Have We Missed the Mark?
With Us or Against Us? In Damascus, a Syrian family looks at a poster representing American and British flags with a big question mark. The poster reads, "What is terrorism? It's killing children, destroying hospitals, stealing the wealth of people, and declaring war without international reference." The United Nations' high-level panel has agreed on its own definition of terrorism. It "attacks the values that lie at the heart...of the United Nations."
Editor’s Note

The War on Terror: Is It Missing the Mark?

Some say current US strategy creates more terrorists than it captures

The report from the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change does more than just set the agenda for the debate over the world’s security framework. It also reminds all of us, especially Americans, that the most serious threats facing the world today are complex, interrelated, and unfazed by national boundaries. The report leads to the logical conclusion that no one country can successfully tackle these problems alone. Global problems need global solutions.

The high-level panel report, titled “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” identified six clusters of threats: economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases, and environmental degradation; interstate conflict; internal conflict, including civil war, genocide, and other large-scale atrocities; nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime.

On the issue of terrorism, the panel wrote:

Terrorism attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations: respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules of war that protect civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Terrorism flourishes in environments of despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression, extremism and human rights abuse; it also flourishes in contexts of regional conflict and foreign occupation; and it profits from weak State capacity to maintain law and order.

And in a minor breakthrough at the global level, the panel was able to offer a workable definition of terrorism. They proclaimed terrorism as any action “...that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”

In this edition of Courier we focus on the battle against terrorism. But we do so with the words from the high-level panel still ringing in our ears—terrorism does not exist in isolation, nor can it be addressed in isolation.

In his article, David Shorr, the Stanley Foundation’s interim director of policy analysis and dialogue, digs more deeply into how the work of the high-level panel could lead to a stronger, more tightly coordinated international response to terrorism.

Lawrence Korb, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, participated in a series of public discussions on national security across the United States last year. The events, cosponsored by the foundation, inspired his commentary on the American war on terror.

Another friend of the Stanley Foundation, Catharin Dalpino, is author of the forthcoming book, Second Front, Second Time: U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia After September 11. For Courier, she explains why some in Southeast Asia worry that the US war on terror may create more terrorists in the region than it catches.

The lion’s share of the Bush administration’s attention in the war on terror still falls to the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Foundation program officer Michael Kraig is just back from a research trip to the region, and in this issue he compares and contrasts the benefits of a US Gulf policy that relies on bilateral relationships with a few friendly nations versus a multilateral approach aimed at involving the entire region.

The Stanley Foundation remains committed to a secure peace with freedom and justice. And we promote “principled multilateralism” as the path for achieving this goal. So we naturally view terrorism as an issue that must be addressed as a joint endeavor by the nations of the world. But just as importantly, as the high-level panel reminds us, such a multilateral effort must view terrorism as one thread in a larger fabric of threats if we hope to succeed.

—Keith Porter
Southeast Asia

A Balancing Act on the Second Front

Support for the United States in the region has dropped dramatically

Catharin Dalpino is adjunct professor of Southeast Asian Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. She is also project director of the Stanley Foundation’s program on Southeast Asia in the 21st Century and author of a forthcoming book, Second Front, Second Time: US Policy in Southeast Asia After September 11.

The war on terrorism has sparked a renaissance of US interest in Southeast Asia after a hiatus of three decades. During the Cold War, the region was a battleground for superpower rivalry; after September 11, it is once again the venue for a superpower struggle—this time with a nonstate network of Middle Eastern radicals.

Will the War Invite Terror?

Although Southeast Asians by and large acknowledge a terrorist threat on their territory, some also worry that a war conceived in Washington—one that seems too willing at times to equate “Muslim” with “terrorist”—could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In plain terms, they fear that the war could create more terrorists than it stops. Whether this degree of alarm is warranted, it is obvious that domestic support for the US war against terrorism is decreasing in Southeast Asia. If this dynamic cannot be reversed, it will be all but impossible for the United States to achieve its policy goals in the region.

To be sure, events since 9/11 have demonstrated that Southeast Asia has a widespread and tangible problem with terrorism. The 2001 arrests in Singapore of operatives of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a regional group with links to Al Qaeda; the JI bombing in Bali in 2002 and its attack on the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta several months later; the arrest of a major JI leader, Hambali, in Thailand in 2003; and even the discovery of a small JI cell in Cambodia all point to the need for a coordinated effort to track and apprehend fringe radicals with a lethal agenda. With each discovery or attack, Southeast Asian leaders have strengthened their cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism.

At the same time, however, public support for the United States has eroded dramatically. In Indonesia, for example, survey data from the Pew Charitable Trust showed that over a two-year period, from 2002 to 2004, approval of the United States plummeted from 75 percent to 15 percent, the single greatest drop of any country surveyed.

Fundamental Missteps

This gap shows a clash of “hard” and “soft” American power in the war on terrorism. It points to three fundamental missteps in US policy: an early resort to military means, lapsed attention to human rights, and barriers to meaningful contact between Americans and Southeast Asians, largely through changes in visa and immigration policies.

Immediately after the US invasion of Afghanistan, Washington’s search for “second fronts” found Southeast Asia to be a key location. As a first step, US armed forces joined with the Philippine military in early 2002 to conduct joint training exercises in the southern Philippines, where Muslim separatist insurgencies persist. A military approach to terrorism in Southeast Asia quickly proved to be ill-advised—the joint exercises founndered the following year when Washington and Manila disagreed over the role of US troops. This impression was difficult to erase.
Remembering the Victims. The apprehension of terrorists associated with the Bali bombing was accomplished only through a coordinated effort among Southeast Asian governments. Here on the coast of Bali, relatives came together to observe a moment of silence and a united front against the Islamic militants behind the attack.

When the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003, the belief that the United States preferred a militaristic approach in dealing with Muslims surged in Southeast Asian publics. The use of the US military for disaster relief in the wake of the December 2004 earthquake and tsunami, particularly in Indonesia, could soften that impression unless that task proves to be transient and is overshadowed by the protracted military presence in Iraq.

Moral Authority Lost?
Post-9/11 US policy in Southeast Asia has also been marked by shifts in emphasis on human rights. The United States has maintained its previous levels of intensity in its human rights policies toward countries that lacked significant Muslim populations, such as Burma, while in other countries with low percentages of Muslims, such as Vietnam, human rights pressure has increased. However, human rights advocates in Muslim-majority countries already felt in the region. In some Southeast Asian countries, the number of students studying in the United States has fallen by 40 to 60 percent in the past few years. Australia and, increasingly, China are the beneficiaries of this about-face. If it continues, this trend will undermine one of the fundamentals of America’s relations with Southeast Asia: the US role as an educational hub that can help shape future generations.

As the war against terrorism enters its fourth year, the consequences of these short-term counterterrorism measures are increasingly apparent. Balancing these policies with a longer-term vision will be a central task for US policymakers in Southeast Asia for the remainder of the decade.

The Visa Mess
The third drain on American “soft” power in Southeast Asia results from more cumbersome and restrictive visa procedures and insensitive treatment of foreign Muslims visiting the United States. These tightened controls negate the impression that the US government’s public diplomacy campaigns struggle to project that of a tolerant society that welcomes Islam in a broad religious spectrum. Although these policies are harshest toward Muslims, they affect all Southeast Asians seeking entry into the United States.

The failure of the US government to square this circle can make exchange programs counterproductive in the short term. In some Southeast Asian countries, for example, recipients of Fulbright grants have been unable to obtain visas to pursue their academic programs in the United States. The implications of this conundrum are
US National Security

The Wrong Fight

Has the “war on terror” really made us safer?

Last fall the Stanley Foundation cosponsored the Secure America Project, a series of 11 debates on national security throughout the United States. Among the participants in those debates was Lawrence J. Korb, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information who served as Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1981 to 1985. In this article, Korb offers his own views on the post-9/11 security picture.

In talking to individuals in nine states as part of the Secure America Project, I found a great deal of confusion about how to judge whether America has become more or less secure since 9/11. Much of this confusion has to do with a lack of clarity over terms and concepts used by those who argue that America is as safe as it can be in what the Bush administration labels the global war on terror.

The United States is not at war with terrorism. Terrorism is not a thing or a group against which one can fight. Terrorism is a tactic that can and has been used by many groups throughout history.

Nor are we at war against all terrorist groups. The United States, for example, is not waging war against the Irish Republican Army. America’s enemy is Al Qaeda and its affiliated organizations. Individuals joining these groups are radical jihadists who are waging holy war against us because of our policies that impact them—for example, what they perceive as our uncritical embrace of Israel and our support for authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Since Al Qaeda cannot defeat our conventional forces, they have resorted to terrorist attacks against the United States over the past decade. As both Senator Kerry and President Bush agreed during their election campaigns, the primary threat to the United States is an attack on the US homeland by Al Qaeda using nuclear weapons. If a ten-kiloton nuclear bomb had been used to attack the World Trade Center instead of two airplanes, up to one million people would have been killed instead of slightly fewer than 3,000.

Nor is this a war in the traditional sense of a military conflict that will end with the capture of bin Laden or the surrender of Al Qaeda. In order for the United States to prevail in this struggle, it must convince the Muslim world that what bin Laden and his followers say about the United States is incorrect—or else Al Qaeda will have an endless source of new recruits. And in dealing with Al Qaeda, the military tool is the least important component of the struggle. The United States must also work with other countries to dry up the financial resources of Al Qaeda, cooperate with law enforcement agencies around the globe to break up terrorist cells, work with the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or materials, and provide sufficient development assistance to deal with poverty, hunger, and disease that create the breeding grounds for terrorism.

Finally, the dispute about using military power proactively is not about preemption but preventive war. If the United States has actionable intelligence that it is about to be attacked, it does not have to wait until the attack actually occurs to respond. The real dispute between the United States and the rest of the world concerns preventive war. Under the Preventive War Doctrine, the United States argues that in the post-9/11 world it can launch a military attack against a group or nation that merely has the capability to harm US interests.

It is only after clarifying the nature of the enemy and the threat—as well as distinguishing between preemption and preventive war—that we can judge whether the policies of the Bush administration have made us safer or as safe as we should be. In order to make us safe, the Bush administration argues that it must wage preventive war, spread democracy throughout the Arab world, and maintain military dominance, which includes developing smaller and more usable nuclear weapons. Moreover, in dealing with these threats, the United States will act unilaterally when it can and multilaterally only when it must.

This strategy has been on display most vividly in the invasion of Iraq. Although Iraq was not an imminent threat, the president argued, the fact that it was thought to have weapons of mass destruction and some contacts with Al Qaeda justified the US attack without the approval of any international body. By replacing an authoritarian regime with an elected government, the argument continued, the United States would be creating a democracy in the center of the Arab world. This would inevitably lead to the democratization of the wider Middle East, which in turn would dry up support for the terrorists. Finally, by maintaining military dominance, the United States would not only be able to wage preventive wars but would also be able to use its own military power for the good of the world.
In the course of the debates, it became clear that the Bush policies are undermining US security. The preventive war doctrine as applied in Iraq has not only made it more difficult for the United States to obtain the help of other nations in the struggle against Al Qaeda, it has destabilized the international system by creating a new norm for the use of military force—particularly since the justifications for the invasion of Iraq turned out to be bogus. The invasion confirmed in the minds of many Muslims what bin Laden has been saying about us; namely, that we wish to impose our way of life on the Arab world. As the British ambassador to Italy noted, the invasion of Iraq has been the best recruiting tool bin Laden could have hoped for.

Similarly, while America can promote and encourage democracy, it cannot impose it. Attempting to do so in Iraq has overstretched US resources. Because of the guerrilla war that erupted after we overthrew Saddam, US ground forces are severely overstretched and remain too reliant on reserves. Not only does this leave the United States vulnerable in other places, it risks destroying the all-volunteer army. Moreover, the war in Iraq has already cost us more than $200 billion and the United States is now the world’s largest debtor nation.

Finally, by spending so much to maintain military dominance and fight a preventive war—that is, more than half of the discretionary funds in the entire federal budget—the United States cannot spend what is necessary on homeland security or the full range of diplomatic, development, and humanitarian tools of foreign policy. For example, only about 6 percent of the cargo containers shipped into this country are physically inspected for weapons of mass destruction. Police and firefighters in major cities like New York still lack common communications equipment. Hospitals in major cities do not yet have an adequate supply of vaccines. Similarly, more than three years after 9/11, the United States has spent less money buying up the fissile material in the former Soviet Union than in the three years prior to 9/11. Finally, the entire international affairs budget is about 6 percent of the size of the defense budget, and the United States spends 25 times more on its military than on development assistance.

The Bush administration has taken such a unilateral approach to the world that it has undermined our ability to prevent a nuclear weapon from falling into the hands of a terrorist group. It has withdrawn from the biological weapons protocol, undermined the nonproliferation regime by starting research on two new nuclear weapons, refused to submit the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for ratification, and announced its opposition to inspections as part of the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

By confusing the nature of the enemy, adopting inappropriate policies, overemphasizing the military component, and adopting a go-it-alone strategy, the Bush administration has not made us as safe as we should be. In fact, we may be less safe than we were prior to 9/11. A strategy of cooperative multilateralism that relies more on the nonmilitary aspects of national security and traditional forms of deterrence and arms control would move us in the right direction. Many supporters of President Bush even admitted in our discussions that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake and counterproductive in the struggle against Al Qaeda.
Despite its political instabilities, the Persian Gulf continues to be the home of the most easily exploited and cost-effective petroleum reserves in the world—natural resources that are fueling the phenomenal economic rise of India and China and the world’s continuous prosperity. Not surprisingly, analysts now view the Gulf as the most strategically important region for the indefinite future.

As the United States continues—during a time of violence and insecurity—to aid Iraq in its transition to domestic rule, it must make a key strategic choice for securing peace in the Middle East. The United States can either attempt again to impose an American hegemony through bilateral arrangements with its friends or it can push forward with a multilateral approach that would include all governments in the region.

The US invasion and occupation of Iraq has cemented a strategic concept that has been evolving for three decades: the rise of the United States as an external guarantor of Gulf security. US military bases, ports of call, troop deployments, and extensive sharing of high-tech weapons technology now define the Gulf environment. By design or by accident, so-called “rogue” states (Syria and Iran) are completely surrounded by US deployments in and around the region.

However, although US military dominance may be unquestioned, the downward spiral of the US occupation in Iraq and increased terror attacks and domestic instabilities in Saudi Arabia have created an unprecedented legitimacy crisis within the region, raising fundamental questions about the future of Gulf security. With the abuses of Abu Ghraib imprinted on the collective psyche of Gulf societies for at least a generation, how should external powers move forward in their policies toward the Gulf?

Reliance on Strong “Pillars” Has Failed

In the past, the United States focused almost completely on building up strong local allies, or “pillars,” to dominate the region without taking account of the domestic side of security. In the 1970s, the United States relied on a strategy of “local hegemony”—support for Saudi Arabia and the sheikdom of Iran as the principal rule-makers of the Gulf region. However, this strategy failed when the Iranian coup of 1979 ejected the shah from power, and later when the rise of transnational terror groups with Saudi citizens as active members resulted in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

In the 1980s, the United States tried to secure peace by creating a pure “balance of power,” which included US intelligence and financial aid to Iraq in its war with Iran. This approach kept both countries from growing too powerful and thereby provided immediate security to neighboring Arab regimes. But it also allowed the Iraqi buildup of offensive military power and tuned a blind eye to the human rights transgressions of Saddam against his own people, as well as his use of chemical weapons against Iran.
After the war with Saddam Hussein in 1991, Presidents Bush and Clinton initiated a multilateral security framework known as the "Madrid Process." This broad-sweeping arrangement was designed to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, arms reduction in the Middle East in general, and "soft" security issues such as environmental degradation, economic development, and water sharing. Despite its novel approach, the political innovations of the Madrid Process were quickly overshadowed by the United States' new focus on containment of Iraq and Iran.

Moreover, throughout its dealing with the Middle East, Washington has consistently failed to recognize the importance of domestic factors in Gulf leaders' threat perceptions. Because of the pressures of globalization and the vast increase in open media sources within Gulf societies, the greatest danger in the Gulf is not a nuclear Iran or a traditional threat of conventional invasion, but internal socio-economic and political changes that might be increasingly hard for leaders to direct or control.

**Hegemonic vs. Multilateral**

So where do we go from here? There are two major contending approaches to Gulf security: US hegemony and principled multilateralism.

Under a hegemonic approach, Gulf relations would be exclusionary, with US "friends and allies" on one side and US enemies such as Iran on the other. The United States would make a decision on who is excluded based on factors such as internal regime structure, support of terrorism, and WMD aspirations. Confidence-building measures in the military realm (such as arms limitations, cooperative military exercises, or transparency on arms builds) would only apply to friends and allies. The ultimate goal would be to target those "rogue" states outside the established order, isolate them, and bring about a "regime conversion" or regime change. WMD would not be viewed as "bad" in and of themselves; rather, the character of the state obtaining WMD would be the primary criterion for non-proliferation efforts. Implicitly, Israel, Pakistan, and India would not be pressured to moderate their nuclear behavior, despite the potentially negative effects of their nuclear activities on Gulf states' security. Arab friends and allies would not base security on their own indigenous capabilities but rather on continued bilateral dependence on the United States as an outside power. Finally, the United States would probably treat Iraq as a base for US economic, diplomatic, and military power projection throughout the region, including against Syria and Iran.

The hegemonic strategy does not deviate from US policies in previous periods and thus risks continued policy failure. Bilateral ties alone will neither solve outstanding political conflicts nor prevent new conflicts from arising among the Gulf states. Moreover, continued dependence on the United States would only increase domestic pressures against current Arab regimes.

In contrast, a principled multilateral approach to Gulf security would be inclusive. Even if Iran were not integrated into the collective military structure of US allies, it would still be included through myriad economic or security ties as opportunities for common action arose. Gulf security would be built on a rule-based order in which universal principles apply to all actors in the Gulf. Accordingly, WMD would be viewed as a general problem requiring equal constraints that apply to all parties, including the United States, Israel, Pakistan, and India. There would be basic recognition of the inherent right to self-defense measures on the part of all states in the region, whether or not the United States considered those states friends or allies. Thus Iran's rights to self-defense, including the maintenance of a viable military, would be recognized and allowed. The "demand" side of WMD proliferation would be addressed because every actor's security concerns would be taken into account. Finally, the goal would not be to end competition through regime change but rather to manage competition among all governments as they are currently constituted.

Overall, the central assumption of the strategy of principled multilateralism is that security is sought with other states, rather than against them, and that US developments in the Gulf will follow a more beneficial course. If all states are gradually intertwined in a web of military and economic agreements that creates strong interdependence between them. Further, the buildup of common goods and mutual trust within the Gulf would help protect global oil supplies from shocks produced by negative domestic trends in individual states.

It is time to craft a genuinely new strategy for security and prosperity in the Gulf region—before the status quo practice of realpolitik bilateralism breaks down once again, with predictably negative results.

—Michael Kraig

First appearing June 29, 2004
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display_article?id=4154

**Resources**

For further reading visit www.stanleyfoundation.org or see page 11 to order "Realistic Solutions for Resolving the Iranian Nuclear Crisis."
Teamwork vs. Terrorism
Panel calls for comprehensive, collective approach to fight serious threats

L
ike the membership of the United Nations itself, the 16 statesmen and women who served on Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change came from all the regions of the world. Similarly, the fate of the panel’s proposed recommendations will depend on whether UN member governments can emulate the panelists’ ability to achieve new consensus on formerly divisive issues.

One striking issue on which panel members came together was the politically charged problem of terrorism. The panel offered seven recommendations for how governments can thwart terrorism—ranging from strengthened capacity to find and capture terrorists (and their financing) to a proposed new international treaty against terrorism.

One of the panel’s mandates from the secretary-general was to take stock of the various threats to peace and security in the 21st century. A senior participant in the panel process told The New York Times that early in the discussions some panel members said the terror threat was exaggerated by the United States. But ultimately these skeptics recognized terrorists as a tangible threat, particularly if they obtain deadly nuclear or chemical material.

“Underlying Dynamics”
The perception of terrorism as a uniquely American concern is indeed one of the political hurdles that must be overcome to build a more effective international counterterrorism effort. The high-level panel calls for a comprehensive strategy that improves the social and political conditions that terrorists exploit for recruitment, strengthens mechanisms for cooperation among governments, and establishes stronger controls for nuclear and chemical material—a strategy that would presumably enjoy a broader sense of international ownership.

As panel member and former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans said at a Stanley Foundation-sponsored discussion in New York City last December, “Terrorism is not a phenomenon that can be addressed simply by military means and by intelligence and policing. You do have to deal seriously with the underlying dynamics...including some of the great issues of political grievance of the day which manifestly are part of the problem.”

In essence, the high-level panel has challenged UN member states to set aside their differences and really attack contemporary threats such as terrorism, civil and regional war, disease, and extreme poverty. But this will be achieved only by confronting the political sensitivities that have undercut unified, effective action in the past.

A New Agreement?
The terrorism debate has long been a surrogate for disputes over various resistance movements against foreign occupation, in particular the territories occupied by Israel. The panel, again with its geographically diverse membership, cut through this political morass by drawing a clear distinction between resistance and terrorism. The panel’s report states, “There is nothing in the fact of occupation that justifies the targeting and killing of civilians.”

The group also proposed consolidating such a consensus on terrorism through a new comprehensive international treaty. While noting the existence of some dozen earlier agreements, the panel recognized “a clear difference between this scattered list of conventions and little-known provisions of other treaties, and a compelling normative framework, understood by all.”

The initial political outlook for the panel’s terrorism agenda is hopeful. The Bush administration’s Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Kim Holmes, told an audience in Baltimore last December that “the United States particularly welcomes proposals on Secretariat reform, peacekeeping, and terrorism.”

—David Shorr

Resources
Oil-for-Food Facts. http://www.oilforfoodfacts.com
Realistic Solutions for Resolving the Iranian Nuclear Crisis
International policy options for the Iranian nuclear crisis do not exist in a vacuum. Desired US national security goals and global nonproliferation goals will be impossible to fulfill if the interests, perceptions, fears, and ambitions of the “target state,” Iran, are not duly considered and incorporated into US decisionmaking. The first section of this brief outlines three Iranian perceptions and domestic realities with potentially decisive impacts on the success or failure of Western policy strategies, followed by five concrete policy recommendations for the United States and its friends and allies.

This Policy Analysis Brief is based on numerous Track 2 and Track 1-1/2 dialogues with both reformist and conservative Iranian officials/analysts in the period 1999 through May 2004, as well as personal research by the author. 2005 Web brief.

US Security Relations With Southeast Asia: A Dual Challenge
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States has given more attention to Southeast Asia than in the preceding 25 years. This greater emphasis is generally positive for US relations with Southeast Asia, but its primary focus on counterterrorism may be too narrow. That may cause policymakers to gloss over attitudinal changes in Southeast Asian militaries and underestimate shifts in security dynamics in the region. Moreover, problems with the US image in Southeast Asia can complicate cooperation in sensitive policy areas. November 2004 policy bulletin.

US Human Rights Policy in Southeast Asia:
New Issues for a New Era
Regaining moral ground is imperative to improving US human rights policy in Southeast Asia as well as to strengthening American policy in the region across the board. The United States cannot maintain its bona fides as a human rights advocate if it does not acknowledge its own deficits in the protection of rights. May 2004 policy bulletin.

Capturing the 21st Century Security Agenda:
Prospects for Collective Responses
The deep international divisions that arose over the Iraq war have made it clear: the United Nations and other parts of the global security framework created a generation ago need an overhaul.

Late last year, a blue-ribbon panel of experts released a report on how the world can identify and tackle the global threats we face...threats which are too big for any one nation to fix alone.

This year those recommendations are being debated in capitals around the world and will be acted on at the United Nations’ 60th anniversary summit in September. November 2004 report, available on the Web at www.stanleyfoundation.org/initiatives/un21/.

Visit http://courier.stanleyfoundation.org
to sign up for an e-mail notification when the latest issue of Courier
is available online.
Reforming the UN for a Safer World

Red, White, and Blue Coming Together is an initiative to unite America behind a common vision of our role in the world. After a bitter election season that focused attention on the divisions between “red” and “blue” America, this event series strives to begin the healing process by raising awareness about the hidden consensus that already exists in a number of key foreign policy areas and by facilitating constructive, nonpartisan dialogue on more controversial issues.

As part of this series, the Stanley Foundation, Americans for Informed Democracy (AID), and United Nations Foundation will hold a series of town hall meetings on “Reforming the UN for a Safer World.” These meetings will address the secretary-general’s high-level panel’s recommendations and focus on identifying common principles that underlie UN reform while also advancing US and world security. The Stanley Foundation and AID will bring high-profile scholars and leaders intimately involved in the UN reform process to Midwestern cities to speak with citizens and students in the heart of America about their vision for the future of the United Nations and collective security.

More Information
For updates on the town hall meetings, visit the Web site at www.stanleyfoundation.org/redwhiteblue.

Red, White, and Blue Coming Together Events

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