Preventing the Next Mass Atrocity
Global Leader Summits Evolve
Summits Crucial to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
Finding Global Solutions for Global Problems Is Still Our Top Priority

Event focuses on genocide prevention, nuclear security, and the G-20

The simple idea that global problems require global solutions has animated the work of the Stanley Foundation since its beginning in 1956. We are unabashed multilateralists, particularly when it comes to managing issues that cross borders and are beyond the grasp of any single nation to resolve.

Our work today focuses on key issues requiring global responses and the mechanisms used by global leaders to reach and implement those responses. And this approach drove planning for our 51st annual Strategy for Peace Conference (SPC) held in October at the Airlie Center near Warrenton, Virginia. The event drew more than 70 invited experts and policy practitioners for discussions spread over three days.

We were honored to have Director of Policy Planning Anne-Marie Slaughter from the US State Department as our keynote speaker. Slaughter, a longtime friend of the foundation, stands at the center of America’s long-term planning process for foreign policy and global engagement. She is a forceful advocate for American interests and understands clearly how those interests are best served by positive interaction with the rest of the world, and her remarks reflected that worldview.

Our SPC format traditionally involves separate, concurrent roundtable discussions on focused topics. Individuals are invited to attend a specific roundtable, but there are many opportunities for participants to interact with those from other groups during meals and informal break times. In this issue of Courier we provide overviews and insights from each of this year’s three dialogues.

Preventing genocide and other mass atrocities requires an understanding of how these crimes are used to advance political causes. And it requires an approach that calls on the international community to help countries avoid (and, when needed, stop) genocide. Fortunately the United States is taking this issue seriously and has taken steps in strategic planning and bureaucratic operations to make genocide prevention a high priority.

Foundation program officer Rachel Gerber organized one SPC roundtable discussion about how to boost these American efforts and connect them better with similar developments at the international level.

Another discussion, organized by program officer Jennifer Smyser, advanced our interest in making sure all nuclear material around the world is secured over the next few years. Participants examined progress made since President Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit last April and the follow-up event scheduled for world leaders in 2012.

The third group looked at the evolution and future of the G-20 and related high-level meetings designed to address global problems. Program officer David Shorr organized this dialogue which took note of the G-20’s unfinished business regarding the global financial crisis but also looked ahead to other issues the G-20 might address in cooperation with other international organizations.

Resources.
SPC discussions can be found at www.stanleyfoundation.org/spc2010.

—Keith Porter,
Director of Policy and Outreach, The Stanley Foundation
Global Stage. This futuristic display of chrome and lights decorated the conference center entrance as world leaders converged on Seoul for the fifth summit of the G-20 group of nations, November 11-12, 2010. South Korea is the first non-G-8 country to host the event. (Photo courtesy of the Presidency of the Republic of South Africa)

World Gathering. The United Nations and other international organizations are forging a complementary relationship with forums such as the G-20. Here, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (right) talks with Lee Myung-bak, president of the Republic of Korea and host of the 2010 G-20 Seoul Summit. (UN Photo/Evan Schneider)
Preventing the Next Mass Atrocity

The US and UN strive to build better systems to prevent human tragedy

Nimble is a descriptor rarely earned by large bureaucracies. Their advantage lies more in political and institutional heft than agility. Yet agility is often the precise quality demanded of effective solutions to the most severe, complex, and intractable of global problems.

Growing political commitment to protect civilian populations from mass atrocity crimes such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and war crimes faces a challenge shared by broader efforts to address contemporary global realities—how to redirect the inertia that drives our political institutions toward systematically nuanced preventive engagement, rather than ad hoc crisis response.

Discussion of atrocity prevention and US national security at the Stanley Foundation’s 51st annual Strategy for Peace Conference echoed this broad challenge as the United States seeks to fully implement its responsibility to protect through a “whole-of-government” approach to mass atrocity crimes. The dialogue convened key US and UN officials, diplomats, and mass atrocity specialists to discuss ongoing efforts to elaborate the US government’s strategic approach to genocide and mass atrocities, explore next steps for effective institutional development, and encourage strategic dialogue between US institutions and their multilateral partners at the United Nations.

Action and Aspiration

The Obama administration’s inclusion of genocide prevention and explicit reference to the responsibility to protect framework within its recently issued National Security Strategy (NSS) has built on numerous institu-
national developments that recognize the threat of mass atrocities to US national security and seek to enhance US capacities for both prevention and response. These strategic elaborations and structural adjustments have been made in parallel with similar developments at the United Nations.

Through words and nascent deeds, the United Nations and the US administration have begun to more fully articulate a commitment to direct their political and institutional heft toward effective and credible responses to mass atrocity crimes.

Roundtable participants, however, questioned to what degree strategic language at the national and multilateral levels provides clear directives for concrete action. While a normative and rhetorical victory, they suggested that the genocide and mass atrocity language in the NSS remains aspirational and has failed to establish the priority of these issues among the myriad goals identified in the document. Many looked to the State Department’s upcoming Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and an expected Presidential Policy Directive to address these gaps.

At the multilateral level, the overarching policy framework provided by the Responsibility to Protect was considered set for implementation, clearly identifying commitments and mechanisms through which they could be advanced. Barriers to concrete action at the United Nations were thought to be more political, institutional, and operational than strategic.

As discussion moved toward implementation of protection responsibilities, participants noted the imperative of effective communication between the United States and the United Nations and underscored the importance of constructive collaboration. Differing roles and comparative advantages suggest that protection-focused actors should better explore the potential for a mutually reinforcing division of labor.

Multilateral coherence, however, remains a challenge. The massive and complex machinery of both the United Nations and the US government often baffles their potential partners. Better understanding of each would encourage more effective engagement.

**Shared Challenges**

Beyond obstacles to direct collaboration, the United Nations and US government share broader challenges in addressing mass atrocities—challenges that would benefit from better communication and reinforced links.

Institutional heft has its advantages, but nuanced adaptability to complex and evolving circumstances is rarely one of them. Both the United Nations and the United States strive to secure upward streams of information that feed predictably into formal decision-making channels. Assessing intelligence in terms of the nuances of mass atrocity dynamics mounts an even greater challenge.

If consistent intelligence and accurate assessment can be assured, national and multilateral actors must then consider how to institutionalize flexible but systematic triggers that elevate policy consideration to the level demanded by shifting dynamics on the ground. All such efforts must seek to balance between the arbitrary confusion of traditional ad hoc crisis response and an over-reliance on automatic processes in situations that demand us to be nimble.

The groundwork needed for these internal shifts raises perhaps the greatest challenge to US and UN efforts to prevent and halt civilian-targeted atrocities: how to balance the needs of long-term planning with the moral and security imperatives of today’s imminent and unfolding crises.

Victims violated and slaughtered over the past year in Kyrgyzstan or Eastern Congo would likely find little consolation in the fact that the United States and the international community are developing processes and tools to better protect the victims of the next decade. While admitting that future options may be greater in number, better honed, and more easily mobilized, participants insisted that “failures of imagination” in response to ongoing and imminent crises are unacceptable.

Imperfect instruments can wield great power when applied creatively and decisively; the international community and the US government must mobilize all tools at their disposal to protect today’s victims from civilian-targeted violence.

**Resetting Defaults to Action**

The decision to commit mass atrocities is a tactical choice made by elites set to profit from the dynamics they unleash. Shifting this calculus requires raising the costs of the decision, both by making ground conditions less easily exploitable and by enforcing credible and appropriate consequences for fundamentally unacceptable behavior.

Political will remains the inescapable prerequisite for any effort to counter mass atrocity crimes. However, building institutional structures that ensure nuanced policy options and accountable decision making raises the credibility of coherent and strategic response, resetting defaults to action rather than inaction.

If such a shift can be made at the United Nations, within the US government, and throughout the broader international system, perhaps perpetrators will take note.

—Rachel Gerber,
Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation
Global Leader Summits Evolve

The youngest of multilateral forums, the G-20, still has some growing up to do

The emergence of the G-20 as a summit-level forum for established and rising powers has been dramatic—forged in the midst of the financial meltdown and convening in rapid succession five times.

It has proven difficult, though, for G-20 leaders to preserve a sense of momentum and decisive action, as well as clarity about its future direction. Faced with myriad complex and difficult issues, they have struggled to repeat their initial success in jointly mounting a response to the 2008 economic downturn.

With the Stanley Foundation’s 51st annual Strategy for Peace Conference taking place shortly before the fifth G-20 summit in Seoul on November 11–12, participants were sensitive to mounting tensions over currency valuations, and the danger of a highly contentious meeting. They saw it as a major challenge for Seoul to keep the currency dispute from deadlocking the entire event, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the process. For some experts at this particular roundtable discussion, the issue was also evidence the G-20 should not be viewed as transitioning from crisis-response mode because the crisis has not fully passed.

Defining the G-20 Role

The conference discussion focused significant concern on the G-20 falling short of the expectations that are set for it. In that spirit, conference participants tried to clarify the proper function, focus, and operating mode for this still-young multilateral forum. A set of G-20 distinguishing characteristics were identified: that it convenes heads of state, brings together countries that are key players in global affairs (as well as nations from a second tier), and functions with a degree of informality. Actually the G-20 is informal in two senses of the word. At the summit meetings themselves, the hosts and planners try to create a setting in which world leaders can connect with one another personally, hopefully with a policy payoff. And then in terms of the international system, the G-20 (like the G-8) lacks the treaty basis or decision rules of a traditional multilateral organization. Strictly speaking, the G-20 is merely a series of meetings, with preparatory consultations between summits.
An Expanded Agenda?

A major focus of the conference discussion was the question of what items belong on the G-20 agenda. As a general matter, participants thought the comparative advantage of the G-20 as a forum for leaders of pivotal powers calls for a focus on “big ticket” policy issues that are compellingly urgent. There was disagreement over whether the G-20 should be restricted to the global economy.

As some saw it, the major challenges confronting leaders are not restricted to international economic policy, and many items on the economic agenda do not need the attention of the top-level leaders. The topic of climate change financing was viewed as an opportune agenda item that straddles the economic and environmental agendas. It was also noted that the agenda is subject to the whims and interests of the leaders themselves, which will not be completely hemmed in by the established preparatory processes.

Better Coordination Needed

Given the contrast between the exclusive old-line Group of Eight and the more inclusive G-20, the discussion took stock of how well the two coexist. There was no clear consensus about whether the two G groupings are complementary or competing but, as a practical matter, they will both continue to meet for at least the next few years. In relation to the rest of the multilateral system, participants saw the G-20’s relationship to other key intergovernmental organizations as absolutely complementary—though work is still needed to optimize the links between the G-20 and other international government organizations.

There have been considerable efforts to consult with UN member nations that are not part of the G-20. What is most important, however, is to carefully synchronize the G-20 and UN agendas in areas of common concern. Not only should the substance be aligned, but clear diplomatic and consultative channels are needed for good G-20/UN coordination, especially on development issues.

There is a need for the G-20 to deliver substantive steps with clear real-world value. That said, cautionary notes were made against devaluing the basic benefit of building trust and good relations among leaders. For instance, the G-20 puts relations between rising powers and traditional powers on a new footing simply by treating all 20 countries as peers. Likewise, the outcome measures that emerge from the process will be different sorts of actions depending on the nature of the agenda item.

Participant David Shorr, Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation, noted that the G-20’s relationship to other key intergovernmental organizations is absolutely complementary—though work is still needed to optimize the links between the G-20 and other international government organizations.

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Nuclear Security Summits Crucial to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Experts analyze role of summits in securing nuclear material

After a first-of-its-kind meeting of world leaders in April of 2010 to discuss the need to secure nuclear material stockpiles worldwide, many are still analyzing its value. It remains undisputed that the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, was an historic and unprecedented gathering that drew much-needed attention to the threat of nuclear terrorism. Yet it is still necessary to look back to determine its contribution to President Obama’s goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material worldwide by the end of 2013. There is also a need to consider how the next Nuclear Security Summit to be held in South Korea in 2012 can most push forward the global nuclear security agenda.

A group of policy experts, government officials, and representatives from both intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations recently gathered to discuss the nuclear security summits and their contribution to the global effort to combat nuclear terrorism. The dialogue at the Stanley Foundation’s 51st annual Strategy for Peace Conference included a reflection on the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, as well as the broader global effort on nuclear security. Discussion also focused on the global consensus on the threat of nuclear terrorism and how the upcoming summit in the Republic of Korea in 2012 could best enhance global nuclear security.

Accomplishments and Opportunities Missed

Roundtable participants generally considered the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit a success, noting that serious and sustained engagement in the year leading up to the summit produced both political consensus and action-oriented commitments on measures to enhance nuclear security. While the official summit convened leaders from 47 countries and three international organizations, meetings on the summit’s margins marked significant new engagement between and among government, the nuclear industry, and civil society.

In considering opportunities missed at this year’s summit, roundtable participants felt that the prior lack of top-level international engagement on the issue of nuclear security leaves countries and organizations with a demanding agenda. While the summit produced a work plan encompassing all of the current international tools, mechanisms, and organizations that together are meant to address nuclear security, the political commitments made are voluntary and, in many cases, not as demanding as many roundtable participants thought they should have been. The unilateral commitments to action made by 30 countries were applauded, although many noted that those commitments could have gone further and that more countries could have made such commitments to increase momentum coming out of the summit.

The Nuclear Terrorism Threat

The official summit statement articulates the consensus of the participating countries that “[n]uclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials.” However, there are differences of opinion as to the scope and urgency of the terrorist threat and whether there are collective ways to address the challenge.

There was a shared understanding among roundtable participants that a detonation of a nuclear device is neither easy nor impossible, and that the low-probability, high-impact equation could help strengthen arguments on both sides on how seriously countries should work to avert such a disaster. While there is no universal view of which country or region might be most vulnerable to a nuclear attack, roundtable participants noted that focusing only on the potential targets of such an attack leaves out the related issues that other countries could effectively
address. It was agreed that while countries have a shared responsibility to address the nuclear threat, each country’s responsibility may be different.

**Looking Forward: The 2012 South Korea Summit**

By announcing at the conclusion of the Washington summit that another would be held in South Korea in 2012, a forum was created by which participating governments will be held accountable to their commitments and expected to make further commitments.

President Obama established himself as a clear leader on global nuclear security by announcing in his Prague speech in April 2009 his administration’s intent to hold the Nuclear Security Summit. Roundtable participants consider it critical for the US administration to maintain a high level of engagement in the 2012 summit.

Also, it was recommended that governments continue to engage industry and civil society in the process leading up to and at the South Korea summit to build upon the success of the 2010 summit. Recognizing that a narrow focus was one of the greatest strengths of the 2010 summit, any attempt to expand the scope to other nonproliferation or disarmament issues or terrorist threats must be carefully considered so as not to dilute the original intent to address nuclear material security.

Finally, one of the keys to the South Korea summit will be how countries demonstrate progress toward the commitments they made at the summit this year. Without some transparent evidence that all countries participating in the summit have taken steps in the interim, it will be difficult for leaders to demonstrate that they are serious about securing global stockpiles of nuclear material.

—Jennifer Smyser,
Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation
The IAEA and Nuclear Security: Trends and Prospects

With nuclear security having been catapulted to the top of the international security agenda and interest in developing nuclear power capabilities spreading around the world, the standards for preventing, detecting, and responding to nuclear terrorist activities are still not well defined. National capabilities for strengthening nuclear security are uneven and the political will for making those improvements is not equally shared.

There is now a plethora of overlapping tools and instruments—some legally binding, others purely voluntary—to deal with the burgeoning problems of nuclear security and terrorist threats. Yet there is no single coordinating body to help make those goals possible. Greater coordination, direction, and clarity of the task ahead are needed. In this new policy analysis brief Jack Boureston and Andrew Semmel argue that because of its established track record and programs already in practice, together with its independence, integrity, and confidentiality, the IAEA is best suited to take that leadership role. But, they say, getting there will not be easy. November 2010 Policy Analysis Brief.

Creating a 21st-Century Nuclear Material Security Architecture

Despite the limited scope of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit and the voluntary nature of the commitments, the summit solidified the foundation of the current nuclear regime and was a starting point for the development of a stronger nuclear material security architecture, one that is capable of responding to the evolving nuclear terrorism threat. Kenneth N. Luongo argues that this lead-up to the 2012 Korea summit be used not just to ensure that 2010 summit commitments are implemented but also to reframe the nuclear material security debate and initiate some key changes in strategy. October 2010 Policy Analysis Brief.

Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs with Resolution 1540

Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenas, and Veronica Tessler propose an innovative, “whole-of-society” approach to bridging the securitydevelopment divide in the Middle East that would leverage donor investments in both security assistance and development assistance, so as to ensure recipient state buy-in and an enduring return on investment. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)—which mandates a sweeping array of supply-side efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction—is one tool that could be used to this end. September 2010 Report.

WMD, Drugs, and Criminal Gangs in Central America: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With UNSCR 1540

Few regions of the world better illustrate the intimate nexus between human development and security than Central America. Brian Finlay explores how United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) could be used by governments across the region to identify novel streams of assistance to address capacity shortfalls, improve customs facilities and migratory border facilities, receive training in the tracking of illegal immigration, improve capacities to prevent money laundering and drug and human trafficking, and strengthen the competencies of government institutions. July 2010 Report.
Fragile States, Global Consequences
The foundation’s newest Now Showing event-in-a-box toolkit features a DVD that helps viewers examine the global challenge of fragile states. It aims to encourage discussion of the growing movement in the international community to find comprehensive ways to promote stronger nations and more effective ways to deal with those that are already on the brink of failure.

With event planner and moderator guides chock-full of helpful tips and resources, the toolkit has everything needed to put together a successful event. Discussion guides are provided to facilitate group discussion on the issues raised in the video. It also includes materials that provide further background on the discussion topics.

Sign up now to receive your FREE toolkit. Call Linda Hardin at 563-264-1500 or order online at www.stanleyfoundation.org/nowshowing.

51st Annual Strategy for Peace Conference
Each year the Stanley Foundation convenes the Strategy for Peace Conference on a wide range of US foreign policy issues with experts from the public and private sectors who meet in autonomous roundtables.

These meetings are designed with an eye toward the future of American relations with the world, the results of which are published in nonattributed conference reports and widely distributed:

• Evolution of the G Groupings—A Progress Check

• The Road to Korea 2012: Nuclear Security Summits Crucial for Global Efforts to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

• Atrocity Prevention and US National Security: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect

Available online at www.stanleyfoundation.org/spc2010

The newest issues of Courier, as well as new foundation work, are announced in our monthly e-mail, think.

Visit www.stanleyfoundation.org/think to sign up.
Founded by freed American slaves, torn apart by 14 years of civil war that ended in 2003, Liberia is a country on the brink of recovery, though plagued by land disputes and ethnic tensions. It’s begun to rebuild with the help of a large UN peacekeeping effort. It’s now turned its attention to building a sustainable peace by settling land disputes, ridding its government of corruption, and providing basic government services.

In November, 11 senior news editors and producers set out for a ten-day fact-finding trip in Liberia, a program of the International Reporting Project, done in collaboration with the Stanley Foundation. They explored the country’s poverty, health, and agricultural challenges, as well as its politics, economic recovery, and UN operations.

Read dispatches from the editors at www.internationalreportingproject.org/stories/gatekeeper-trip/1557/.

Sunni Khalid, of WYPR radio of Baltimore, interviews a young girl in a Liberian boarding school who was the victim of sexual assault, a pervasive problem in a country rebuilding from 14 years of civil war. Khalid was one of 11 editors on the trip. (Photo by Sean Harder/TSF)