IS HUMAN PROTECTION A PRIORITY?

Building Truly Preventive Strategies
Peacebuilding Under the Microscope
Intervening in Fragile States
Putting People First. A Sudanese refugee child from Darfur peers from a hole in his shelter at the Farchana refugee camp that had more than 20,000 Darfur refugees in 2008. The United Nations estimates that as many as 300,000 civilians died as a result of violence or hardships brought on by the forced displacement of nearly 2 million Darfurians that began in 2003. Critics have argued the world could have done more to prevent the crisis in the first place. (Issouf Sanogo/AFP/Getty Images)
Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities Must Be Strategically Addressed

Global efforts are under way to mobilize peacebuilding and the Responsibility to Protect as preventive tools

Hotspots for ethnic strife and the specter of real or potential genocide are strewn across this decade’s headlines. In central Africa and Burma, ethnically based oppression and killing is part of a brutal political strategy. In other spots, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, horrible conflict has given way to glimmers of hope and stability. And in places like Kenya and Kyrgyzstan the very worst outcomes of ethnic violence seem to have been avoided (so far).

Through all of this, diplomats, academics, and international civil servants have developed a more sophisticated understanding of the complex causes behind genocide and mass atrocities. This has generated new hope for halting these human crises but, more importantly, creative and flexible approaches are now being deployed aimed at actually preventing genocide and mass atrocities.

The Stanley Foundation is working to promote and expand effective pre-crisis preventive engagement, as well as the much needed rapid response to genocide and mass atrocities. Prevention can be advanced by full implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that includes promoting the acceptance of states’ sovereign responsibilities to ensure basic human protection, improving international efforts to help states meet those responsibilities, and ensuring an effective multilateral response when states prove unwilling to honor them. Pre-crisis atrocity prevention efforts can also be improved by promoting greater international coordination in mobilizing mechanisms for peacebuilding.

In this issue of Courier, foundation program officer Rachel Gerber lays out the very real challenges facing those who would focus on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. Gerber uses the unique yet telling story of Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic strife earlier this year as a case study.

A sad truth is that countries emerging from conflict and ethnic division are also among the most likely to slip back into war and potential genocide. This reality was acknowledged by the United Nations five years ago when they created the Peacebuilding Commission to specifically work with post-conflict societies. Also in this issue of Courier, independent journalist Jina Moore examines the impact of the United Nations’ peacebuilding efforts. Moore’s work was supported by the Stanley Foundation and the Pulitzer Center for Crisis Reporting.

Two other journalists, Kira Kay and James Maloney, (also part of a Stanley Foundation collaboration with the Pulitzer Center) highlight another reality of 21st-century conflict: The weakest states in the world, rather than the strongest, are the most at risk for violent conflict and spreading strife and instability. Kay and Maloney summarize a series of reports they recently produced on this topic for PBS NewsHour.

Finally, the foundation has developed a new resource specifically for you and your friends on this important topic. So called “fragile states” are the most at need for the kind of pre-crisis atrocity prevention measures described above. Our new Now Showing event-in-a-box toolkit Fragile States, Global Consequences features a DVD, discussion guide, and more. See the back page for a full description and page 10 for ordering details.

—Keith Porter
Director of Policy and Outreach, The Stanley Foundation

Cover: Standing Guard. A soldier surveys the scene as Burundians turn out for a rally of the political opposition in Bujumbura-Rurale, about one week after the opposition pulled out of the presidential race in June. (Photo by Jina Moore)
On June 10, the international community found itself once again befuddled as political instability morphed into open, ethnically targeted violence in Kyrgyzstan. Its confusion seemed only to increase as Roza Otunbayeva, Kyrgyzstan’s interim leader, declared the situation in Osh to be “out of control” and explicitly requested “outside armed forces to calm the situation down.”

The request, itself, was striking—governments are loath to admit their deficiencies, especially regarding the capacity to maintain control within their own borders. Even in today’s interdependent world, monopoly of force remains fundamental to the logic of sovereignty. Perhaps the only thing more surprising than the request, however, was the silence with which it was met. Inaction in the face of mass atrocity crimes has long been a plague on the global conscience. Yet it was precisely this inaction that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, endorsed in 2005 at the highest level and in the broadest collection of world leadership, was intended to address.

R2P provides a framework to prevent and halt mass atrocities by identifying the mutually reinforcing state and international responsibilities to protect civilian populations against genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. These responsibilities include not only the obligation of the state to protect its population but also an international commitment to assist states to fulfill this responsibility, and a promise to respond when a state fails to do so.

A Reluctance to Prevent
In the summer of 2008, Russia invoked a distorted understanding of R2P to justify its Georgian incursions. Yet, with top Kyrgyzstani authorities pleading for assistance as promised by R2P, Russia expressed a rather uncharacteristic support for multilateralism and deferred all such considerations to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In its defense, Russia was only one player within a broader international community from which little protection support was forthcoming.

What the Kyrgyzstani experience makes clear is that commitments to R2P remain largely rhetorical and that the international community has yet to determine how to approach its responsibility to “assist those under stress” with their own protection obligations.

The only element of the R2P framework that has attracted less attention in terms of implementation than immediate protection assistance is its promise to help states prevent mass atrocity crimes “before crises and conflicts break out.”

The responsibilities inscribed in the R2P framework are preventive, not simply responsive. The doctrine supports a spectrum of engagement that provides the international community tools to address the potential for mass atrocities well before slaughter begins. These tools range from targeted development and protection assistance for those unable to protect their populations, to various means appropriate to confront those unwilling to do so.

Yet, even among the strongest proponents of the R2P doctrine, the responsibility to prevent, as opposed to the responsibility to respond, is often forgotten.

For some, this forgetfulness is a conscious choice; they argue that emphasizing pre-crisis prevention will stretch and dilute the concept, limiting its power to mobilize political will in the face of the most extreme atrocities.

One of the great lessons to be learned from the word genocide, however, is that a term’s potency is not the best measure of its power to shape behavior. When states are left with no alternative beyond crisis intervention, the threshold for engagement rises so high that political will becomes virtually impossible to muster. Enabling states with concrete tools and methods for pre-crisis atrocity prevention could rather enhance the relevance of the concept by coupling rhetoric with action.

The Need for New Strategy
A second barrier to maximizing the preventive elements of R2P arises with what some have termed the problem of “comprehensiveness.” Building local protection capacity sounds a lot like state building, or the daunting
Calling for Help. Ethnic Uzbeks from Kyrgyzstan who live in
Ukraine hold placards during a rally at the UN mission building in
Kiev in June. The demonstrators called for UN peacekeepers to be
deployed in Kyrgyzstan where fighting between ethnic Kyrgyz and
Uzbeks have left at least 179 people dead and about 2,000 injured.
(Sergei
Supinsky/AFP/Getty Images)

In this case, however, intuition has yet to lead to action,
or even to much concerted thought on what the interna-
tional community can do to foster state protection
capacity within a strategic approach to pre-crisis atroci-
ty prevention.

It would be foolish to assume that all states cited for
high civilian atrocity risk have simply been waiting
for the international community to lend a helping
hand. For many states, perpetration of mass atrocities reflects unwillingness, not inability, to protect
civilian populations.

However, for every Sudan there is a Kyrgyzstan. The
international community must begin to think seriously
about its obligation to prevent genocide and other mass
atrocities and provide such governments with the sup-
port they require, before bodies are in need of burial.
—Rachel Gerber
Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

Can the international community wave aside the com-
plexities of state fragility and set itself to the fresh con-
struction of fully sound regimes with all the guarantees
of effective governance, social inclusion, and shared
economic prosperity? Certainly not with the speed and
urgency demanded to halt mass atrocity crimes.

Can it adapt its approach to development assistance
and diplomatic leverage in a way that targets crucial
gaps in internal protection capacity before crises
emerge? Likewise, can it use these tools to support and,
when necessary, coax states to protect their own civilian
populations from the most heinous forms of violence?
Logic, as well as the intuition that has driven the devel-

dopment of the R2P framework, suggests that it can.

The seeming futility of such a large endeavor is seductive; it rids inaction of its discomfort.

Yet the capacity to protect civilian populations from
genocide and other mass atrocities is much narrower
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dopment of the R2P framework, suggests that it can.
Peacebuilding is a problem, at least as a word. It’s an awkward compound noun, more a linguistic aspiration than the clear denotation of an idea, and its wobbly claim on language betrays weak conceptual roots. The simple fact is that, for all the talk about peacebuilding, no one really knows what it is.

That makes the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) either a daring risk or an ill-conceived whimsey—or both. Some of it appears to work. Much of it doesn’t. There’s a good deal to be learned from the failures and success of the PBC, but there’s also a bigger point: For all of even its outright blunders, this may be exactly what we want from our United Nations.

The PBC is an intergovernmental body orbiting UN Headquarters in New York. It has 31 members, drawn from the member states of the United Nations. It advises the Security Council and its ancillary architecture—a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), with its own assistant secretary-general—and gives the UN secretary-general leeway to take direct
action on peacebuilding matters. Ban Ki-moon thinks convening a political dialogue is key to stopping a spiral of political violence in Sierra Leone? Send $1 million to Freetown, done.

The infrastructure of support that comes from these three interconnected peacebuilding bodies is complicated, but the point is to be flexible. The UN’s peacebuilding projects are supposed to be “quick win” interventions intended to catalyze donor interest in unsexy sectors and respond to sudden developments. It is, as many have pointed out to me, risk tolerant. The peacebuilding infrastructure is designed to do what the rest of the United Nations so often fails at: being relevant, responsive, and adaptable.

What interested me as a journalist is whether the infrastructure works.

When I set out for the four inaugural countries of the commission’s first five-year agenda, I thought I’d take several common hypotheses from the literature about creating sustainable peace and see how they fared in each of the four countries. The trouble is, the PBC agenda is a poor taxonomy. Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Central African Republic, and Guinea Bissau—the PBC’s first four countries—have only the broadest characteristics in common. They’re all in Africa, on the top of failed states lists, and the bottom of the Human Development Index. They all had war, and they all want peace. And that’s about it.

Meanwhile, there’s barely a consensus on the meaning of the word itself. It’s fair to say there’s a notion that peacebuilding hovers somewhere between peacekeeping and development, but every person I asked to define it gave me a different answer. Some people, in the field and in New York, insisted that differentiating between peacebuilding, state building, and development was passe. Others said it was critical. Some refused to get caught up in questions of sequencing; others insisted sequencing was precisely the point. Some inveighed against peacekeepers peacebuilding; others insisted it should be required.

The conceptual confusion, unsurprisingly, creates some difficulties on the ground, particularly when cash is on the table. There’s confusion, there’s institutional infighting, there’s sometimes outright hostility between organizations the money is supposed to bring together as partners.

But there’s also creativity. In Guinea Bissau, 250 young people wrote business plans; the best of them were awarded micro-finance grants, and they got their first payments in July. In Sierra Leone, a quick grant from the PBF made it possible to negotiate an end to a violent standoff between the country’s two biggest political parties. In the Central African Republic (CAR), peacebuilding money trained journalists for the first radio station in Paoua, a small town a 12-hour drive from the capital, in the heart of rebel-held territory.

In fact, Paoua’s would-be radio station illustrates the real problem with peacebuilding. It’s not the fuzziness of the concept or the novelty of the infrastructure. It’s old-fashioned politics.

The radio project is pitch-perfect, on paper. It’s a three-way partnership between the national government, the people of Paoua, and the United Nations—the epitome of “local ownership” that all peacebuilding projects seek to achieve. The community donated the building, volunteered their labor, and raised money for paint and a new roof. The United Nations trained the journalists and technicians and promised to give them equipment. And the government of the CAR agreed to outfit the station with a $2,000 antenna.

The antenna never showed up. The journalists haven’t touched a recorder or a soundboard in months; some are looking for new work. The government says it has the antenna but can’t get it up to Paoua. UN staff say the CAR isn’t exactly that reliable when it comes to coughing up the cash.

Some people suggested to me that peacebuilding projects, like the wars that came before them, are largely about the symptoms of a dysfunctional political economy: unemployment and hunger, poor health care, crumbling roads, dirty water. Aid and development also try to treat these symptoms, but UN workers in Sierra Leone suggest that getting actively engaged with the political system may help the PBC deal with the much tougher underlying problem—making that system work. It’s an approach riddled with risk, but the PBC is, perhaps, the place for that.

That’s a problem that has bedeviled world politics, from development to diplomacy, since long before the PBC. It would be a tall order to expect the PBC to suddenly solve the problem. But the fact it’s there at least opens institutional and political space within which to try different tools, and if they don’t work, to try them again. If the commission stays as aspirational as the process it’s named after, that may just be the right approach.

—Jina Moore

Editors Note.

The United Nations is undertaking a five-year review of the Peacebuilding Commission. Freelance multimedia journalist Jina Moore is taking an independent look at the PBC as part of a reporting project made possible through collaboration between the Stanley Foundation and the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting. For more about her reporting, visit www.pulitzercenter.org.

Fall 2010

7
Editors Note. Journalists Kira Kay and Jason Maloney explored the successes and failures of these four countries as part of a reporting project done in collaboration with the Stanley Foundation and the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting in 2009.

For decades, the balance of power between strong states was the central issue in discussions of international security—the Cold War, the rise of China, and peace in the Middle East as brokered by the dominant world powers.

But today it is so-called “fragile” states that are seen by many as posing equal, or potentially even greater, threats to global security. Fragile states run the spectrum from those that are struggling to keep a functional government in place to those that are failing in their ability to protect and provide for their populations.

US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice emphasizes that instability from fragile states can fester and spill over to neighboring countries and create environments where extremists and criminals can operate and where...
The Bureau for International Reporting—Kira Kay and Jason Maloney, Resource.

To receive a copy of Fragile States, Global Consequences, an event-in-a-box toolkit featuring a DVD that helps viewers examine the global challenge of fragile states, see page 10 or visit www.stanleyfoundation.org/howshowing.

terrorists can find safe heaven. She sees additional threats of disease pandemics and mass migration. Therefore, she says, the United States has a stake in the successful resolution of conflicts, even in parts of the world that may seem distant and far-flung to the average American.

More than a billion people across 60 nations are living in fragile or failing states. For them, the inability or unwillingness of their governments to protect people and provide basic social services means that large portions of the world’s population are unable to pull themselves out of poverty, illiteracy, or gender inequality. So, the need to shore up fragile states is one that transcends security, and it has economic and moral ramifications as well.

But just as there has been a rising recognition of the risks that fragile states create, there has been an increase in international efforts to stabilize and build up—or rebuild—these nations. Today the UN Department of Peacekeeping has a record 120,000 personnel in 16 missions around the globe. Many more multinational efforts, often led by regional bodies such as the African Union or NATO, work alongside, or even independent from, the United Nations.

Four Case Studies

As part of our reporting project on fragile states, we filmed in four countries on four continents—all of which have been the target of large nation-building efforts with varying degrees of success. Our goal was to examine what has worked and what has not; what lessons could be learned for future efforts; and how the United States might be better able to support—and be supported by—such multilateral interventions.

The first story in the “Fragile States” series focused on peacekeeping efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It was the only in-field report to air on national American television during Secretary of State Clinton’s visit to the country in 2009, and offered an inside look at the complexities of protecting civilians in one of the most dangerous parts of the world. Challenges to the UN mission there—the largest in the world—include a lack of equipment, the responsibility to patrol difficult terrain the size of eastern United States, and the necessity to partner with a national army that is almost as predatory on the population as the rebels they are meant to fight.

The series continued to look at East Timor as the fledgling nation celebrated the tenth anniversary of its independence from Indonesia last August. The vast efforts to rebuild the country have been referred to as a “test tube” for international intervention, and have provided lessons for other nation-building efforts around the world, even Afghanistan. Everything from a functioning army and police force to governing bodies, to schools and roads were needed, and plans had to be developed for the country to adequately manage its natural resources wealth. Success in East Timor is far from guaranteed, but this report offered Americans a better understanding of what it takes to stabilize a post-war country.

The series also examined how 15 years of peace and reconstruction in Bosnia have failed to dispel underlying instability stemming from ethnic divisions entrenched by civil war and segregated politics. Rising nationalism is now once again stoking tensions, threatening to undermine the peace agreement that ended the bloodshed there in 1995. Bosnia is currently facing its biggest crisis since the end of its brutal war, and some observers, even diplomat Richard Holbrooke who helped broker the Dayton Accords, fear a return to conflict. Yet this urgent situation, so relevant to the United States, has been almost completely overlooked by the American media.

Finally, the series wrapped up with an examination of the perpetually struggling country of Haiti and its “moment of hope” that was beginning to take shape in the year before the devastating earthquake hit. A confluence of political stability and security was allowing the tentative return of investors, especially those looking to expand Haiti’s once thriving but now mostly mothballed garment industry. Whether Haiti could take advantage of this promising trend and finally pull itself out of failure was an open question. Now the country is facing challenges larger than could ever be foreseen.

Human Security Indicators

The “Fragile States” series also examined the very definition of what it means for a state to be secure. Louise Arbour, president of the International Crisis Group, suggests that analysts have historically looked at security in a very traditional and maybe too narrow way—with the demobilizing of belligerents, the reintegration of ex-combatants, and a very military approach to security.

Her suggestion is that instead we expand our assessment of state fragility to include other indicators of real human security; for example, whether or not girls are returning to school and women are safe in their communities or whether civil society is occupying some space. Arbour believes that by looking at these other types of indicators, we will have a better sense of whether this is a state that is ensuring security to its populations.

—Kira Kay and Jason Maloney

Resource.
Review and Vitalization of Peacebuilding

In an increasingly interdependent world, strategic international coordination has proven a largely elusive ideal. The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was explicitly designed to confront this challenge and tailored to meet the demands of post-conflict complexity by providing an integrated and coherent approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Five years after creation of the PBC, many of the issues it faces highlight the challenges it is likely to confront in the long term, making this an ideal time to take stock of PBC experience and consider ways to maximize its potential.

On May 21–23, 2010, the Stanley Foundation convened a conference, “Review and Vitalization of Peacebuilding,” to assist the PBC’s five-year comprehensive review. Participants included the appointed review facilitator team leaders and representatives (Ireland, Mexico, and South Africa), UN officials, diplomats, and civil society experts.

The conference examined key issues for the review process. Many inspired consensus, while others raised questions in need of further exploration. June 2010 report.

Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia

In 2003, more than a decade of civil war had cost more than 250,000 lives, earning Liberia The Economist’s dubious distinction as “the world’s worst place to live.” Seven years later, increasing stability in the country reflects the substantial progress that can be achieved by determined national leadership, active international community engagement, and realistic approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.

John Blaney, Jacque Paul Klein, and Sean McFate examine how central actors in the immediate post-conflict period reflect on lessons learned from the implementation of Liberian disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and security sector reform programs. Rooted in the concepts of human security and building basic state institutions, their approaches reveal telling insights with potential resonance across the diverse spectrum of post-conflict experience. June 2010 analysis brief.

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect

The world is moving from affirmation of the Responsibility to Protect toward full implementation of this important concept. The Stanley Foundation recently hosted a conference to discuss key issues and specific steps involved in this historic effort. The meeting brought together state representatives to the United Nations, senior Secretariat officials, and experts. The event included a keynote address by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. March 2010 online conference report.

WMD, Drugs, and Criminal Gangs in Central America: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With UNSCR 1540

This Stanley Foundation project report, informed largely by a regional workshop in Panama City earlier this year, analyzes a region of inherent economic and social promise that has long been frustrated by countless security challenges related to small arms, drugs, and criminal gangs.

Author Brian Finlay, senior associate at the Stimson Center, explores how United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) could be used by governments across the region. July 2010 project report.

Now Available

Now Available

Stanley Foundation Resources

These reports and a wealth of other information are available at www.stanleyfoundation.org

The foundation’s newest Now Showing event-in-a-box toolkit, Fragile States, Global Consequences, features a DVD that helps viewers examine the global challenge of fragile states. It aims to encourage discussion of the growing movement in the international community to find comprehensive ways to promote stronger nations and more effective ways to deal with those that are already on the brink of failure.

With event planner and moderator guides chock-full of helpful tips and resources, the toolkit has everything needed to put together a successful event. Discussion guides are provided to facilitate group discussion on the issues raised in the video. It also includes materials that provide further background on the discussion topics.

Sign up now to receive your FREE toolkit when it becomes available in November 2010. Call Linda Hardin at 563-264-1500 or order online at www.stanleyfoundation.org/nowshowing.
Now Showing:
*Radioactive Challenge*

The video in this event-in-a-box toolkit helps viewers examine the challenge of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials globally. It aims to encourage discussion of the complexities of the “world’s greatest security challenge,” keeping nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists.

Now Showing toolkits, brought to you by the Stanley Foundation, offer everything needed for an easy-to-plan, successful event.

To order your FREE toolkit, call Linda Hardin at 563-264-1500 or order online at www.stanleyfoundation.org/nowshowing.

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**Evolving Global System**

**Leadership and the Global Governance Agenda: Three Voices**

Three leading global think tanks—the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), the Stanley Foundation, and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) in the People’s Republic of China—joined together in 2009 to examine the many challenges facing global governance leadership in the rapidly evolving context of “messy multilateralism.”

In this document a representative of each partner institution summarized current global governance leadership challenges in the lead-up to the G-8 and G-20 summits in Canada. Each “voice” is personal but informed by the work of the respective institutions—“three voices” from three critical countries involved in global governance: Canada, China, and the United States. June 2010 online report.

**Challenges in Global Governance: Opportunities for G-x Leadership**

The upgrading of the G-20 at last September’s Pittsburgh summit to become the premier global economic policy forum was an important step to heighten cooperation among established and emerging powers. Arguably, though, this move merely gave diplomatic form to geopolitical realities and power shifts that have already been clear for some years. Indeed, a number of significant questions remain regarding the future shape of multilateral cooperation.

Alan Alexandroff, a senior fellow at CIGI and co-director of the University of Toronto’s G-20 Research Group, examines the various ways that the G groupings, despite their lack of formal decision mechanisms, can provide policy leadership. June 2010 analysis brief.

**A More Effective G-8 and G-20**

The regular summits of world powers should better marshal their political will to tackle urgent global problems. Foundation efforts advocate such an expansion of the summits’ agenda—as well as strenuous diplomacy to bridge differences, vigorous follow-through on policy initiatives, and complementary relationships with the United Nations and other multilateral institutions to fully tap the international community’s capacity. These reforms will help the summits better contribute to effective global governance. See our resources in connection with recent G-8 and G-20 meetings at www.stanleyfoundation.org/g8g20meetings.
For decades, the balance of power among the world’s strongest nations was the dominant issue in discussions of global security. Many of today’s policies and international institutions were specifically created to deal with potential violent conflict between major powers.

But today, the world’s most fragile states are emerging as the most serious threat to 21st-century global security.

Fragile states aren’t failed states. They are countries that straddle the thin line between survival and chaos, suffering from weak governing infrastructures, internal conflict, ethnic tensions, or economic despair—and sometimes from all of the above.

Though largely overlooked, the global consequences we all face from the growing number of fragile states are both immediate and real. Their weaknesses often permit extremist groups to thrive within their borders. Beyond the threat of terrorism, fragile states can become breeding grounds for disease pandemics; create waves of regionally destabilizing mass migration; or offer safe haven for drug, arms, and even human traffickers.

The Now Showing Fragile States, Global Consequences event-in-a-box toolkit features a DVD and other materials that helps viewers examine the global challenge of fragile states. It aims to encourage discussion of the growing movement in the international community to find comprehensive ways to promote stronger nations and more effective ways to deal with those that are already on the brink of failure.

See page 10 for more information on how to sign up now to receive your FREE toolkit when it becomes available in November 2010.