Building a Secure Peace

A Softer Approach to Counterterrorism

Fostering Asian Security

Reaching a Nuclear Crossroads
So many of the decisions being made in US foreign policy and national security seem to be driven by (or justified by) fear. But there are other ways for Americans to look at the world. In the past and in the present, the United States has found ways to provide positive global leadership. The radio production team at the Stanley Foundation went looking for those examples. The result is a brand new radio documentary, “Beyond Fear: America’s Role in an Uncertain World.” The following story is adapted from one of the radio program’s three field segments.

President Teddy Roosevelt is the author of the legendary “walk softly but carry a big stick” line about America’s posture in the world. In many cases, that “big stick” is the massive US military with 737 bases around the world and an imposing $462 billion annual budget.

In the Horn of Africa the United States military is beginning to use some of its vast resources to also play the “speak softly” role by carrying out roles normally reserved for diplomats and humanitarians. This is the focus of the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa, headquartered at Camp Lemonier in the tiny nation of Djibouti.

“The work our troops are doing—building schools, repairing schools, drilling water wells in some very drought areas, and we are also doing medical clinic work—it really gives you a good feeling,” says Paul Vandenberg, part of the SeaBees, the US Navy’s engineering corps. “Ultimately I think that’s the way we are going to really change this part of the world.”

Janet Schulman, the country director for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Djibouti, believes working jointly with the US military based at Camp Lemonier is helping to win the hearts and minds of young people in a region vulnerable to religious extremism.

“The military has always had a civilian affairs unit. And rather than have them roaming around the country willy-nilly, constructing things that may or may not be useful and may or may not be a priority for the community, I think us [the military and USAID] coming together, planning together, and executing projects together is to the benefit of all.

The Army National Guard’s 1132nd Well Digging Crew from Mooresville, North Carolina, believes this work is fully part of the global war on terror. Today the crew is surveying a well for rehabilitation.

“What we’re doing here, we’re actually doing more of a preemptive strike,” says the group’s acting first sergeant, William Robert Brown. “The terrorist organizations go into countries like this that can’t provide for themselves and have very poverty-ridden areas. And they’ll go in and promise these people money, promise them services so that they can use their children or their younger men and younger women to do terrorist acts.” America is a safer place by virtue of us being here and the insurgents not.

A new kind of mission
At Camp Lemonier, the sense that these troops are on a new kind of mission seems to have sunk deep into the camp culture. Troops are even volunteering their spare time to help locals better their lives and improve Djiboutian perception of America.

The camp’s chaplain corps has adopted two local orphans and raised thousand of dollars to renovate dilapidated buildings. Every week van loads of American troops arrive to play basketball and soccer with these boys.

Kennedy Mohamed Ali, a journalist from Djibouti’s government-owned newspaper, The Nation, says the Muslim locals are warming up to the Americans there—though before their arrival “they did not truly like the Americans” because of the war in Iraq. But now they’ve seen the good side of Americans.
“Since the American forces arrived in Djibouti, there has been a lot of progress,” Ali says. “Progress on the level of national education, because they have contributed to the construction of schools. Progress in terms of roads, since they’ve rehabilitated the roads. Progress in the level of health, because they have given materials to various hospitals; they’ve rebuilt them.”

For all the good being done here by the Horn of Africa Task Force, there are only 1,700 troops in Djibouti, and the estimated $49 million it will cost to run the task force in 2007 is a tiny drop in the Defense Department’s $420 billion dollar budget.

Critic: NGOs can do a better job
Ken Bacon, the president of Refugees International, a Washington, DC-based nongovernmental organization, believes existing nongovernmental agencies are better suited than the US military to provide humanitarian relief. “I’m not sure that this is the best use of our military,” Bacon says. “I think the best use of our military is to make places secure.”

Bacon also believes the US military puts itself on a slippery slope when delivering humanitarian aid. “On a day-to-day basis I don’t think it makes sense to have soldiers with uniforms, carrying arms, perhaps driving around in armed HUMVs, delivering military aid—because it tends to confuse in the eyes of the people receiving this, it confuses humanitarian work with military protection,” he says.

Beyond digging wells and building schools
John Prendergast, senior advisor to the International Crisis Group, a nongovernmental organization working to prevent conflict worldwide, is also critical of the work being done by the US military, but for different reasons.

“At the same time we were doing all this wonderful stuff for the last two-and-a-half years in the region, we were also providing...through our CIA station chief in Kenya, we were providing suitcases full of cash to warlords,” Prendergast says. “Just crushing and undercutting the long-term agenda that was patiently attempting to be built through these civil affairs.”

Prendergast adds the result is a confusing and contradictory policy in the region, “You can’t sit there and analyze only what the right hand is doing when the left hand has got a whole other agenda. We’re firing rockets into southern Somalia in the middle of this invasion by the Ethiopians. We can’t then...point to all the nice wells we built last year. People don’t care. They see the United States once again attacking a Muslim country, looking out for number one and its interest. And that’s just what everybody feels. And if every time we build up a head of steam doing some little good in the world, we then come in with the hammer and undercut it all. I frankly have to question the very basis of that strategy.”

—Kristin McHugh

Resources
More interviews, articles, and audio from “Beyond Fear: America’s Role in an Uncertain World” are on the Web at www.stanleyfoundation.org.
Need Reform. Smog-draped apartment buildings in Pyongyang, North Korea, greet South Korean delegates to an April 2007 meeting of an inter-Korean economic cooperation committee. Participants discussed aid possibilities despite North Korea’s failure to make progress on an international agreement to dismantle its nuclear programs. (AP Photo/Park Min-kue, Korea Pool)

North Korea’s Best Path Forward

Can it join the global economy?

Resolving the current impasse between the United States and North Korea over $25 million in frozen bank holdings is just one of several difficult steps that lie ahead on the path toward North Korea’s nuclear disarmament. Once that dispute is settled, a big question remains: Just how serious is North Korea about joining the international community and reforming its economy?

Because, in the end, resolution of the nuclear question will depend heavily on whether or not North Korea is motivated to integrate economically and engage diplomatically with the rest of the world.

Although it’s always risky to claim insight about a society as opaque as North Korea’s, by all indications the country today appears caught in a tug of war between the maintenance of its traditional command economy and market reform.

On the one hand, editorials in the North Korean media at the beginning of this year stated a willingness to engage in economic experimentation and some government officials appear determined to introduce market incentives into the economy.
Yet, on the other, are signs that Kim Jong Il, like his father before him, continues to micromanage economic decision making and sits atop an economy fragmented between the military, the party, the “palace elite,” and the state—all locked in a fierce competition for resources that creates internal bottlenecks and inefficiencies.

For example, many military units are involved in civilian production, such as construction and resource mining. The bottom-line problem with North Korea’s economy is not just a lack of infrastructure or resources, but more importantly its leaders holding on to bad policies.

Military First
The military is a core constituency of North Korea’s political leadership. And the inward-looking Korean People’s Army (KPA) remains deeply suspicious of the outside world. So as long as North Korea remains isolated from the international economy and international community, there is little chance that the “military first” ideology will change, or that the enormous influence wielded by the KPA over policymaking will lessen.

Moreover, it appears that after decades of economic isolation, the North Korean variety of central planning mixes features of Stalinism with the homegrown ideology of national self-reliance called “Juche.” And the political system blends what some have called “Red Confucianism” with ultra-nationalism. To compound the problem, a lack of access to even basic information about their own economy has eroded the ability of senior economic officials to make informed decisions.

In fact, the perverse incentives and lack of information characteristic of the North Korean system are a serious impediment to the nuclear negotiations. It is difficult for key decision makers to fully appreciate the nature of economic benefits being offered in the six-party talks—or even to undertake successful negotiations on these issues. And without this clear conception of the benefits of integration, how can a political constituency for denuclearization be mustered inside the DPRK?

Moving Forward
So, in view of the reality that denuclearization and economic integration are mutually dependent, what is the most viable pathway forward?

Help the North Koreans to help themselves. Improving the quality of North Korean economic decision making will help achieve and sustain the nuclear agreement. That means providing technical training, economic education, and capacity-building even as negotiations on those very issues are ongoing. In short, North Korea leaders need to be able to make informed choices and better understand the potential benefits being placed on the table.

Focus on shifting from humanitarian support to development assistance and the provision of technical expertise and guidance. For example, as progress is made in the six-party process—progress that must be calibrated and tightly benchmarked to performance on the nuclear issue—the international community should lay the groundwork for the investment and support of the International Monetary Fund (more critical to North Korea than the World Bank.)

Encourage North Korea to study its successful neighbors. South Korea offers one of the best economic models for North Korea to follow, as does China. But North Korea should be encouraged to find its own path. At this delicate moment, trying to foist a cookie-cutter model for economic change on the North will run into resistance, or worse.

The economic reform many analysts say is taking hold may be creating significant opportunities for traction in the six-party talks. To realize that potential, any economic package negotiated should provide greater incentives within North Korea’s own system to implement denuclearization, as well as provide the country’s leaders an alternative economic vision and a pathway toward global integration they can believe in.

—Loren Keller and Michael Schiffer

Keller and Schiffer are program officers at the Muscatine, Iowa-based Stanley Foundation. This commentary is drawn from discussion at a recent workshop on North Korea at the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation in Washington, DC.
Over the last decade, the dynamics that define the regional security environment in Southeast Asia have changed dramatically. The hope of a more stable and peaceful Asia after the end of the Cold War, premised on the expectations that the geopolitical and security tensions brought on by the Cold War overlay would finally come to pass, were short-lived.

Instead, the region is confronted with both traditional and new security challenges emerging from a host of transnational threats. Of late, there is growing recognition that new security challenges are proving to be more severe and more likely to inflict more harm to a greater number of people than conventional threats of interstate wars and conflicts.

These newly emerging threats are referred to as non-traditional security (NTS) threats. And they are defined as challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of nonmilitary sources, such as climate change, cross-border environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime.

These NTS threats have common characteristics. They are mainly nonmilitary in nature, transnational in scope—neither domestic nor purely interstate, come with very short notice, and are transmitted rapidly due to globalization and communication revolution. As such, national solutions are rendered inadequate and would require comprehensive (political, economic, and social) responses, as well as humanitarian use of military force.

To be sure, NTS issues have direct implications on the overall security of states and societies in Asia. The gravity of the problem can be seen in the way these transnational threats are now increasingly discussed among policymakers in East Asia. These issues are also portrayed by officials as posing threats to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, as well as to the well-being of their respective societies. As a consequence, policymakers in the region have had to rethink their security agendas and find new and innovative ways to address these new security challenges.

Global Institutions
As demonstrated by East Asian states’ support for the United Nations, there remains a shared and strong
interest among states in the region to maintain and strengthen global institutions. With the emergence of NTS threats, the impetus for effective multilateralism has become more urgent.

Initiatives are driven by the broader objectives of building more capacity and coherence in regional efforts to address new regional challenges and, in the process, complement the global efforts of the United Nations and other international organizations to promote peace, human rights, and development.

Regional institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have responded to new security challenges by adopting measures that have gone beyond the usual process-oriented, confidence-building measures. Many of the regional measures adopted are now geared toward problem solving, involving sharing of information; developing certain types of regional surveillance systems for early warning on infectious diseases and natural disasters; providing relief in disaster management, rehabilitation, and reconstruction; and, more significantly, working toward coordinated procedures and attempts at harmonizing legal frameworks in addressing transnational crimes.

Regional institutions are still working to develop appropriate mechanisms for managing the new and emerging security challenges facing the region. The massive December 2004 earthquake and tsunami illustrated the kind of devastation that natural disasters can cause and the immensity of the tasks involved in undertaking disaster relief operations and in providing humanitarian assistance and post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation.

**Tsunami Aftermath**

The disaster reflected the lack of any regional capacity to respond to disasters and to provide emergency relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. In the aftermath of the tsunami, Southeast Asian countries held a number of meetings and agreed to enhance cooperation in disaster relief, including prevention and mitigation. Specifically, ASEAN members agreed to mobilize additional resources to meet the emergency needs of tsunami victims.

Post-tsunami, is the region doing enough to protect the security of its people? Aside from these demonstrations of regional solidarity, one could argue that the region needs to do more in the areas of prevention and mitigation by developing a more effective regional early warning system.

Looking ahead, there are a number of significant developments that will define not just the shape but, more importantly, the substance of regionalism in Asia. The institutional developments in East Asia, particularly at the ASEAN and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), reflect a qualitative change in interstate cooperation as different actors—both state and nonstate—respond to new security challenges. The new, robust regionalism in East Asia has raised the human and comprehensive security agenda right in the heart of each member’s national policies.

Creating an East Asian or Asian security community can only be realized when states and societies share a common security agenda. Regional actors therefore will be compelled to cross many hurdles, including navigating through possible tensions between maintaining traditions of conservatism and noninterference and the evolving necessity for flexibility for the sake of collective and effective (regional) governance. The future of regional security architecture in East Asia will be contingent on how regional actors strike the delicate balance between the push and pull factors for greater regional cohesion and institutional limitations and domestic constraints.

—Ashley Calkins

This article is a summary of a new Stanley Foundation policy analysis brief by Mely Caballero-Anthony, an associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. The full brief is available at www.stanleyfoundation.org.

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*Painful Reminder. More than two years after the tsunami, a large ship that washed ashore and destroyed houses nearly a mile from the ocean remains a symbol of the disaster in Banda Aceh, Indonesia. (photo by Kristin McHugh)*
Earlier this year, the countries of the world came together in Vienna, Austria, to discuss the state of nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and nuclear energy in our world today. As one of the diplomats gathered might say, there is room for improvement.

We have reached a crossroads on nuclear issues, and it's clear from the discussions I attended last week in Vienna—as well as our debates here at home—that we have not yet decided where we want to go. Our task would be much easier if each issue could be taken in turn, one at a time. But as all three issues are intertwined, we do not have this luxury.

Securing dangerous nuclear material is considered a global priority in Vienna as it is in the United States, where President Bush and Senator Kerry in 2004 agreed that nuclear terrorism is the greatest international security threat facing the country. The global community has given a lot of lip service to this goal—and some progress is being made.

But terrorists cannot make nuclear weapons—at least not without significant help from countries—whether intentionally (as in the scenario of North Korea selling nuclear weapons to terrorists for hard currency) or unintentionally (such as the possibility of a guard in Russia being bribed to turn a blind eye as nuclear material goes out the back door of a warehouse).

As retired Senator Sam Nunn likes to say, “Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for the terrorists to take and the easiest step for us to stop. By contrast, every subsequent step in the process is easier for the terrorists to take and harder for us to stop.” So while we must be comprehensive in our efforts, the majority of our focus should be on dealing with countries before the material reaches terrorists.

Energy and Weapons
The real challenge lies in the fact that any country independently developing nuclear energy within their own borders also can, given sufficient time and material,
develop nuclear weapons. Potential solutions to this problem have been circulating for the past several years, most suggesting that international sources of nuclear fuel should be created to supply countries requiring it so they don’t need to develop it internally.

Many countries are skeptical of this plan, fearing a loss of independence. And they have a point: consider our own dependence on foreign oil and the problems that has caused. Furthermore, for the countries that don’t have nuclear weapons—all but nine—a move to restrict their activities is viewed as unfair when the rich and powerful nuclear “have” countries make no concessions themselves.

Disarmament When?
Which brings us to the second problem. Most countries have agreed not to pursue nuclear weapons for themselves on the condition that the countries that do have them eventually get rid of theirs. But 37 years after making this bargain, most see little progress on this end.

In fact, they point to a number of recent indications—most coming from the United States—that the nuclear-armed states have no intention of giving up their weapons. Right now there are plans to build new US nuclear weapons for the first time in a generation. The same policies of preemption that led to the war in Iraq also raise the possibility of a US nuclear strike, even on countries without nuclear weapons. And we continue to keep thousands of our current nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, ready to fire at a moment’s notice 15 years past our nuclear face-off with the Soviet Union. Under these developments, most of the nonnuclear weapon countries wonder why they should improve their efforts.

Loss of Credibility
Our loss of international credibility and leverage in these matters is evident in Vienna, where discussions are making little progress, as have similar conferences over the last several years. The situation here in the United States in recent years is not so different with the White House and Congress at odds over the future direction of US nuclear weapons policy.

With the United States preoccupied with a host of other matters—Iraq, Afghanistan, domestic politics, and an ongoing series of political scandals—it seems unlikely that a new grand initiative on nuclear security will be forthcoming anytime soon.

Yet experts and officials warn us of the present dangers of a “nuclear 9/11” all too often, and we cannot afford to delay indefinitely. Strong leadership that presents a comprehensive roadmap to a more secure nuclear future urgently is needed—and soon.

—Matthew Martin

This commentary from Martin, a Stanley Foundation program officer, is adapted from a piece that originally appeared in the Iowa City Press-Citizen on May 13, 2007.
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PUBLICATIONS

New Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia: Issues for US Policymakers
At the 47th Strategy for Peace Conference, four panels assessed the political, security, economic, and regional aspects of the changing power dynamic in Asia, with particular attention to Southeast Asia. Participants considered the regional challenges, as well as opportunities, for US policy. May 2007 dialogue brief

What Did We Learn From KEDO?
The Stanley Foundation, in collaboration with the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University, convened a two-day conference entitled “What Did We Learn From KEDO?” A group of experts and policy practitioners, who had firsthand experience with KEDO, explored possible lessons learned from KEDO’s ten years of operation. May 2007 dialogue brief

Delivering Coherence: Next Steps for a Unified United Nations System
The United Nation’s Delivering as One report called on UN agencies to work more cohesively in their global efforts to promote development, environmental protection, and gender equality. Participants at a Stanley Foundation conference on the subject were especially enthusiastic about a pilot program in which all the agencies in select countries are already working with the host government to harmonize the various programs on the ground. March 2007 report

Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide Series:
• Are We All Nation Builders Now?
Andrew Erdman and Suzanne Nossel argue that the United States should expect to undertake additional nation-building projects in the years to come, and prepare accordingly. The authors recommend steps to boost key relevant capabilities (particularly civilian) but, more important, they make the case for a strong bipartisan commitment to post-conflict reconstruction as integral to American global interests and aims. Released June 2007

• America and the Use of Force: Sources of Legitimacy
Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan offer American policymakers a guide for the decision to use military force, particularly describing how such can be undergirded with legitimacy. They examine three dimensions of legitimacy: the proposed military action itself (and its intended aim), related consultation and decision with other nations, and the normative foundation underlying the first two—in particular, democratic values. Released June 2007

• Keeping Tabs on China’s Rise
Coauthors Michael Schiffer and Gary Schmitt identify China’s rise as the principal strategic fact of the twenty-first century. Where China goes—and how fast—will have a significant, if not defining, impact on the shape of the international system and will exert considerable influence on the future of American security and prosperity. Released May 2007

• Course Corrections in America’s War on Terror
Peter Brookes and Julianne Smith lay the ground for consensus on the nature of Islamic extremism, give an assessment of progress to date, and point the way ahead as the United States and its partners fight what many now refer to as the “Long War.” Released May 2007

• The Case for Larger Ground Forces
Coauthors Frederick Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon explain why the US Army needs to immediately start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 soldiers a year to protect our security and global interests. Released April 2007

• A Full-Court Press Against Nuclear Anarchy
The proliferation of nuclear weapons to new nations, as well as groups within states, is widely recognized as the most urgent threat confronting the United States. Coauthors Stephen Biegun and Jon Wolfsthal argue the prospect of a significant spread looms so near, with such dire potential consequences, that policymakers should spare no effort to resist this possibility. Released April 2007

• How to Keep From Overselling or Underestimating the United Nations
David Shorr and Mark Lagon resist both the skeptics and boosters of the United Nations by pointing toward appropriate expectations for the world body and other intergovernmental forums. Released March 2007

• The Cost of Confusion: Resolving Ambiguities in Detainee Treatment
Kenneth Anderson and Elisa Massimino address the need for a clearer, more consistent, and balanced legal basis for the handling of suspected terrorists. Released March 2007
Building an Open and Inclusive Regional Architecture for Asia
This Policy Dialogue Brief includes specific recommendations for how, as a new Asia-Pacific architecture emerges, Washington can effectively realize the interests of the United States and its friends in the region. This includes building on alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, and India while encouraging US-China cooperation in multilateral forums. March 2007 dialogue brief

Nontraditional Security and Multilateralism in Asia: Reshaping the Contours of Regional Security Architecture? This Policy Analysis Brief explores the changing dynamics of security in Asia, and how newly emerging non-military security issues—such as climate change, transnational crime, and resource depletion—are reshaping institutional architecture in Asia. June 2007 analysis brief

RADIO DOCUMENTARY

Beyond Fear: America’s Role in an Uncertain World
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Retired US Army General Colin Powell served as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as national security adviser before becoming US secretary of state in 2001. He spoke with David Brancaccio in March 2007 for the documentary “Beyond Fear: America’s Role in an Uncertain World” produced by the Stanley Foundation and KQED Public Radio.

Q: It’s often argued that leadership is about winning respect first and then people want to essentially follow you up the hill. Do you agree with that idea and can we apply this better to our relationship with the rest of the world?

Powell: I think leadership is about trust and you garner trust by convincing people in the rightness of your cause, and also by sometimes taking chances. You can’t always wait until everybody agrees with the action you’re about to take. Sometimes you have to act and then hope that public opinion will follow that action.

I think it’s important for us to give reasons for our actions and to spend time listening to our friends. But you know, there is a suggestion that America hasn’t been doing this, but let’s look at some of the facts. We have been engaged in multilateral negotiations and diplomacy with our European friends to do something about the Iranian nuclear program. We have been in multilateral discussions with our friends in Asia to do something about the North Korean program: HIV/AIDS; solving the North/South crisis in Sudan; dealing with the problems of Liberia, of Haiti, and so many other places we have worked with our friends.

Q: You pointed to examples where America is working with our coalition partners, talking, listening. But could we do an even better job? Do we have the ratio off slightly in terms of engaging versus essentially asserting our authority?

Powell: I think we could do a better job. I think we could take more time to listen and consider the views of others, and not just hear them, but actually listen to them and crank their positions into our own deliberations as we go forward. I’ve always been a believer in diplomacy, a believer in dialogue. Let’s do everything we can to avoid a crisis or to avoid a war.

Resources
More interviews, articles, and audio from “Beyond Fear: America’s Role in an Uncertain World” are on the Web at www.stanleyfoundation.org.