In the bustling go-go city of Seoul, South Korean officials are encouraging a deliberate and multilateral diplomacy to build on new breakthroughs with their Communist North Korean neighbors and bring lasting peace and security to the divided peninsula.

Following the North’s nuclear missile test last year, the six-party talks stalled for a few months and then made rapid progress. Most notably, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has agreed to shut down his nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid and normalization of relations with the United States and Japan.

The North Korean government is expected to disable its Yongbyon nuclear facility and account for its nuclear program by year’s end, said Chun Yung-woo, special representative for the Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Office of South Korea’s foreign ministry.

“Our goal is to dismantle its nuclear program and complete denuclearization by summer of 2008, and we know accomplishing this will require patience by all parties,” Chun said. “To move into dismantlement, we need greater trust in each other and that is what we’re doing now.”

Denuclearization, a declaration of peace on the Korean peninsula, and eventual normalization of relations with the United States will lay the foundation for eventual unification of the two Koreas, Chun said.
With a peace treaty, the North Korean view of the American troop presence on the peninsula will evolve, but US soldiers will likely be needed beyond reunification as a stabilizing force in East Asia, he said.

Editors Gain New Perspectives
Chun made his comments to a group of 12 American newspaper and broadcast editors. Their visit was made possible by the Stanley Foundation’s second collaboration with the International Reporting Project at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, which sent the journalists to South and North Korea November 2-14, 2007.

The journalists also met with North Korean defectors, South Korean students, former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, and US Ambassador Alexander Vershbow. They toured the demilitarized zone and visited the Hyundai-owned Mt. Kumgang Resort in North Korea—a joint tourism project between the two Koreas.

The trip served as a perspective-widening experience that will help news editors, and therefore the American public, better understand world events, said Randall D. Smith, deputy managing editor of *The Kansas City Star*.

“Americans have not done enough traveling, and in fact have done very little, so I don’t think that as a nation we have a tremendous firsthand understanding of the world,” he said. “As a result, I think these trips allow us to understand the context of world events. It helps us [know] where best to play the news and how best to play the news.”

Smith said visiting South and North Korea helped him gain a “much more realistic perspective on the real struggle for unification, and the importance of that from an economic and military perspective.”

He said it also underscored the importance of multilateral engagement to resolve conflict.

“This doesn’t just involve the two Koreas, it involves China and it involves Japan in some very fundamental ways.”

Most Prefer Slow Unification
The stakes on the Korean peninsula couldn’t be higher.

The United Nations estimates that a return to full-scale war involving South Korean and American troops in the South and North Korea’s 500,000-strong army would result in 1.5 million deaths in the first 24 hours.

Yet a burgeoning economy has left the newest generation of South Koreans less focused on the threat posed by the North and more focused on their personal success.

Hyungjin Kim, a 22-year-old student at Seoul National University, told the American editors his generation views North Korea as a foreign country posing little threat to the South. Unification of the two Koreas, he said, is not viewed as an important objective.

“I don’t want unification,” he said. “If we just have a peace treaty, I’m fine with that. I don’t want it to hurt the economy.”

The collapse of the former East Germany and the economic price paid for unification by the West indeed serves as a history lesson that worries many South Koreans.

Sung-Doo Kang, a 55-year-old working-class necktie distributor in Seoul, said he desires unification, “as soon as possible, but not before the economy improves in the North.”

South Koreans largely support former president Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy that resulted in the first inter-Korean summit and set a course for improved relations with the North.

Yet the ambivalence of the younger generation, which is “less interested in political or social concerns and more focused on immediate concerns such as how to get employed, is worrisome,” said Kim.

“We once enjoyed one shared culture, one shared language and we were one unified nation,” Kim said. “Ever since the Second World War we were divided arbitrarily by the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

“This is not something we chose ourselves. We cannot give up our aspiration for unification and the tradition of being one unified nation for the last 1,300 years.”

—Sean Harder

Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

Cover Photo. A South Korean soldier straddles the border between the North and South in a modified tae kwon do stance in a building along Conference Row. The building is often used for UN observed cross-border talks between the two countries, which have yet to sign a peace treaty and still adhere to the armistice agreement signed after the Korean War. (Stanley Foundation Photo/Sean Harder)
It’s Time to Rethink US Nuclear Posture

Amid renewed calls for eliminating nuclear weapons, Stanley Foundation analyzes issues behind US strategy

It’s time for a quiz. Please answer the following questions: How many nuclear weapons does the United States have today? What is their utility? Given the necessary scenario, how would we deliver them? What is that “necessary scenario”? How do nuclear weapons fit into our current thinking on national security? Are nuclear weapons useful in the war against terrorism? How many nuclear weapons do other countries have? How do they intend to use them? How do we influence others’ nuclear decisions? And by the way, didn’t we take care of all these issues at the end of the Cold War?

The surprising overarching answer to all these questions is that in 2007, in a post-Cold War, post-9/11, post-Iraq war, post-Inconvenient Truth world, when so much has changed about the way we think about global threats, international security, and our own US security within it, very little has changed in US nuclear weapons policy since 1991.

Sixteen years ago, then-President George H. W. Bush recognized the irrelevance of Cold War policies brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the opportunity to forge a stronger peace by taking the initiative on nuclear policy. In a relatively brief period of time, he ordered all nuclear weapons removed from US surface ships, eliminated all ground-based battlefield tactical nuclear weapons, and negotiated and oversaw the ratification of START I (reducing strategic nuclear weapons numbers in parallel with Russia).

Torched. A Russian shipyard worker uses a cutting torch to break down a large bulge section of a Russian Oscar Class submarine at the Little Star shipyard in Severodvinsk, Russia, May 29, 1996. Russian ballistic submarines are being dismantled as part of the Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. (DoD photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Todd P. Cichonowicz, US Navy)
Given this auspicious beginning, the wonder is how little we have changed our thinking in the intervening time. Perhaps partly from a sense of unfettered freedom of action brought about by transforming into the world’s only global superpower in the 1990s, perhaps partly out of a fear of letting go of a perceived unquestioned superiority as the strategic landscape shifted precariously beneath it after September 11, the US changes have mostly been about quantity, not quality.

**New Reductions, Same Force Posture**

In 2002, with the Moscow Treaty, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed to each further reduce their strategic nuclear stockpiles, but without any form of verification that the other side was complying, and leaving each country with around 2,000 active weapons by 2012. The United States has subsequently said that it does not foresee a need for further negotiations—meaning that the current reductions are mostly about each side ridding itself of excess capacity while maintaining the same missions and force postures.

At the beginning of his presidency in 2001, the Bush administration did produce a new US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)—the official document that gives direction to US nuclear weapons policy. In some ways, along with other official documents like the US military’s Quadrennial Defense Review, the 2001 NPR did reflect a shift away from Cold War planning, notably by redefining the “Strategic triad” from its traditional nuclear-exclusive definition (nuclear bombers, nuclear ICBMs, and nuclear strike submarines) toward a new triad that could achieve some strategic missions with conventional forces, instead of only nuclear forces.

In other places, where the NPR shifted away from conventional Cold War thinking, the underlying assumptions seemed to spring from a sense of unquestioned strategic superiority and complete freedom of action—a position that feels tragically shortsighted in the wake of the Iraq experience: renouncing the former US pledge to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; urging the development of new nuclear weapons with new capabilities; and building up the US nuclear infrastructure to maintain a perpetual nuclear complex, cutting against former commitments to work toward nuclear disarmament.

At the same time, however, the 2001 NPR strengthened and even heightened other Cold War assumptions and modes of behavior: it reasserted the right of the United States to strike first with nuclear weapons, even explicitly naming seven countries that this policy might apply to; and, while acknowledging the changes within Russia, it maintained that Russia was still the primary reason to keep the majority of our policy unchanged.

**Time Ripe for Strategic Review**

Now in 2007, there is a growing sense that US nuclear policy needs to be revisited. At the beginning of the year, four senior retired US statesmen—former Secretaries of State George Schultz and Henry Kissinger, former Senator Sam Nunn, and former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry—led a bipartisan call for renewed commitment toward a world without nuclear weapons, and urged greater action on the part of the United States. For its part, Congress has proposed, and likely will legislate before the end of this year, that the next US president undertakes a new Nuclear Posture Review, in light of the changed circumstances since the 2001 NPR.

The Stanley Foundation is participating in these broader discussions as well. Between autumn 2007 and spring 2008, the foundation is hosting a set of workshops to highlight and analyze various issues that go into the thinking behind a new NPR, such as: the place of nuclear weapons in US national security policy, the role of the international community and multilateral forces, the relative importance of arms control, the trade-offs between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons, and the implications of seeking nuclear disarmament for US and international security. The foundation expects to host a symposium to discuss the findings of these meetings in late spring 2008 and follow on that effort with broader outreach within the United States.

Throughout the nuclear age, US nuclear weapons policy has been formulated behind closed doors and largely without input from the US public.

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*Throughout the nuclear age, US nuclear weapons policy has been formulated behind closed doors and largely without input from the US public.*

—Matt Martin

Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation
With the Burmese military junta’s brutal suppression of the “Saffron Revolution,” which brought tens of thousands of monks to the streets to demand democracy and political change, it is clear the international community’s efforts to encourage peaceful political transition in Myanmar/Burma have run up against yet another roadblock.

Ultimately, change in Burma must come internally, but there is a role for the international community, which can play a vital role in channeling peaceful and sustainable change.

There are few cases that appear better suited for concerted action by the international community than Myanmar. The ability, however, of the international community to develop unanimity of purpose and a concerted plan for effective action remains stymied by an increasingly sterile and decades-old debate over the best strategies and tools, the cross-pressures of competing interests among major powers, and a lack of consensus about what to do or how to best encourage change in a highly resistant and brutal regime.

If nothing else, recent events have made clear that neither sanctions—the preferred policy tool of the United States—nor the continued approach of constructive engagement advocated by the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been successful. That is due in part to the failure of the United States and ASEAN to coordinate a policy that centers on a unified, coordinated, and multilateral approach to change in Burma.

**Change Hinges on Regional Response**

President Bush made clear that the United States stands with the people of Myanmar in this struggle, calling for new sanctions targeting the members of the ruling junta when he spoke before the United Nations General Assembly in September, and then implementing a new round of tightly targeted US financial and travel sanctions in October.

Australia has indicated that it will likely follow the US lead on sanctions, and the European Union is also considering action. But unilateral action by the United States, or even narrow multilateral action by a portion of the international community will not be effective on its own. China and Russia continue to block further action in the
UN Security Council. India, the world's largest democracy, continues to engage in the sort of trade deals that facilitate the junta's grip on power. And ASEAN is taking a significant step in condemning the regime but doing little by way of concrete action. Given this, it is hard to see how sanctions, by themselves, will succeed.

The simple fact of the matter is that unless states with leverage over Burma's military leadership are willing to do more to meet their responsibilities to both the people of Myanmar and to international peace and security—using a more integrated multilateral approach with both sticks and carrots—change is unlikely.

Burma's neighbors in ASEAN need to recognize that the approach toward engagement by ASEAN in the last decade has failed. ASEAN invited Myanmar to join its ranks on the idea that integration would help mainstream the junta. With ASEAN now on the verge of taking a historic step in the adoption of the ASEAN Charter, inclusion of Burma as a signatory runs the risk that Myanmar's continued enjoyment of membership may well serve to erode the organization's credibility.

Burma Model for Future Security Threats

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and his envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, have taken an important step in opening dialogue between the Burma regime and Nobel prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. These UN actions are necessary and useful, and the special envoy can play a critical role in assuring that the light of day continues to shine on the shameful actions taken by the regime.

Although not the sort of traditional threat to international peace and security represented by cross-border interstate wars, Myanmar may be the model for the sort of 21st-century threats that the UN Security Council (UNSC) will increasingly face. To retain its relevance, the UNSC must demonstrate that it is adequate to meet the task.

It must make it clear that the regime needs to embrace a serious process for national reconciliation—a process that includes a genuine negotiated political settlement between Burma's ruling military junta, the Burmese people, and the political opposition with an end goal of creating a genuine representative government for Myanmar.

The Security Council, with support from ASEAN, must also make clear that it supports a process of national reconciliation not just in the abstract, but with a clear and concrete timeline. Beginning now, the regime must move toward an immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and account for those, especially monks, still missing since the start of the regime's crackdown. The UNSC might also want to consider stronger action, such as an arms embargo, to send an even more stark-and-clear message to the junta.

Multilateral Approach Yet to Develop

Empowered by a unified UNSC, Gambari can then travel back to Burma to deliver this message to the ruling junta. And now that Suu Kyi and the military have entered into dialogue, Gambari should continue to play a vital role in making sure that the talks between her and the SPDC leadership move forward in a meaningful and timely way toward national reconciliation.

In the end, it’s unclear how willing the regime in Myanmar is to change, or if there are divisions within the regime that may suggest leverage points in areas where traction can be gained. The signs are far from hopeful, suggesting a regime that is simply willing to absorb whatever punishment others in the international community mete out.

But a truly multilateral and multilayered rearticulating of the international community’s approach to Burma—including ASEAN, the major powers, and the United Nations—has yet to develop a set of incentives and coercive tools that can produce change.

For too long Myanmar, once the richest nation of Southeast Asia but now reduced to poverty by brutal dictatorship, has paid a high price of tyranny and oppression. The international community may resolve the current crisis, but it is certainly necessary if progress toward freedom and democracy is to be made. The Burmese people deserve no less.

This piece is adapted from an op-ed published in The Des Moines Register.

—Michael Schiffer
Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation
E fforts to promote democracy around the world are yet another element of foreign policy made more difficult by the Iraq war. Bringing liberal democracy to Iraq was not the main objective of the military intervention in 2003, but it subsequently became a rationale for the continued US occupation.

Now, the ongoing violence and instability in Iraq and other aspects of the war on terror have tarnished the image of the United States abroad. And at home, the American people have grown cool to promoting democracy.

However, democracy promotion and military intervention need to be delinked. Placing the focus on military action to achieve democracy promotion is to argue from the most extreme and unusual case.

**Principled Stands**
Participants recognized democracy promotion must be weighed against high-priority strategic and security interests, tailoring the approach to suit different countries and situations. However, they also said that American officials should be able to faithfully adhere to three key precepts when dealing with nondemocratic regimes:

- The United States should never break faith with its concerns about the undemocratic practices of foreign governments even as it engages those governments in pursuit of other...
objectives. Many concessions can be made to gain the concurrence of autocratic leaders; whitewashing their record on democracy and human rights is not one of them.

• The United States should never be silent about its concerns. Democracy and human rights issues can be raised publicly or quietly, depending on the severity of the problem and what else is at stake in the relationship, but they should always be on the bilateral agenda.

• Bilateral relations should not be conducted exclusively with national governments. The need for a full range of relationships in another country is one of the basics of diplomacy, but maintaining communication with democracy advocates and human rights groups is particularly vital in undemocratic countries. Such people can give insight into the problems as well as options for trying to improve the situation.

Some argue that pressing these issues jeopardizes bilateral relations and national security concerns, but most conference participants rejected that argument. The historical record shows that the US government can promote democratic principles in a country without excluding cooperation on other objectives of mutual interest.

**Other Tools in the Toolbox**

To underscore the point that forcible regime change is the most extreme means of trying to spread democracy, participants made an inventory of several less aggressive approaches. Current and future policymakers have a range of tools at their disposal for democracy promotion, both with regard to nondemocracies and emerging democracies. Some of the most prominent include:

• Providing a positive example in America’s own democratic system.

• Exchanges of students, scholars, and other citizens.

• Technical training programs and other engagement with and support of key sectors (women, labor unions, legislators, civilian and military defense managers).

• Expressing an interest in individuals who have been detained and otherwise harassed.

• Material support for democratic elements (taking our cues from these people themselves).

• Admission of new democracies into multilateral institutions that offer concrete benefits.

• Strengthening cooperation and coordination with allies that are already established democracies.

• Public and private diplomacy.

• Reports and other periodic assessments to highlight exemplary countries and programs as well as identify continuing problems.

• New conceptual frames for issues of democratization.

As an example of the last point, participants highlighted the Islamic concept of justice as an underexplored cultural value related to democracy and legitimacy.

**Working With Others**

Allies can help with democracy promotion. By pooling resources and drawing on unique advantages, countries supporting democratic principles can help shore up existing democracies and encourage the emergence of new ones. In other words, the United States can most effectively promote democracy when it acts in concert with other democracies.

US policymakers have the option of working through several different multilateral institutions to help promote democracy. Depending on their geographic focus and political-security-economic purposes, these intergovernmental organizations can offer very useful diplomatic avenues for democracy promotion. For instance, the African Union and Association of Southeast Asian Nations have recently given greater emphasis to upholding prodemocratic norms.

The United Nations, as the premier universal institution, with a long history of addressing human rights and democratic values, has certain advantages but also some liabilities in this regard. The recent establishment of the UN Democracy Fund underscores the organization’s operational capacity and role in solidifying international norms.

...the United States can most effectively promote democracy when it acts in concert with other democracies.
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**PUBLICATIONS**

**Overcoming Nuclear Dangers**

Concerns about the perils posed by nuclear weapons have focused primarily on the spread of the bomb and the prospect that terrorist groups may acquire such weapons. Nuclear dangers, however, also exist in the policies of the United States and Russia, which still have thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. A policy analysis by David Cortright examines that danger, probes the factors behind proliferation, and looks at role of diplomacy. November 2007 analysis brief.

**Supplying Demand or Demanding Supply? An Alternative Look at the Forces Driving East Asian Community Building**

Why do some East Asian countries join regional organizations and others do not? Author Shaun Breslin argues there is a lack of consensus over which countries are part of the East Asian region and which are not. November 2007 analysis brief.

**The Future of Gulf Security**

The rising influence of states and actors within the Gulf subregion is significantly impacting the political, security, and economic environment of the entire Middle East. The Stanley Foundation’s latest project, The Future of Gulf Security, identified perceived security threats and trends, encouraged confidence-building measures to alleviate rising tensions, and determined how Gulf states might develop more sustainable, subregional security frameworks. November 2007 project summary report.

**Economic Dimensions of New Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia: Trends in Aid, Trade, and Infrastructure**

The Stanley Foundation convened a weeklong series of meetings in Cambodia to consider the means by which the United States and the international community can best encourage the structural change now under way in Southeast Asia, and recalibrate policy to promote development of a peaceful and stable region that contributes to global growth. November 2007 dialogue brief.

**The UN and Iraq: Moving Forward?**

The prospect of the catastrophic collapse of the Iraqi state has given sudden impetus to proposals for UN peace-brokering. Author James Traub argues the chance of success for a UN role is low, but no other diplomatic, political, or military process offers a greater likelihood of success. October 2007 analysis brief.
Restructuring America’s Ground Forces: Better, Not Bigger
How do you make the US military more effective at irregular warfare and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations in weak or failing states while still retaining strategic capabilities for major power warfare? Authors Frank Hoffman and Steven Metz argues keeping the size of US ground forces the same, but with enough cross-training that each service branch could operate outside its normal region. September 2007 analysis brief.

The High Road to Damascus: Engage Syria’s Private Sector
Due to a variety of economic and political forces, Syria is releasing controls on the Syrian economy. Author Andrew Tabler argues this opens a new arena for American influence in Syria by capitalizing on the entrepreneurial qualities inherent in Syrian culture. August 2007 analysis brief.

RADIO DOCUMENTARY

Beyond Fear: America’s Role in an Uncertain World
Hosted by David Brancaccio, this new radio documentary will go beyond the headlines with expert insight and field reporting from Africa, Asia, and Europe and will explore new scenarios for US global leadership built on common action, trust, and hope.

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