and independent national human rights institutions/ombudsman's office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacities for peaceful resolution and management of conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vibrant and free civil society</td>
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</table>

#### Legitimate and Capable Authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Resilience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unaccountable government</td>
<td>Legal equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak rule of law</td>
<td>Independent judiciaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impunity for the perpetrators of past/present atrocity crimes (government and nongovernment)</td>
<td>Legislative protection of human rights and their enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak protections for human rights</td>
<td>Institutional accountability to law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccountable security sector</td>
<td>Separation of powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical capacity to commit atrocity crimes</td>
<td>Accountable, transparent, and inclusive government decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government income through taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional security forces</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian control and management of the security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal access to justice</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monopoly of means of organized violence in the hands of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective and equitable service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence of/limited corruption</td>
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#### Security of Livelihoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Resilience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low/average wealth</td>
<td>Economic growth and wealth accumulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal inequalities</td>
<td>Antidiscrimination laws and their enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites that stand to benefit economically from atrocity crimes</td>
<td>Balanced regional investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equality in public sector employment and contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure asset bases at the community level</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimate, transparent, and well-managed land laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vibrant and politically engaged private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public–private partnerships</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimate and accountable management of natural resources</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Limited corruption</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Vibrant Civil Society and Active Private Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Resilience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Conditions of armed conflict/recent history of atrocities and</td>
<td>- Civil society organizations that hold the justice system and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>armed conflict</td>
<td>forces to account through monitoring and advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Practices of discrimination against a defined group/patterns of</td>
<td>- Nonstate groups/private sector actors that challenge discrimination in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>human rights abuse</td>
<td>policies and actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Exclusionary ideologies</td>
<td>- Promotion of inclusive ideologies and practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Unaccountable government</td>
<td>- Civil society and free press that report crimes and abuses to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Weak rule of law</td>
<td>international community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Unaccountable security sector</td>
<td>- Organizations that help survivors cope with trauma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Restricted civil society</td>
<td>- Capacity for early warning of atrocity crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Average/low wealth</td>
<td>- Nonstate capacities for the resolution, mediation, and management of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Horizontal economic inequalities</td>
<td>conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Elites that stand to benefit economically from atrocity crimes</td>
<td>- Nonstate assistance/pro bono legal aid to ensure improved access to justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Physical capacity to commit atrocity crimes</td>
<td>- Advocacy for preventive action</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Advocacy of R2P and related norms</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Capacity to provide education for peace and conflict resolution</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Capacity to understand and learn the lessons of history</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Equitable investment practices that reduce horizontal inequalities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Fostering of innovation that leads to economic growth/wealth creation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Logistical support for atrocity prevention</td>
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Guarantees of Nonrecurrence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Resilience</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Conditions of armed conflict/recent history of atrocities and</td>
<td>- Legal accountability for past perpetrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>armed conflict</td>
<td>- Truth and recognition of past crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Physical security and stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Recognition and implementation of human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Legal disincentives for perpetration of atrocity crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Judicial competence and independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Constitutional guarantees of nondiscrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Regulation of security sector</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Vibrant civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Legal empowerment of marginalized groups, including women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Education for peace, tolerance, critical thinking, and conflict</td>
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<td></td>
<td>resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Truthful and sensitive teaching of history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Memorialization of past crimes through culture to build understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and empathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Psychological support for victims and survivors</td>
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About Us

The Stanley Center for Peace and Security partners with people, organizations, and the greater global community to drive policy progress in three issue areas—mitigating climate change, avoiding the use of nuclear weapons, and preventing mass violence and atrocities. The center was created in 1956 and maintains its independence while developing forums for diverse perspectives and ideas. To learn more about our recent publications and upcoming events, please visit stanleycenter.org.

Cover photo by freestocks/Unsplash
In October 2020, the Stanley Center for Peace and Security held a Strategy Consultation on Mass Violence and Atrocity Prevention, with an emphasis on early or upstream prevention and building societal resilience. Utilizing a range of convening techniques, the center engaged with more than 60 participants from across the world to brainstorm ideas, strategies, and synergies to effectively drive policy progress and collective action over the next two to three years.

As a part of a larger process, the center regularly holds strategy consultations to inform the strategic direction of its programming efforts. While bringing direct benefit to the center, the consultations are also intended to stimulate new ideas that participants and others not directly involved could benefit from and apply to their work. This report summarizes the main discussion points from this most recent strategy consultation, including challenges, gaps, and opportunities.

The following were the goals of the Strategy Consultation on Mass Violence and Atrocity Prevention:

- **Map and analyze**: Look at the current landscape of the mass violence and atrocity prevention and related fields, highlighting key takeaways from recent analyses and mappings.
- **Recognize gaps**: Identify what has been overlooked, given less attention, or underutilized in early/upstream prevention. Consider where there have been missed opportunities for better policy approaches, for greater or new stakeholder engagement and/or collaboration, and to scale or build upon research or best practices.
- **Consider solutions**: Brainstorm ideas, strategies, and synergies to effectively drive policy solutions and collective action in the next two to three years.
- **Build connections**: Provide a space for a global group of participants to connect, ideate, and benefit from each other’s thought leadership.

**Strategy Consultation Methodology**

The center’s intent in the strategy consultation was to listen and learn in order to consider its own part in the broader effort to address mass violence and atrocities. Normally, the center would hold an in-person gathering to achieve the strategy consultation goals, but due to the global COVID-19 pandemic, it instead designed a three-part virtual engagement. Deep consideration was given to who was consulted, around what questions discussion would focus, and how participants could be engaged virtually.
recognizing the opportunities and limitations of doing so. Sapna Chhatpar Considine, Director at Strategy for Humanity, worked with the center to develop and implement the strategy consultation methodology.

Participants

The center sought to engage with a diverse group of varied stakeholders with expertise in mass violence, identity-based violence, atrocity crimes/mass atrocities, violent conflict/armed conflict, human rights violations, political violence, interpersonal violence, and psychosocial support. To achieve this, nearly 100 people from around the world were invited to participate from local and international nongovernmental organizations, academia, philanthropy, journalism/media, governments, and regional or multilateral organizations. The more than 60 people who participated in the strategy consultation were from 23 countries (see map below). A full list of participants is included on page 8.

Discussion Paper

To guide the conversations in the strategy consultation, the center prepared a discussion paper highlighting nine common assumptions drawn from more than a dozen mappings and analyses by other organizations and networks in this field or related fields, as well as Stanley-led surveys and Stanley-organized events. Based on those assumptions, the center selected eight themes to focus the consultation discussions:

- **Labels**: Key differences and similarities on upstream prevention or building societal resilience to mass violence and atrocities and related sectors such as peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals/Sustainable Development Goal 16.

- **Collaboration across policy sectors and stakeholder groups**: Effective methods of meaningful cross-collaboration and information sharing for policy development.
- **Equitable and meaningful inclusion**: Improving on or reimagining how to ensure that those most impacted by mass violence can share their knowledge, evidence, and analysis, as well as influence policy, to ensure that policies (at every level) are informed, representative, and sustainable.

- **Upstream prevention and building resilience**: While prevention and building resilience apply in every context all the time, where and how to prioritize attention, programming, and resources.

- **Evidence to inform decision- and policymaking**: Improving the channels of communication, advocacy, and collaboration between those who are gathering and analyzing evidence and those who are in policy and decision-making spaces.

- **Loss of respect for and trust in multilateral approaches**: Other promising global collective action opportunities, including existing governance institutions, mechanisms, and processes (formal or informal, top-down or bottom-up) where greater collective action by a wider range of stakeholders is needed to boost impact.

- **Hate speech and the role of the media**: Strategies for ensuring rigorous, ethical, and inclusive journalism, including investigative journalism, to counter divisive mis/disinformation, call out or diffuse identity-based dangerous speech, and increase accountability in situations with risks for mass violence and atrocities.

- **Role of funders**: Successful examples of funder collaborations oriented around a particular policy goal, outcome, or moment and ensuring that funder coordination or funder encouragement of collaboration does not exacerbate unhelpful power dynamics.

## Strategy Consultation Design

The strategy consultation consisted of three parts: three live, online focus groups; a live, online plenary session; and an online platform for asynchronous, text-based thematic discussions. Each of these parts was intended to encourage a robust and dynamic conversation. Collectively, the parts were also meant to be as inclusive as possible across time zones, giving participants multiple opportunities to engage in the process.

[STRATEGY CONSULTATION TIMELINE]

- October 1 Focus Group
- October 6 Focus Group
- October 8 Focus Group
- October 15 Plenary
- Asynchronous Input
Focus Groups
To replicate the nature of highly interactive in-person meetings, the center organized three focus groups. During these focus groups, a limited number of the themes from the discussion paper were explored as preselected by participants through an online survey. Notably, the following three themes were ranked as top choices for focused discussion across all three focus groups:

- Upstream prevention and building societal resilience
- Evidence to inform decision- and policymaking
- Meaningful and equitable inclusion

In addition to these three themes, one focus group discussed the lack of trust in multilateral approaches and another discussed collaboration and communication across policy sectors and stakeholder groups. None of the themes were discussed in isolation from one another, and other themes came up during the focus group discussions, such as funding, hate speech and the role of the media, and labels.

To ensure a dynamic, participatory experience for participants, we used a platform called Mural to visually capture the dialogue in an organized way, with opportunity for participants to interact with the notes or add their own comments (see example below).

Plenary Session
The center also virtually convened a final plenary session that brought together participants from all three focus groups, as well as new participants who had not joined a focus group. The goal for this final session was to share what was discussed in the focus groups but then to step outside of what the center analyzed and prioritized as
themes for the consultation. Participants were asked to reflect on what was missing and where other opportunities may lie for policy progress and collective action in the coming two to three years. The plenary session included five small-group breakout sessions to facilitate interactive and candid dialogue.

**Asynchronous, text-based thematic discussions**

In addition to the focus groups and plenary session, we also designed a space for asynchronous written input on all eight themes using a platform called Basecamp. Participants from the three focus groups and the plenary session were invited to use the platform; it also enabled another opportunity for interactive feedback from participants who could choose their own availability to engage outside of the live, online sessions.

This multilayered approach to the strategy consultation provided multiple opportunities for participants to engage. It was meant to help reach a diverse swath of experts for their input and interactive feedback. In practice, there were challenges in accessibility, including internet connectivity problems and difficulty with online tools. Also, the time of day for the live, online sessions was not necessarily convenient for all time zones despite efforts to be as inclusive as possible.

**Consultation Takeaways: Challenges, Gaps, and Opportunities for the Field**

The consultation discussions revealed challenges, gaps, and opportunities for further attention and action. Though not exhaustive, the following section outlines major takeaways from all three parts of the strategy consultation—focus groups, the plenary session, and asynchronous written input.

**A. On Upstream Prevention and Building Societal Resilience**

There is often too much focus on stopping ongoing violence rather than preventing it. Policymakers tend only to pay attention when violence is imminent or has already begun, and there is pressure from funders and some within the media to focus solely on the phases where violence is more proximate. Peacebuilders need not be neutral actors; independence and nonpartisanship are important, but more can and should speak out as advocates when human rights abuses, atrocities, and injustice occur and when there are clear opportunities for preventive action.

Inclusive language can help with collaboration in prevention efforts, and it reflects the reality that labels do not matter to those experiencing violence. For example, the term “resilience” can mean many things depending on context. On the one hand, inclusive terminology like “resilience building” resonates with and draws in other communities of practice working in the same upstream time/space. Because “upstream prevention” and “atrocity risk” can mean little to those outside of the mass violence and atrocity prevention field, the ambiguity of “resilience building” provides useful connection to other sectors and actors by dejargoning, avoiding inflammatory or unattractive terminology, or using overly securitized language.

On the other hand, using the terminology “building resilience” can also imply that outsiders are imposing frameworks, rather than recognizing the agency of people living in those societies. Policymakers need to understand better what actions are already being taken at the national, local, and community levels to reduce the risk factors for mass violence and atrocities, and how they can support those actions, rather than assuming their own models and frameworks are somehow superior.

**B. On Evidence to Inform Action by Decision- and Policymakers**

As described in the discussion paper, many exciting new initiatives and programs seek to draw out, collate, and analyze evidence of what works in preventing mass violence and atrocities. Even so, more research is needed, whether on threat multipliers (such as migration, gender, climate change mitigation through renewable energy or land use, and pandemics like COVID-19) or on contributors to mass violence and atrocities (such as racism and colonialism, unethical and uncontrolled information via Big Tech platforms, and mental health and trauma). Evidence that incorporates intersectionality (e.g., women, youth, racial and ethnic) is missing. So too is a greater understanding of the motivations and factors of those who perpetrate mass violence and atrocities, the role of education in preventing mass violence and atrocities, and how trauma affects recidivism.

Participants felt that the problem is not always a lack of evidence but also relates to communicating the evidence to policymakers—and arguably also to the wider public, including youth, civil society, and nonacademics—to build the political will to act or prevent. Advocates should develop broader, more-inclusive narratives about the benefits of and need for prevention. More precisely, shared narratives could help address deficient political will. Such narratives must be rooted in evidence, which in turn lays the groundwork for policymakers and leaders to better interpret new evidence and make better policy decisions over time.

The continuous exchange of evidence between policymakers and civil society/academia is essential for informed policies. But that evidence and information need to be clear, concise, actionable, and readily available in a known location. Also, where evidence for upstream prevention already exists in indicators related to inclusive economic systems, human rights, gender equality and participation, and free and fair media, it may not be recognized as such.

Quantitative evidence tends to be valued more than qualitative evidence in policymaking, often further privileging those who generate quantitative evidence and excluding those who cannot produce that type of evidence. Perception data or story-based evidence from local peacebuilders, which comes from a deep knowledge of community needs, is equally important. Too often this type of evidence is ignored by policymakers, viewed as not
legitimate or not representative enough of the wider community or trends. More work is needed to build decision makers’ understanding of how to use story-based evidence, as well as to improve methodologies for capturing story-based evidence.

Evidence questions and priorities tend to be driven by actors in the West/North, who often ask for the evidence to be “provided” or “extracted” by local actors or atrocity victims for outsiders to analyze. Instead, there is a need to build long-term relationships and dialogue with local communities and experts and to include them in developing evidence agendas, informing evidence-related questions, analyzing data, and measuring impact. At the same time, there is also a need to recognize language and framing barriers: there is a demand for evidence written in English from contexts where English is not the primary language or from experts who do not speak or write in English. On top of this language barrier, there is often an expectation that inaccessible technical language be used in reporting, which unproductively undermines local expertise and limits access to evidence from certain contexts. In other words, by overfocusing on format and language, policy circles often miss the critical content and context necessary to make meaningful progress.

C. On Meaningful and Equitable Inclusion

While there has been a clear rhetorical and conceptual shift by international leaders to include more local and national peace-builders and actors in their work, participants indicated that governments and government networks do not often have the tools, capacity, or experience to bring in local voices. Moreover, funding constraints continue to drive what is and what is not possible for inclusion, whether due to translation or travel costs or a lack of recognition of the time needed to develop and maintain genuine relationships with local communities. It is also important to acknowledge that access to discussions does not equate to inclusion.

There are some clear better practices when it comes to ensuring meaningful and equitable inclusion. To overcome language challenges and barriers, there must be greater investment in translation and multilingual conversations, dejargoning, and eliminating what can be considered offensive language (such as the word “empowering”). It is also important to not instrumentalize or “tokenize” individuals; do not ask one person to represent a whole region or perspective or use local voices to advance a policy agenda that does not add value for local populations. The conversation around the interactions of international and local actors often becomes about geography (i.e., those in conflict-affected countries aim their advocacy toward world capitals or international forums). Instead, multilateral forums should be thought of not as the object but rather in how they serve as places, spaces, and formats for discussion. The response by many organizations to move to virtual convenings during the COVID-19 pandemic has solidified the idea that there are many more opportunities to include local expertise in policy conversations.

Survivors should not be taken advantage of. These individuals are willing to share and relive their experiences for greater learning but can be retraumatized in the process. All actors should ensure that programs are sensitive to trauma and other psychosocial impacts of conflict and violence. Building trust with survivors and ensuring participant safety is essential; these groups are often attacked by the state, called terrorists, sexually harassed, and put on state kill lists.

More should be done to recognize and include agents of change who have traditionally been ignored, not seen as important enough, or left outside of existing power structures. These include:

- **Youth**: Youth may lack trust in formal institutions, which can impact how they engage and wish to be included. More needs to be done to go to their tables rather than simply inviting them to the traditional ones.

- **Local journalists**: Journalism and media are struggling financially and are increasingly restricted by governments. Supporting and connecting with local journalists and ensuring local voices/media are picked up in international news outlets is crucial.

- **Disempowered voices**: When trying to dismantle power structures, those who do not need additional power are often granted it and those who need to be elevated are often disempowered.

- **Informal change agents and social movements**: It is important to include those that fall outside of more-established nongovernmental or civil society structures.

Finally, the movements to decolonize peacebuilding and decolonize aid provide inspiration to find better approaches to inclusion in the institutions, fields, and communities focused on this work. In addition to widening the range and sources of participation in internal convenings, those working to prevent violence should seek opportunities to participate and share perspectives in new venues that others organize. Moreover, spaces must be expanded for greater inclusion, and those with influence must consider what they need to give up for others to have a place. More consideration should be given to whether funding opportunities may be better suited for others, if traveling or speaking opportunities should be passed to those left outside of existing power structures, and how to make all feel comfortable by building trust and using inclusive language.

D. Collaboration and Partnerships across Policy Sectors and Stakeholder Groups

In addition to enhancing meaningful and equitable inclusion with the above groups, participants also expressed the need to continue and deepen collaboration among a broader set of actors who
are already working on building societal resilience and upstream prevention. These include:

- **Youth**, including through childhood education programs, educational institutions that train the next generation of leaders, and online youth networks that are countering hate speech.

- **Women**, from the women, peace, and security community and those tackling the role of masculinity and patriarchy in contributing to conflict.

- **Survivors and migrants/asylum seekers**, who are part of diasporas.

- **Social movements**, from those tackling systemic inequality, such as Black Lives Matter, to those combating climate change and gun violence.

- **Social media influencers, artists, and media makers**, whose impact may be more emotive and culturally relevant for vast populations.

- **Indigenous leaders and communities**, who have historical knowledge and tools for communicating, including through poetry and song, what preventing violence and peacebuilding mean to them.

- **The mediation community**, which is working at all levels to address the root causes of violence and bring fractured groups and societies together.

- **Legal and justice systems**, which establish the truth and uncover the facts, as well as courts, which have addressed hate speech.

The danger, however, is that in many fields, including violence prevention, communities of practice continue to duplicate rather than amplify or build on each other’s efforts. Competition among those who lead collaboration or who build networks is a growing and unhelpful trend that needs to be called out. More is needed to enable effective cross-sectoral collaboration, foster conversations, and create space for trust and relationship building.

**Looking Forward: Priorities for the Next Two to Three Years**

Though time-bound restrictions on what is needed and attainable were not considered in the strategy consultation discussions, especially given the long-term generational endeavor of building resilience and upstream prevention of violence, four stakeholder groups were seen as especially important to prioritize engagement with over the coming two to three years:

1. **Cities**: Seen as more agile and nimble service providers who have identities outside of and beyond the national, cities can connect to regional and multilateral forums in different ways than national governments. There is little competition between them and more of a sense of community grounded in a commonality, such as identity and end goals. The Peace in Our Cities initiative aims to halve urban violence by 2030, and there may be other opportunities to further prevention through cities and city groupings.

2. **The private sector and the corporate accountability community**: Though there is existing research on the economic value of investing in prevention rather than postconflict response and rebuilding, more is needed to highlight for companies the economic consequences of mass violence and atrocities. Demonstrating to corporate leaders how their bottom line may be affected could impact their interest and investments in operating in environments where there is government-perpetrated violence. Those who engage the private sector often focus on multinational enterprises, whose leaders have low levels of will in changing their behavior. Targeting small-to-medium-sized enterprises that have a greater interest in supporting community building and prevention could be a path to pursue for local communities. Also, connecting with the corporate accountability community, which has long engaged in advocacy around human rights abuses, should be considered, whether through engaging with corporate leaders and board members, global boycott campaigns, strategic litigation, or other avenues. There is also an opportunity to learn from the insurance industry and climate community on how they quantify risk and “sell” prevention.

3. **Local media and journalists**: Recognizing that populations often rely on local and community-based media (including informal media such as blogs and other social media platforms) for their news, there are opportunities to further support, train, and amplify the work of local journalists and local media outlets, especially at a time when they are under such financial stress. It is important to note that local media platforms often operate in local languages and are sometimes organized or “tribalized” around ethnic lines, and they can be where mis/disinformation and propaganda thrive. At the same time, local journalists (like other local actors) also face risks to their safety when reporting information and attempting to hold power to account, and therefore precautions should be undertaken. There are also opportunities to engage with journalism and media networks that can serve as bridges to local media.

4. **Big Tech, especially social media companies**: Offline conflict is often started or fueled online, and tech and social media platforms are used to spread hate and mobilize, repress, divide, and instigate violence. The digital rights community, committed to combating disinformation and hate/dangerous speech, has been working to identify which Big Tech companies have the resources, power, and interest to address human rights violations after their occurrence and assess mistakes in hindsight. While Big Tech generally progresses
quickly, more thinking is needed on the role these companies can play for prevention. Beyond their use in inciting violence, new technologies (facial recognition, surveillance, and other forms) are a frontier for exploitation and repression of human rights defenders. Technology itself is not inherently good or bad, and it holds the potential to be used for effective prevention as well.

Many participants in the strategy consultation highlighted distinct opportunities and risks related to the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 may be an extinction event for many organizations working in this area, as the financial crisis that has accompanied it has had an extended impact on civil society and nongovernmental organizations through reduction or elimination of funding. This will, without question, result in a loss of capacity globally to address these issues.

This Discussion Takeaways captures the major discussion points and recommendations from a Strategy Consultation on Mass Violence and Atrocity Prevention that will inform the Stanley Center’s work in the field.

Participant List

Organizers
Jessica Kline, Program Associate, Mass Violence and Atrocities, Stanley Center for Peace and Security
Kelsey Paul Shantz, Program Officer, Mass Violence and Atrocities, Stanley Center for Peace and Security
Jai-Ayla Quest, Program Specialist, Mass Violence and Atrocities, Stanley Center for Peace and Security
Kelly Smits, Program Assistant, Journalism and Media, Stanley Center for Peace and Security
Jennifer Smyser, Vice President and Director of Policy Programming Strategy, Stanley Center for Peace and Security
Devon Terrill, Program Officer, Journalism and Media, Stanley Center for Peace and Security

Facilitator
Sapna Chhatpar Considine, Director, Strategy for Humanity

Participants
Paige Arthur, Deputy Director and Director of Prevention and Peacebuilding, Center on International Cooperation, New York University
Jenny Aulin, WILPF Membership and Project Manager, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
Liz Baker, Senior Manager, Independent Journalism and Media, Humanity United
Sara Batmanglich, Senior Operations Officer, Fragility Conflict and Violence Group, The World Bank
Alex Bellamy, Director, Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Professor, Peace and Conflict Studies, The University of Queensland
Annie Bird, Program Officer, Atrocities Prevention and Response, Wellspring Philanthropic Fund
Ariela Blätter, Program Officer, Wellspring Philanthropic Fund
Rachel Brown, Founder and Executive Director, Project Over Zero
Friederike Bubenzer, Senior Project Leader, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
Cathy Buerger, Director of Research, Dangerous Speech Project
Eugenia Carbone, Director for Latin America, Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention, Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation
Mark Clark, Chief Executive Officer, Generations for Peace
Lesley Connolly, Global Policy Advisor and Team Lead, Inclusive Peace in Practice, Life and Peace Institute
Cedric de Coning, Senior Advisor, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and Research Professor, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

Don Deya, Chief Executive Officer, Pan African Lawyers Union

Roberta Dirosa, International Policy Officer, European External Action Service

Julian Egan, Head of Advocacy, International Alert

Camille Eiss, Chief of Global Partnerships and Policy, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project

Martine Kessy Ekomo-Soignet, Founder and Executive Director, URU

Luke Errington-Barnes, Strategic Advisor, Life and Peace Institute

Jack Farrell, DME for Peace Project Manager, Search for Common Ground

Kate Ferguson, Co-Executive Director, Protection Approaches

Maria Fernandez-Garcia, Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, Internews Network

Gabriela Ghindea, Director, Mediterranean Basin Programs, Auschwitz Institute for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities

Caleb Gichuhi, Senior Specialist, PeaceTech Lab

Rebecca Hamilton, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law (AUWCL)

Saba Ismail, Founder, Aware Girls

Mike Jobbins, Vice President of Global Affairs and Partnerships, Search for Common Ground

Dia Kayyali, Program Manager, Tech + Advocacy, WITNESS

Naomi Kikoler, Director, Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

Rachel Kleinfeld, Senior Fellow, Democracy, Conflict and Governance Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Giovanna Kuele, Researcher, Igarape Institute

Rachel Locke, Director, Impact:Peace, University of San Diego

Khin Maung, Founder, Rohingya Youth Association

Peter McBride, Director, The Cohen Center

Gus Miclat, Executive Director, Initiatives for International Dialogue

Bridget Moix, United States Executive Director, Peace Direct

Noel Morada, Director, Regional Diplomacy and Capacity Building, Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Director (Regional), School of Political Science and International Studies, The University of Queensland

Win Naing, Media and Communications Manager, Search for Common Ground Myanmar

Landry Ninteretse, Burundi Local Expert, Peace Direct

Dismas Rugason Nkunda, Chief Executive Officer, Atrocities Watch Africa

Sarah Noble, Director of External Relations, The New Humanitarian

Michael Oghia, Advocacy and Engagement Manager, Global Forum for Media Development

Savita Pawnday, Deputy Executive Director, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

Gilberto M.A. Rodrigues, Professor and Head, International Relations Graduate Program, Federal University of ABC

Thiago Rodrigues, Associate Professor, Fluminense National University

Darynell Rodriguez Torres, Executive Director, GPPAC Foundation, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict

Nadia Rubaii, Co-Director, Institute for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention, Binghamton University

Megan Schmidt, Quaker Representative, Quaker United Nations Office, New York
Renata Segura, Deputy Director, Latin America and the Caribbean, International Crisis Group**^  
Ashad Sentongo, Director, Africa Programs, Auschwitz Institute for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities^  
Andrei Serbin Pont, Director, CRIES***^  
Conor Seyle, Director, One Earth Future Foundation*^  
Graeme Simpson, Principal Representative (New York) and Senior Peacebuilding Adviser, Interpeace USA and Adjunct Lecturer in Law, Columbia University School of Law*^  
Bryan Sims, Senior Manager, Peacebuilding, Humanity United***  
Karen Smith, Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect, United Nations*^  
Debbie Stothard, Founder/Coordinator, ALTSEAN–Burma**^  
Margaret Williams, Independent Consultant**^  
Kyaw Win, Executive Director, Burma Human Rights Network^  
Uzra Zeya, Chief Executive Officer and President, Alliance for Peacebuilding

Stanley Center Governance Members and Leadership Team  
Brian Hanson, Chair, Board of Directors, Stanley Center for Peace and Security and Vice President of Studies, Chicago Council on Global Affairs  
Cassie Mathias, Director of Finance, Stanley Center for Peace and Security  
Patty Papke, Vice President and Director of Operations, Stanley Center for Peace and Security  
Keith Porter, President and Chief Executive Officer, Stanley Center for Peace and Security  
Mark Seaman, Director of Communications, Stanley Center for Peace and Security  
Jennifer Smyser, Vice President and Director of Policy Programming Strategy, Stanley Center for Peace and Security  
Joseph Stanley, Director, Board of Directors, Stanley Center for Peace and Security  
Lori Zook-Stanley, Director, Board of Directors, Stanley Center for Peace and Security

Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Participants attended as individuals rather than as representatives of their governments or organizations.  
*Participated in Focus Group 1 on Thursday, October 1, 2020.  
**Participated in Focus Group 2 on Tuesday, October 6, 2020.  
***Participated in Focus Group 3 on Thursday, October 8, 2020.  
^Participated in the Plenary Session on Thursday, October 15, 2020.

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The Stanley Center for Peace and Security partners with people, organizations, and the greater global community to drive policy progress in three issue areas—mitigating climate change, avoiding the use of nuclear weapons, and preventing mass violence and atrocities. The center was created in 1956 and maintains its independence while developing forums for diverse perspectives and ideas. To learn more about our recent publications and upcoming events, please visit stanleycenter.org.

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