Security in the Pacific

Communicating With Arabs
Global Strike
Boosting Civilian Capacity
the continuing security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region is largely contingent on enhanced cooperation between the region’s three dominant powers: China, Japan, and the United States.

While in many respects the United States, China, and Japan have enjoyed a reasonably stable regional system in recent years, it is equally true that shifting power dynamics in the region have created a situation that is highly fluid and remains vulnerable to pressure for confrontation and possibly conflict. There is a need to address the new and changing realities of the Asia-Pacific region.

While creating strong and capable regional architecture that can accommodate the interests of the major powers of the region is a laudable long-term goal, it is unlikely to transpire soon. Absent such an institutional “shock absorber”—and with the close operating proximity of the US, Japanese, and Chinese militaries in the region—the need for increased confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) is compelling. CSBMs can alleviate specific friction points and contribute to a stable and sustainable peace among the Asia-Pacific community.

Fostering confidence—and reducing misperceptions in the military field as well as historical, cultural, and political issues—is a key objective and necessary building block for achieving peaceful, stable, and cooperative regional relations.

Confidence- and security-building measures can foster stable, productive relations between the United States, China, and Japan

Pacifying the Pacific

Port of Call. Chinese sailors man the rails aboard the destroyer Qingdao as they arrive in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in 2006. Military exchanges like this go a long way toward building trust between nations. Known as confidence- and security-building measures, such activities can alleviate specific friction points and contribute to a stable and sustainable peace among the Asia-Pacific community. (US Navy photo by Joe Kane)
The Role of CSBMs

The definition of CSBMs varies from the traditional narrow focus on operational military activities to a broader interpretation which encompasses an array of political, diplomatic, military, and even economic action that builds confidence and trust between the participating countries. Setting up crisis communication “hot-lines,” for example, or sharing data on military capabilities are classic examples of CSBMs. Confidence building is most frequently seen in the process of communication between governments, and can be furthered by both formal and informal measures that address, prevent, or resolve uncertainties on political, military, and other issues. Such measures can reduce the possibility of accidental, incidental, or inadvertent war as well as managing problems that might otherwise lead to confrontation.

Moreover, many of the activities embodied by CSBMs contain a strong implied normative framework that is consistent with the sort of multilateral solutions-oriented diplomacy that is at the heart of Stanley Foundation goals and values. CSBMs can play important roles in delegitimizing the use of force to resolve disputes. They can also marginalize and control certain weapons systems. And CSBMs may even support trilateral and multilateral fora designed to reach common decisions and to adjudicate disputes. Buy-in to a CSBM regime may therefore have the appearance of being small, technical, and incidental. However, as the Helsinki experience in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s illustrated, such a regime can contribute to broader and more far-reaching political or diplomatic change.

Workshop Aims to Foster Cooperation

Over the past year, the Stanley Foundation has convened a trilateral workshop with US, Japanese, and Chinese participants to develop a concrete and realistic menu of CSBMs that can be considered by the three countries. If implemented, they would contribute to reducing the dangers of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and conflict, and to the misapprehension of military activities.

There are, of course, areas where significant disagreement between the participants in the project remains. The working group, however, has broad agreement on a basic goal: improving strategic communication and security cooperation between the United States, Japan, and China through a frank and open exchange of ideas to foster receptivity and recognition of the need for confidence building at various levels between the three powers.

Considerable discussion in the working group was devoted to exploring traditional transparency and communication CSBMs. Given the nature of the Asia-Pacific region, naval CSBMs are also being discussed, with participants pointing to issues like port visits, strengthened communication channels at sea, exchanging students at naval academies, developing joint exercises, and an Incidents at Sea Agreement as the focus of a robust naval CSBM regime.

Some of the CSBM measures under consideration by the trilateral working group might be proposed in the short term under current conditions. Others might be implemented in a series of steps over a somewhat longer period of time. Still others might require a higher level of cooperation than currently exists. But by creating a mutually reinforcing virtuous cycle of cooperative interactions, progress on the first two levels will help achieve this higher level of cooperation.

A Path to More Productive Relations?

All participants agreed on the rising importance of nontraditional CSBMs in helping to build stable and productive trilateral relations in the region. Although many discussions in this area remain unsettled, some suggested that it’s easier to start CSBMs in nontraditional security areas—cooperation on natural disaster warning and response, for example—and then expand to a trilateral CSBM regime that covers more contentious traditional security issues at a later time.

Lastly, working group participants all acknowledged that domestic politics and policies in the respective countries complicate the ability to coordinate coherent foreign policies. However, this should not produce insurmountable obstacles to the creation of CSBMs.

There are few illusions that CSBMs, in themselves, can create a sustainable and enduring cooperative regional framework and melt away the issues of contention between the United States, China, and Japan. But, during a period of power transition when uncertainty about intentions, misapprehension, or even an accident could spark an unwanted and unintended confrontation, the development of a robust trilateral CSBM regime can also play a key role in stabilizing the region.

—Michael Schiffer
Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

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Welcome Aboard. Pacific Ocean—Commander, Carrier Strike Group Five Rear Adm. James D. Kelly describes flight operations to Japanese Navy Rear Adm. Isamu Ozawa, a distinguished visitor on board the conventionally powered aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk. Military exchanges like this serve as confidence-building measures. (US Navy photo by Airman Jimmy C. Pan)
Marwan M. Kraidy is an expert on Arab media and an associate professor at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania. This is adapted from an op-ed that ran in The Des Moines Register and draws from his recent Stanley Foundation paper, Arab Media and US Policy: A Public Diplomacy Reset.

One of the most daunting tasks facing the next US president will be the restoration of America’s reputation in the world. Nowhere is this imperative so difficult and yet so vital than in the Arab world. Since September 11, the US image has steadily deteriorated among Arabs, and a recent poll by the Pew Charitable Trusts found that “The US image remains abysmal...in the Middle East.”

According to the Pew poll, the view that the United States acts unilaterally is an opinion that has tracked closely with the decline in America’s overall image over the past five years. Conversely, the perception that other leaders act multilaterally enhanced their standing considerably. Former French President Jacques Chirac has an excellent reputation in several Arab countries compared to the negative perceptions of President Bush. This difference is explained by France’s insistence on multilateral solutions to foreign policy crises even while France pursued an aggressive and largely failed domestic policy toward its Muslim population.

To counter these hostile perceptions in the Arab world, the present US administration has resorted to censorship at home and counterpropaganda in the Middle East, such as censoring pictures of the coffins of US soldiers, “coordinating” with US networks on how to cover the war on terror, and planting stories in Iraqi newspapers.

Backfire

In an Arab world awash with media, such actions fuel exactly the currents in public opinion they were intended to weaken. The Arab media field is intensely competitive, with high levels of attention scarcity. Since 1990 the Arab media sector has experienced explosive growth. Though Al Jazeera is the best known, there are more than 300 privately owned satellite channels. In contrast to life behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, Arabs today are awash with information of all kinds, delivered through various media platforms and covering a broad ideological spectrum. Many Arabs increasingly find foreign broadcasts dubious in motivation, redundant in content, and preachy in tone.

Grasping the complexity of the Arab media environment entails moving beyond asking whether an Arab media outlet is “anti-American” or “pro-American.” Though some institutions display biases for or against US policy, many channels present a more ambivalent package, advocating some declared US objectives like transparency in governance, while opposing US Middle East policies. To deal with this ambivalence, US policymakers will have to put long-term policy goals ahead of immediate foreign policy needs, a difficult task in the age of the 24-hour news cycle.

Alternative Choices

So what should the United States do to rebuild its reputation? Working with others must become institutionalized in US foreign policy. It should go back to being a deal maker, not a rule breaker. Multilaterally vetted policies are credible and legitimate, and enhance national reputations.

A renewed US multilateralism must integrate numerous state and nonstate actors. A series of basic, commonsensical steps should be undertaken:

- Create an empowered, better-funded, and more autonomous public diplomacy organism.
- Expand Arab language training.
- Set up a structure of incentives to learn Arabic.
- Provide Arab journalists with wider and easier access to US sources.
- Facilitate visa and airport entry procedures.
- Make sure US consular staff is adequately trained in human relations.
- Most importantly, emphasize two-way exchanges and decrease one-way advertising.

Finally, the United States should undertake a bold and imaginative initiative such as establishing a Global
Endowment for Creativity (GEC). The GEC would be funded and managed jointly with international partners—Japan, the European Union, perhaps China—to bring together public servants and civil society. Like the national endowments for the arts and for the humanities, this new body should award grants and fellowships to Arab artists, intellectuals, and journalists. It should sponsor annual literary and media competitions, whose winners would be granted wide distribution or publication.

The low US reputation in the Arab world is not a communication problem but a policy problem. Communication, like mortar, holds together the bricks of an edifice; just like we cannot substitute mortar for bricks, we cannot substitute communication for smart policies. The silver lining is that negative perceptions of the United States in the Arab world are not old or immutable. They are the result of US policies. So a change in policies can also result in a change in perceptions.
Prompt Global Strike  US Military
Advances Raise New Strategic Consequences

Fast and Deadly, NASA Langley Research Center, VA—This hypersonic cruise missile was used in the first-ever ground test of a full-scale missile using conventional liquid hydrocarbon fuel. The Office of Naval Research is doing experiments to produce a future high-speed strike weapon, capable of speeds in excess of Mach 6 with a range of 600 nautical miles. A group of leading experts brought together by the Stanley Foundation is recommending transparency in developing new “prompt global strike” methods. (Photo courtesy DARPA/ONR/NASA Langley Research Center)
The desire to carry out a precise and lethal military attack from a long distance away is hardly new. The idea even has a handy acronym among defense experts, PGS, which stands for “prompt global strike.”

Using these long distance attacks to achieve a certain freedom of action has long been a goal for all militaries, including the United States. But here at the beginning of the 21st century, the rapid advancement of technology and its integration into military planning and programs has made the issue more prominent than ever.

The United States is the predominant leader in PGS. And with the upcoming change in presidential administrations, America has a unique moment to consider and plan strategic goals for national and international security and the role of PGS in all of this.

Worldwide Targeting

As a basic military goal, PGS seeks to precisely hit any spot on the planet with conventional munitions within 30-60 minutes. But experts say when this desire for a specific military capability is injected into various strategic plans, situations, and missions, a wide variety of potential, and sometimes unpredictable, outcomes results.

Striking Osama bin Laden with a conventional intercontinental ballistic missile, based on rapid intelligence gathering and short reaction times may be quite different than bombing North Korea because there are signs of an imminent missile launch, taking out Iranian infrastructure because they might be developing a nuclear weapons capability, or building an entire offensive and defensive space architecture to enable greater freedom of action.

PGS can be a powerful defensive tool that raises our national security infrastructure above and beyond that of our adversaries. Few people in any country would want to give up the advantages inherent in the PGS concept.

A Strain on Relations?

But PGS also has the potential to damage the bonds between US and allied forces; between the decision maker and the impacts of those decisions; between PGS and other tools of US action internationally, both military and nonmilitary.

While PGS offers great promise, it can also build momentum and rationale for increased unilateral military action against a wide variety of international security challenges. And it might spark new and unconventional responses from others as they try to level the playing field.

Should we allow technological developments alone to define our strategic future? How can we encourage further analysis and strategic planning, including a proper context for PGS, at the highest levels?

Policy Group Recommends Transparency

The Stanley Foundation brought together a group of leading experts last fall to address these issues at its 48th annual Strategy for Peace Conference. Because the official policies and directives defining PGS are few, disconnected, and vague, conference participants saw this as an opportune time to consider the larger strategic ramifications in a variety of important areas:

- Military decision making
- Overall strategic planning
- Traditional deterrence
- Preemption/prevention
- Legitimacy
- Arms control
- Multilateral frameworks

The group developed these recommendations for US policymakers:

- Increase transparency. Global strike capabilities and programs are both diffused across the entire Defense Department as well as closely connected to other military doctrine that has increased in saliency in recent years, such as the use of preventive strikes. This has resulted in vagueness and opacity when delineating “global strike” from other categories, making judgment difficult.

- Concretize the mission. Because of its catch-all nature, “global strike” is often framed in overly broad and generalized scenarios. But this lack of specificity blurs the lines between theory and implementation, ignoring or misjudging practical realities and limitations. Global strike should be evaluated at the micro, not the macro, level.

- Embed global strike capabilities into new, reconsidered doctrine. Maturing technologies and associated infrastructures have shown incredible capabilities that would have been considered science fiction in the not-so-distant past. Yet US national security strategy and doctrine have not kept pace, allowing technology to lead. This revolution in military affairs should be considered in the context of a new security strategy and doctrine that draws from a wider toolkit, including rejuvenated diplomacy and increased intelligence, noting in particular the strategic value of a US foreign policy that recaptures global credibility and respect.
A Silent Consensus

Most agree the United States must boost its civilian diplomacy efforts. So why isn’t the idea gathering steam?

You Gotta Know the Territory. The leader of the Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Andrew Passon of the State Department, chats with a local businessman in the historic Abu Nawaz area as part of efforts to help the local shops reopen and improve their services. January 2008 (Photo by Ben Barber/USAID)
This election year provides a fascinating opportunity to observe the interplay between the substance of foreign policy and the political process. We are all watching how the candidates couch the issues as they compete for the mandate of the American people. The high profile these issues have taken in the election make for a foreign policy junkie's heaven.

But what if there were an issue that enjoyed near universal support—from right to left and everywhere in between—within the professional policy community? And let’s say that despite this overwhelming consensus, action to deal with the problem is not gathering steam. This is the case for the weak state of our civilian international affairs agencies, and it highlights a different dimension of the relationship between policy and politics.

Despite America’s superpower status, our government is not as effective as it should be in conducting our day-to-day relations with the rest of the world. The most outspoken advocates of boosting our civilian capacity are the leaders of the US military (including Defense Secretary Robert Gates), who feel compelled to fill the gap and perform civilian functions such as reconstruction and even diplomacy itself.

A Lack of Political Attention

While the problem is at the day-to-day level of promoting American interests and values, which almost by definition lies beneath the radar of political debates and decisions, the solution will require a push from top leaders. Only through political decisions and commitment will the necessary resources be marshaled to boost our capacity to work more effectively around the world. The Stanley Foundation is collaborating with the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) on a new initiative entitled “What a Strategy of Engagement Entails: Is the US Government Properly Equipped?” that is focusing on this issue—particularly the disconnect between the urgency of the problem and the lack of commensurate political attention.

As a superpower, the United States must manage a dizzying array of economic and political relationships and issues across the globe. And whatever one's position on the Iraq war, it has certainly served as a lesson in the limits of what can be accomplished through military force alone. It is now widely understood that diplomacy, aid and trade, democracy promotion, and public information are all vital for US national security. Becoming more effective in all of these areas will require a sizable investment to put more people on the case.

There is already a great deal of excellent work being done in this area both within and outside the government—the Smart Power Commission of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy are two of the best. For our part, the Stanley Foundation and CNAS plan to look at the problem in its largest dimensions and context.

In fact, one initial focus of our project will be to map the existing efforts to help them be as complementary as possible. At our first roundtable discussion, we will ask participants about the working assumptions of their work. We will also assess the political environment for these issues, something that will be an ongoing interest through the rest of the project.

Project Seeks Real World Results

To help make the issue more tangible, the project is drawing up examples of the results that should flow from an investment in civilian capacity. How will these new representatives of the United States help the nation deal with the shrinking, fast-changing 21st-century world? For example, they can broaden our diplomatic contacts with emerging leaders in other countries so that when people rise to prominence, we already know them, and vice versa. We can work to preserve and promote the “brand” of America’s private sector so that businesses around the world want to do business with Americans. Stronger capacity will also enable the United States to work more steadily and intensively in multilateral forums like the United Nations, where they can strengthen international cooperation on global problems like nuclear proliferation and poverty reduction.

The project will take a keen interest in how budgetary planning and decisions in the executive branch link to national security strategy, as well as the need for the constructive involvement of Congress. A final report will be published in October 2008.

—David Shorr
Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation
Multilateralism as a Dual-Use Technique: Encouraging Nuclear Energy and Avoiding Proliferation
For smaller or less advanced countries, multilateral cooperation on nuclear energy development may be the only way to play an active role in a prestigious industry with evolving technology and potentially good profits. For all countries, it offers a gateway to security of fuel supply without political strings. John Thomson and Geoffrey Forden, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, propose a model multilateral arrangement that is applicable to any part of the nuclear fuel cycle. March 2008 analysis brief.

Prospects for International Cooperation in Economic Development Knowledge Sharing With the DPRK
The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) and the Stanley Foundation convened a workshop in Seoul in November 2007 that brought together a diverse group to discuss ways to improve cooperation in knowledge-sharing activities with the DPRK. Overall, the workshop aimed to provide a forum for sharing of information and perspectives for those already involved in knowledge relationships as well as those considering future involvement, and discussing concrete ideas for moving forward. February 2008 report.

New Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia: Changing Security Cooperation and Competition
Fair or not, the longstanding perception that Southeast Asia remains on the back burner of the United States’ strategic agenda endures. The United States has engaged with Southeast Asian countries according to individual security concerns rather than through multilateral frameworks. There is a growing need to reconsider the role of regional institutions as new power dynamics and evolving concepts of security take shape in the region. October 2007 dialogue brief.

Arab Media and US Policy: A Public Diplomacy Reset
Several polls have underscored that the reputation of the United States in the Middle East has steadily deteriorated. This negative image poses a challenge to the ability of the United States to engage the Arab region and casts suspicion over political, economic, and cultural initiatives. Marwan M. Kraidy, an expert on Arab media, recommends a new strategy for how US policymakers communicate to the Arab world. January 2008 analysis brief.

Oil and Security
Using analysis of both the global and domestic economy over the past several decades, Clifford Singer demonstrates that the time has passed when oil was strategically important enough to require individual industrialized nations to be prepared to intervene militarily in oil-producing regions. Singer, a professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, examines how US military, political, and economic strategy can be reconfigured when the strategic role of oil becomes better understood. January 2008 analysis brief.

Overcoming Nuclear Dangers
Concerns about the perils posed by nuclear weapons have focused primarily on the spread of the bomb and the prospect that terrorist groups may acquire such weapons. Nuclear dangers, however, also exist in the policies of the United States and Russia, which still have thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. David Cortright examines that danger, probes the factors behind proliferation, and looks at the role of diplomacy. November 2007 analysis brief.
Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide
Editors–Derek Chollet, Tod Lindberg, and David Shorr

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