President-elect Obama takes office in January having pledged to restore the United States’ standing in the world.
Gather Stakeholders, Not a League of Democracies

Building multilateral security cooperation may require expanding the G-8

One path to Obama’s goal of restoring US standing, according to many foreign policy professionals, is to revitalize international political institutions such as the United Nations. Some have been calling for a new league or concert of democracies to offset the perceived ineffectiveness of the United Nations Security Council and other institutions. The common assumption underlying this idea is that authoritarian regimes in particular, acting in and through the United Nations, have repeatedly thwarted both US interests and broader security goals on pressing global problems.

Proponents of a league of democracies share several assumptions. They agree that in a world of new transnational threats such as catastrophic terrorism, deadly infectious disease, and global warming, the United States needs robust, sustained international cooperation.

They dismiss the effectiveness of the United Nations in responding to these threats and attribute that failure either to the universal nature of the General Assembly, where all 192 member states are equal and therefore prone to deadlock, or to the disproportionate role given to key authoritarian states, especially Russia and China, in the Security Council. And while they may differ on the exact functions of the league or concert, they agree that one of its key roles will be to legitimate the use of force by states.

US Leadership Style Must Change

Proposals for a league of democracies derive from the assumption that the world would be much safer and more prosperous if it consisted solely of liberal democracies. Democracies historically do not go to war with each other; their interests in free trade and economic growth
foster easier economic cooperation; and shared values in promoting liberty, freedom, and human rights create greater amity and genuine friendships among people.

It would be folly, however, to base US foreign policy and strategies for international order on this ideal, because democracies alone will not provide the international cooperation essential for countering transnational threats. Security from nuclear and terrorist threats, a stable global financial system, stopping deadly infectious diseases at their source, and solving global warming all will require cooperation with nondemocracies.

Moreover, a close look at the foreign policy stances of myriad democracies in the developing world—such as Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, and India—show that their national interests and aspirations are hardly easier to manage than the goals of a recalcitrant Chinese or Russian veto on the UN Security Council. Indeed, as these developing democracies “rise” in the global system, all indicators point to the increasing prominence of nationalism and nationalist aspirations in their domestic politics—that is, the universal hunger for recognition and power in international decision making commensurate to their internal growth, a fact that does not make these countries inherently more malleable in diplomatic forums than, say, an autocratic Malaysia or Egypt.

To elicit greater cooperation in addressing transnational threats, therefore, US foreign policy and its leadership style must change.

Creating a New Forum
A key problem over the last eight years has been the United States: on many issues it has been at odds with the rest of the world, including its close democratic allies. To obtain the cooperation it needs for its security and prosperity, the United States must create new relationships with the major and rising powers, and rebuild trust and confidence. It’s hard to see any institution generating more effective global cooperation without a change in America’s leadership style and foreign policy. This is a necessary condition for effective international problem solving against transnational threats.

What is needed is not an organization that will divide the world into democracies and nondemocracies, but a new institution that will help the United States, and major and rising powers cooperate on shared transnational threats. This new institution would replace the current Group of Eight (G-8) with a new Group of Sixteen (G-16) that would include Brazil, China, India, South Africa, Mexico (the “Outreach 5”) and Indonesia, Turkey, and Egypt, which are key Muslim majority states.

A G-16 will not magically solve global problems. It can, however, be a prenegotiating forum, a place where the smallest possible grouping of necessary stakeholders can meet to forge agreements on the parameters of responses to major global challenges. It can be a mechanism for building knowledge, trust, and patterns of cooperative behavior among the most powerful states. In addition, it can be a device by which leading states encourage one another to take responsibility not only for the global impacts of their national actions but also for their global role in tackling common problems.

Such an institution could not make decisions for the rest of the world; it could, however, be a force for making the United Nations and other multilateral and regional bodies more effective. Policy discussions among 16 nations have much greater potential to be productive than a dialogue among 60 to 100 disparate democracies or 192 member states in the United Nations. Moreover, given that these are the most powerful states in the international system, their ability to create shared threat perceptions could make both the work of the Security Council more effective and, indeed, make its reform more likely and desirable. Its convening power, the collective weight of its economies and diplomatic and military capacities, and its combined populations would create an unparalleled platform to catalyze and mobilize effective international action.

The key challenge is to find a way to bring old and new sources of power to bear on the problems of the 21st century. An institution that allows the 16 major and rising powers to reach common ground on shared interests has a far greater chance of producing greater global cooperation against today’s transnational threats than a value-based coalition that focuses on regime type as the primary characteristic of membership.

—Michael Kraig
Director of Policy and Analysis, The Stanley Foundation

Resource
America and International Cooperation: What Role for a League of Democracies?
The above article is a summary of a new Stanley Foundation policy analysis brief by Stephen J. Stedman. A G-16-type process that brings in a bevy of middle powers, emerging economies, rising powers, and major powers—both democratic and authoritarian—may be the best way to bring the world’s resources and wealth to bear on the world’s thorniest problems. Stedman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI) and director of the Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies at Stanford University, proposes a new path. You can read his full policy brief at www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources or order on page 10-11.
Ever since an American diplomat first urged Chinese leaders to make their rising nation a responsible stakeholder, the term has been bandied more than it has been analyzed. On its face, the concept doesn’t seem controversial. Shouldn’t every member of the world community be a responsible stakeholder?

Unfortunately, the term was originally couched as a set of demands that an established power placed on an emerging one.

Therefore, some viewed it as the United States being patronizing and once again trying to dictate terms to another nation. At its essence, though, being a responsible stakeholder is a matter of basic good citizenship in the international community, rather than a fixed set of values demanding 100 percent adherence. What’s more, it certainly does not assume that a functioning international system will be dictated by a single, globally dominant power.

Viewed most charitably, the term expresses the notion that those countries that have the greatest wealth and power benefit the most from a healthy global order. In other words they have a larger stake. To extend the logic, then, those who benefit the most have a larger responsibility to make the system work well.

That is a straightforward concept, but the application of it in the midst of the ongoing evolution of international politics is not always self-evident. Exploring the development of responsible stakeholdership in the current circumstance is the focus of the Stanley Foundation’s ongoing Powers and Principles project. The project is premised on the very idea that stakeholdership, and perhaps the shape of the international order itself, would be clarified by exploring what it demands of various nations. If the duty of global stewardship were a shared one, and responsibility is mutual, would the system seem less skewed toward a privileged few? Perhaps the international order would appear more eminently sensible and less biased if all of its members were asked, “what have you done lately” for the greater global good?

The Critical Powers

The Powers and Principles project has commissioned writers to describe the paths that nine powerful nations, a regional union of 27 states, and a multinational corporation could take to becoming constructive stakeholders in a strengthened rules-based order. How might each country or entity deal with the internal and external challenges posed by international norms pertaining to the global economy,
domestic governance and society, and global and regional security? As the papers are completed, they are being posted on the Stanley Foundation Web site, and in spring 2009 they will be published by Lexington Books as an edited volume.

The cases include the powers that will be critical for the emerging global order. Choices are always arguable but China, the United States, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Brazil, and South Africa seem to represent a critical mass for the international community. If they remain in rough alignment, the community should be able to surmount the formidable challenges it faces. If not, the future is more worrisome.

In an era of growing influence for nonstate actors in the international system, it seems appropriate to look at the role that a major nonstate actor might play. The oil and gas industry, one that is dominated by multinational corporations, posed an interesting and wide set of issues. Thus it is the subject of the 11th paper in the series.

Recognizing the Possible

The project did not set out to define the true standards of good international behavior. It was quite revealing, though, to ask what are the questions of international norms that logically suggest themselves for the foreign policy agendas of these different actors.

At root, each essay is an assessment of what steps toward greater international common cause are politically possible—with a description of the associated pressures and incentives. Writers say which new stances or orientations a nation would adopt as it places increasing priority on the norms of the international order. They examine how the national interest calculations of governments reflect not only the particular needs of their country but a shared stake in the international common good. And given the project’s emphasis on a healthy world community, they look at the public goods of the global order, and how they might be generated or preserved.

Aside from the classic questions of international relations theory—the role of interests, ideals, power balances, and norms in determining the actions of nations—this inquiry also explores the domestic determinants of foreign policy. In a way, the contributing authors’ essential subject is the relationship between international politics and domestic politics. The organizers merely started with the contention that the impulse to virtuous behavior, while hardly irresistible, is actually a potent international political force.

—David Shorr
Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

Powers and Principles
International Leadership in a Shrinking World

The Powers and Principles project aims to identify plausible actions and trends for the next ten years that could build a more unified international community. Focusing on 11 key powers in today’s world, pairs of expert writers discuss how a given country (plus the European Union and a major oil company) might deal with the internal and external challenges posed by international norms.

Unlike the typical crystal ball projects that think tanks sometimes conduct, Powers and Principles does not ask participants to rate the probability of their scenarios or filter them through any test beyond mere plausibility. This exercise is about a particular global future—an international community with broad support for norms—and how it might take shape.

While interdependence and the necessity of international cooperation is increasingly recognized even by many of the most hard-nosed, Powers and Principles tries to push past conventional thinking. It seeks to identify the specific actions and developments that would lead to a greater degree of international solidarity.

All of the writers were recruited for their extensive knowledge of the country about which they would be writing. Beyond that, though, they have embraced the premise that the nations and leaders at the focus of their given country could plausibly steer elements of policy and politics toward service to the greater global good.

To learn more, visit www.stanleyfoundation.org/powersandprinciples.
In the waning days of the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August, politicians in Turkey focused elsewhere—on Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Central Asian players in regional energy markets.

Turkey’s energy minister [Hilmi Guler] visited the two former Soviet states to discuss long-term energy strategies, just three weeks after a tentative cease-fire was inked between Moscow and Tbilisi.

The meeting, which came on the heels of a costly trade dispute with Russia over Ankara’s decision to authorize US naval access to the Black Sea during the Georgia fighting, has been widely interpreted as a warning shot to Russia that Turkey is not about to be pushed around.

Looking East
Looking east in troubled times comes naturally to Turkey, which was among the first countries to recognize the independence of Central Asian states when they split away from the disintegrating Soviet Union in the 1990s. Under former President Turgut Ozal (1989-1993), political and economic ties between Turkey and these Turkic-brethren states took off. Since 2002, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took office, a renewed focus on Central Asia has led to rising foreign investment and international trade with Turkey’s eastern neighbors.

In the wake of the Russia-Georgia conflict, Turkish officials say, ties to newly independent former Soviet states assume even greater importance. Ahmet
Davutoglu, chief foreign policy adviser to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in a meeting with journalists in Ankara, argues that Turkey has taken on an important role in keeping lines of communications open between antagonists—not only in the Caucasus but also in the greater Middle East where Turkey, uniquely, has good relations with Israel, Arab states, and Iran.

“In principle we are against isolation,” says Davutoglu. “We were against isolation of Syria, we were against isolation of Iraq, because isolation creates economic stagnation. Isolation creates a barrier.”

Exports Increase to Turkey’s Neighbors
The emphasis on economics is not accidental. Exports to Near Asia and the Middle East region, for instance, have skyrocketed in recent years climbing to more than $15 billion in 2007 from $3.3 billion in 2001, according to statistics kept by the Turkish Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Exports to North America, Africa, and other Asian states also gained during the same period, and Turkey is pursuing opportunities to expand trade with Africa too. But Turkey’s near-abroad partnerships have been among the biggest recipients of Turkish-made goods during the AKP tenure. (In Turkmenistan, for instance, Turkey has become the leading source for foreign direct investment, sending about $1.5 billion in 2007.

Russia’s Undeniable Importance
In the near term, however, no amount of courting Central Asian and Middle Eastern states will supplant economic reality: Russia is Turkey’s largest trading partner. In 2007 bilateral trade totaled $28 billion, a figure that is expected to climb to $38 billion by the end of 2008.

On the energy front, Turkey imports nearly two-thirds of its total natural gas supplies from Russia, a vital heating source for homes in Istanbul and Ankara that some analysts believe Turkey’s ruling party will not interrupt as winter approaches and March 2009 elections loom. Turkish heavy construction firms, banks, and its energy services sector have been major players in the post-Soviet revival of the Russian economy.

Henri J. Barkey, a Turkey expert at Lehigh University, says logic argues for Turkey to avoid pushing Russia too hard. Barkey points to a recently proposed security agreement between Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—a so-called platform for security and cooperation in the South Caucasus—as evidence of Turkey’s desire to maintain close relations with the Kremlin.

“Turkey will always choose with the United States...especially when it comes to a choice of the United States and Russia,” said Hugh Pope, a Turkey expert at the International Crisis Group. “But Turkey’s whole strategy will be to delay any such moment of truth. They do not want to be outed on this question.”


Editors Trip to Turkey
Greg Bruno was one of 11 American editors and producers who attended the International Reporting Project’s (IRP) Gatekeeper Editors trip to Turkey September 14-25. The Stanley Foundation collaborates with IRP in making the trips possible.

The group met various media and business leaders to understand Turkey’s rich history and Turkey’s future as a rising economic, political, military, and cultural power. It had dinner with US Consul General Sharon Wiener and interviewed US Ambassador Ross Wilson, Turkey Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, as well as retired military leaders about the strong role Turkey’s military plays in protecting its secular identity.

The group flew to Diyarbakir, a Kurdish city near the borders of Syria and Iraq. There it met with the mayor and governor, as well as several members of the business community. It also visited a women’s cooperative and a rural village.

The participating editors included:
Greg Bruno, staff writer/editor, www.CFR.org,
Council on Foreign Relations
Jill Burcum, editorial board member, Star Tribune, Minneapolis
Yavonda Chase, international editor, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette
Justin Dial, senior producer, CNN American Morning
Larisa Epatko, world editor, PBS NewsHour with Jim Lehrer
Gary Graham, managing editor, Spokesman-Review, Spokane, Washington
Bridget Kelley, supervising editor, NPR Morning Edition
Liz Heron, Web editor, The Washington Post
Steven Paulson, executive producer, Wisconsin Public Brian Winter, foreign editor, USA Today
Jake Ellison, Web editor, Seattle Post-Intelligencer

This trip is part of the Rising Powers: The New Global Reality project. More information is available at www.risingpowers.org.
Since the end of the Cold War, the global security environment has undergone profound changes, but US nuclear weapons policy has not kept pace. This is a dangerous and unstable situation in which US dependence on nuclear weapons reduces rather than supports American security.

US nuclear weapons policy must change to reflect the current and foreseeable global threat environment, one in which the utility of nuclear weapons is drastically reduced and the consequences of maintaining large numbers of nuclear weapons and aggressive doctrines are great. To correct this and meet the security challenges of today, the United States should lead the global community in reducing dependency on nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of multilateral, verifiable nuclear disarmament. To achieve this, the United States will need to take several steps.

Here are five fronts on which the United States should move:

1. Despite real strains in the relationship, Russia remains a critical player as the only other state with huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons. A new strategic dialogue on further stockpile reductions is critical to moving beyond the current situation where each side retains thousands of nuclear weapons.

2. The United States must engage China—a rising power and a state with a significant nuclear weapons infrastructure—to find a common, secure nuclear future.

3. The new administration must rethink the basing of US nuclear weapons in Europe, and discuss this with our European allies.

4. The United States is an outlier on ratification of an agreement to end nuclear weapons testing and, in fact, has pursued the rejuvenation of its stockpile and considered building new nuclear weapons. This is counterproductive and counterintuitive at a time of concern about stopping the spread of nuclear material and technologies around the globe.

5. Other countries seek clarity about US intentions, and the United States must declare that while it moves to lessen reliance on nuclear weapons, the existing nuclear weapons would only ever be considered weapons of last resort.

Within the first year of a new presidency, the United States will have an official opportunity to adopt these
changes when it undertakes a formal review of its nuclear weapons policy. With this in mind, the Stanley Foundation launched a US Nuclear Policy Review project to produce recommendations for changing US nuclear weapons policy.

**Renew Deal With Russia, Work With China**

By 2012 the United States has committed to reducing its “actively deployed strategic stockpile” to approximately 2,000 weapons. Yet to carry out the only missions where nuclear weapons could be determined absolutely necessary—those involving existential deterrence—far fewer weapons are needed. The United States should seek further cuts.

Russia is not the threat the Soviet Union was. Continued high level of US and Russian nuclear arsenals lends itself to reciprocal action on reductions, especially since current warhead levels encourage Russia to maintain an artificially robust nuclear stockpile.

The United States should initiate a new strategic dialogue with Russia to explore how additional significant reductions can be achieved in a mutually reinforcing manner. One thousand nuclear weapons in the total stockpile on each side could be a useful starting point for discussion. The United States and Russia should also extend the existing reductions verification regime between the two countries that is set to expire in 2009, leaving the United States and Russia with no nuclear weapon verification mechanisms between them.

As China continues to deepen its engagement with the global community, its participation in strategic dialogues also becomes more critical. The United States should encourage a relationship with China that includes a shared understanding of a secure nuclear future, involving decreasing salience of nuclear weapons and a strengthened nonproliferation regime.

**Remove US Missiles From Europe**

In 2008 the United States is the only nuclear weapons state that stockpiles its nuclear weapons on foreign soil. First deployed as an integral part of Cold War strategy—aimed to counterbalance overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority in Europe—the remaining US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe now serve no military purpose. They needlessly raise tensions among the European allies. In consultation with European allies and Russia, the United States should pursue the timely removal of all remaining nuclear weapons from European soil.

**Ratify the Test Ban Treaty**

Since the 1999 US Senate vote rejecting ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), tremendous steps have been made to address the two significant concerns raised at the time: (1) how to assure a safe, secure, and reliable US nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing and (2) the verification of compliance via an extensive global monitoring system. Several senior-level scientific studies have recommended that these technical concerns have been satisfied.

Therefore, a new US administration should consult with the US Senate on CTBT ratification. To ensure ratification, the executive branch must work to lay the groundwork for favorable consideration of the treaty.

**A Need for Presidential Leadership**

Finally, a new review of US nuclear weapons policy should consider key issues in nuclear strategic policy that have previously been ignored.

First, as the United States encourages the other nuclear weapon states and the global community to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons, it must be careful to avoid simply substituting conventional capabilities for nuclear capabilities. That will not provide more durable security.

Secondly, given that the supreme authority to use nuclear weapons rests solely with the president, the lack of understanding of plans and options at the most senior levels in the event that deterrence fails is disturbing. This must change.

The 2009 review of nuclear policy will reflect the preferences of the next administration and its judgments about the global political landscape. Presidential leadership can move US strategic policy into the modern era and do much to restore a shattered consensus, building a new contract for the United States in the global community that shapes a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear future.

—Matt Martin, Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

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**Resources**


The path each country takes regarding nuclear weaponry has a global impact on policy and military decisions. The Stanley Foundation examines the United States’ own nuclear policies in the context of international cooperative measures. Learn more at [www.stanleyfoundation.org/usnuclearpolicy](http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/usnuclearpolicy).
Now Available

Stanley Foundation Resources

These reports and a wealth of other information are available at reports.stanleyfoundation.org.

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**PUBLICATIONS**


Reducing American dependency on nuclear weapons will lead to greater security for the United States and its allies and should be the driving force behind US nuclear weapons policy. The ultimate American goal should be multilateral, verifiable nuclear disarmament, according to a new report by the Stanley Foundation. To achieve this, the US will need to take several steps, including adoption of a no-first-use policy, pursuing the removal of all remaining US nuclear weapons from Europe, negotiating an extension of the START verification protocol with Russia, and engaging China in ways that build a secure nuclear future.

With a new incoming presidential administration, the US will undertake a formal review of its nuclear weapons policy. With this in mind, the Stanley Foundation launched a US Nuclear Policy Review project to produce recommendations for changing US nuclear weapons policy. Project report available in January 2009.

**Challenges to Effective Multilateralism: Comparing Asian and European Experiences**

A key component of successful US foreign policy in the 21st century will be its ability to interact with the growing economic and security agendas and geopolitical weight of key regions throughout the world, especially Europe and East Asia. To date, little serious comparison of these two regions’ dynamics has occurred. To fill this gap, the foundation and several cosponsors hosted a conference on this topic. November 2008 conference report.

**What an Engagement Strategy Entails: Is the United States Government Equipped?**

This brief focuses on past lessons and current realities for the reform of US civilian international affairs agencies to orient them toward the adoption of a coherent and integrated global engagement strategy. October 2008 dialogue brief.

**United States-China-Japan Working Group on Trilateral Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM)s**

The Stanley Foundation and Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies supported the creation of three working groups—one each in China, Japan, and the United States—comprised of leaders in the military, government, and academic fields in order to discuss and come to agreement on specific confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM)s at the national level, intended to help reduce misperceptions and build greater mutual confidence and trust in the region. October 2008 conference report.

**Strategic Deterrence and US Nuclear Weapons Policy**

Strategic deterrence is difficult to define and even harder to prove. In response to this perceived uncertainty, the Bush administration has altered its conception of deterrence, but it is unclear whether this change is a new model and, if so, whether this new model is any more or less effective than previous ones. On July 8, 2008, a group of foreign policy scholars and experts met to discuss these issues. October 2008 online dialogue brief.

**A Stake in the System: Redefining American Leadership**

The decline in the United States’ international standing and credibility is widely recognized and remarked. Less well understood, though, is how to renew US international leadership. Looking at the challenges confronting the new president, Suzanne Nossel of the Center for American Progress and the Stanley Foundation’s David Shorr found that the “legitimacy agenda” includes a formidable set of human rights, security, economic, and environmental issues. The authors identify a number of policy steps the next administration(s) must take to uphold international norms and a rules-based global order in a manner befitting the United States’ stake in that order. 2008 online working paper.

**A Rising China’s Rising Responsibilities**

The question about China is not whether it will be an integral part of the international community, but rather how it will use...
its position as a rising global power. Does it aim merely to evade international criticism and reap near-term benefits—neither rejecting nor committing to the current global order? Stanley Foundation’s Michael Schiffer and Bates Gill, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, focus particularly on how China’s domestic governance will affect its international posture. China’s development as an international stakeholder depends on maintaining domestic stability and meeting its citizens’ needs accountably and responsibly. If China continues steadily cultivating pluralism, equity, and justice, it will see the value of these norms in other countries. Conversely, a China plagued by domestic instabilities—or unable to fulfill public expectations—will be a far more suspicious and less cooperative partner internationally. 2008 online working paper.

RADIO DOCUMENTARY

Brazil Rising
Hosted by David Brown, this radio documentary explores Brazil’s emergence as one of the fastest growing players in the global economy. Can Brazil successfully chart a path that overcomes grinding poverty and violent crime while still preserving the country’s unique environment?

Visit www.stanleyfoundation.org/radio for our complete Rising Powers feature and to explore the countries responsible for the changing global order, the big issues that play a cross-cutting role, and the implications for the United States.

GROUP RESOURCES

The Stanley Foundation offers Now Showing toolkits to community and student groups to hold an easy-to-plan, successful event in their community or on their campus.

The toolkits are designed to encourage discussion about the most urgent global issues today. The following toolkits are available FREE to interested groups:

Rising Powers:
The New Global Reality
This toolkit features a DVD which helps viewers explore the idea of the changing global order as well as Brazil’s rise in a new global reality.

Beyond Fear: Securing a More Peaceful World
This toolkit features a DVD with two segments that explore US leadership in today’s uncertain world.

How to Get a Toolkit
Call Susan Roggendorf at 563-264-1500 or order online at www.stanleyfoundation.org/nowshowing.
The topic of the United States and rising powers is the subject of an article in the 2009 Great Decisions briefing book. The article, written by Stanley Foundation program officer Michael Schiffer, examines how the US-dominated post-Cold War era is waning and new countries are increasing their influence in economic, political, and even military matters.

On trade issues, the so-called BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China are an increasingly powerful voice within the World Trade Organization. And energy-rich countries have all benefited from high global prices that show no signs of declining in the long term. These rising countries are also becoming increasingly assertive on the world stage, whether it’s Russian influence over European energy supplies or Brazil pushing its demands and those of other developing countries like South Africa and India in the Doha round of trade talks. The United Nations Security Council and the G-8, two bastions of post-World War II power, are also not immune to increasing demands from the rapidly developing world. Schiffer encourages readers to consider how the United States will engage these rising powers as they seek a greater global voice.

The briefing book is part of the Great Decisions program from the Foreign Policy Association. In addition to rising powers, the 2009 Great Decisions briefing book features articles on Afghanistan/Pakistan, energy and the global economy, the Arctic, Egypt in the 21st century, global food supply, Cuba after Castro, and universal human rights. Look for the US and rising powers article in January at www.risingpowers.org.