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This brief summarizes the primary findings of the conference as interpreted by rapporteur Kelsey Davenport, roundtable organizer Jennifer Smyser, and chair Ambassador John Bernhard. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this brief. Therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all of its recommendations, observations, and conclusions.

Effective and Sustainable Global Nuclear Security: Looking Beyond the Horizon

With the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process likely coming to an end after the 2014 summit in the Netherlands, the next 18 months are crucial for setting an effective long-term agenda for nuclear security and capitalizing on the momentum created by heads-of-state-level political engagement. Integral to crafting this agenda is the consideration of metrics that will allow for not only measuring progress made in securing nuclear material over the span of the three summits, but also for determining the post-summit future of the nuclear security policy discussion.

Although the goal of locking down all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years was agreed to by leaders at the 2010 Washington summit, the goal will not be met by 2014, and even with stepped-up efforts since the first summit, a number of nuclear security gaps will remain. To move nuclear security forward beyond the summit process, it is necessary to clearly articulate the gaps that exist within the current system, identify actions to bridge the gaps, and create a clear vision of the longer-term goals for a global nuclear security system. Within this context it is important to recognize that improving the nuclear security architecture cannot be confined to or defined by the summit process, but rather the NSS should be seen as a driver of a larger, long-term effort to improve nuclear security worldwide.

The Stanley Foundation convened a group of experts and policymakers from the United States and abroad on October 17-19, 2012, at its 53rd annual Strategy for Peace Conference. The group discussed “Effective and Sustainable Global Nuclear Security: Looking Beyond the Horizon.” This policy dialogue brief offers an overview of the discussion and recommendations of roundtable participants.

Strengthening Global Nuclear Security

Even after two relatively successful Nuclear Security Summits, there are still many issues of contention among participating nations. Two primary areas of debate emerged within the larger topical area of strengthening nuclear security, the first centered on how to enhance and promote universal buy-in to nuclear security and the second on how to navigate the sensitivities of national sovereignty while moving toward a more global system of nuclear security governance.

Building International Consensus

One of the areas that participants generally agreed needs attention is universalizing the recognition that nuclear security is an issue that requires cooperation and action by every state, regardless of whether it possesses fissile material. While a nuclear terrorist incident was highlighted as having catastrophic consequences, roundtable participants debated whether to frame nuclear security primarily within that context at the exclusion of other issues. Too narrow of a focus on preventing nuclear terrorism and the security of weapons-usable nuclear material decreases buy-in for many states, particularly those in the developing world that view the problem as one to be dealt with primarily by a smaller group of states.

Several participants said that while there is general international agreement that the consequences of a nuclear terrorist incident might be global, it is the nature of the threat that is not seen as universal. Many states view the primary responsibility for nuclear security as emanating from protection at the source, rather than as a cooperative global endeavor. The gaps in the current framework of nuclear material security are not the product of opposition, but rather a lack of engagement and enforcement of existing mechanisms. It also was suggested that the threat of nuclear terrorism, which is low, should not be divorced from the shared consequential risk, which is inestimably high. Bringing consequences and likelihood together can be a valuable frame for the argument of universalization.

Expansion of the nuclear security agenda at the 2012 NSS to include an increased emphasis on radiological source security was generally viewed as increasing buy-in for a number of states, as security for high-intensity radiological sources is more applicable to a larger number of states than fissile material security.

A few participants expressed concern that expansion of the nuclear security agenda, particularly in the summit process, is politically confusing and dilutes the emphasis on nuclear material security. It was brought up that universalization by means of enlarging the scope of the summit may undermine efforts to emphasize securing and minimizing weapons-usable material. The point was raised that this broader framing may be less helpful because nuclear and radiological security require different policies.

While there was agreement that responses to an incident involving a radiological dispersal device versus a nuclear weapon would be different, and that radiological source security and fissile material security may require different types of protection, it was noted that inclusion of these issues increases the likelihood of universalization and the buy-in for states. Also discussed was how the broadened agenda allows for moving past the basic premise of the Cold War dichotomy between the nuclear-weapon states and those states without weapons. The inclusion of high-intensity radiological source security is one mechanism that is more inclusive by nature. This was seen as more in line with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) definition of nuclear security, which includes fissile materials and radiological sources. It was suggested that if the agenda is expanded to include radiological sources, a triage approach could be a way to more effectively work toward compulsory control of nuclear material by prioritizing the highest-risk materials and threats.

It was noted that the NSS process, by restricting the number of state participants, has contributed to the view of some states that the process is not universal, despite the broadened agenda. In the view of some developing countries in particular, more focus and funding directed at nuclear security, especially at the IAEA, could mean less money for technical cooperation projects, which is of greater interest to them. The point was raised that to increase the buy-in, particularly from developing countries, increased engagement from the technical community could be beneficial. The technical community could be better placed to explain the universal nature of the risk of radiological sources and fissile material, without states feeling political pressure to move away from developing nuclear energy programs or continued use of high-intensity radiological sources.

While a greater emphasis on disarmament as an aspect of nuclear security was also suggested, most participants agreed that other international forums exist for addressing that issue and that it should remain outside the parameters of discussion, both in the summit process and in developing a long-term global governance system for nuclear security.

There was less consensus, however, as to whether the NSS process and subsequent architecture should include noncivilian fissile materials. It was noted that 85 percent of the global stockpile of fissile materials is noncivilian, but only approximate-

ly 25 percent is actually in active or retired warheads. It was proposed that a closer look be taken at the fissile material that is designated as noncivilian but is not in warheads. The counterpoint was made, however, that these issues are being dealt with in other forums, such as the Conference on Disarmament, and should remain there.

Moving Toward Global Governance

When participants considered ways to improve nuclear security on the global level, the complex interplay and tension between respecting national sovereignty and building an effective international architecture received considerable attention. While the need to move toward universalizing state responsibility was acknowledged, participants questioned whether working toward a binding global governance regime is realistic in the short term. It was generally recognized that effective nuclear security in every state is not equivalent to global nuclear security. There are many cross-border issues that cannot be addressed by focusing solely on the state level, such as nuclear smuggling and tracking nonstate actors with nuclear terror goals. In addition, further cross-border initiatives could emerge that would require global cooperation, such as the development of international fuel banks.

Two primary concerns regarding the feasibility of building a binding global regime emerged. First, binding legal norms would require institutionalization and a more comprehensive framework convention than the current patchwork of agreements and instruments. Among states, there is not yet a clear consensus as to what such a regime, system, or binding legal convention needs to comprise. While the IAEA has a nuclear security component, in its present form it would be unlikely to encompass all of the areas necessary or have the capacity to enforce such a regime. Also, other organizations, such as Interpol, may be better suited to carry out particular functions. Funding for nuclear security also was brought up as one of the key impediments to expanding IAEA activity, particularly because the budget mostly consists of voluntary contributions, and it is common practice for states to tie funding to particular projects.

The IAEA will, however, be developing a Nuclear Security Plan for 2014-2017 to be adopted in September 2013. The IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security in July 2013 may contribute positively to this plan, especially if the conference succeeds in attracting substantial political participation

at the ministerial level in addition to the technical component of the meeting. Promoting the importance of working toward implementing existing mechanisms, such as the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), is one area that the IAEA could emphasize, given the current lack of political will to move toward more binding obligations.

Second, many participants thought that given the basis of nuclear security as a sovereign responsibility, states are unlikely to consider ceding that sovereignty to an international institution, particularly in the short term. The political will to move toward a more comprehensive binding legal instrument also does not appear to exist at this moment, although it should still be an aspirational goal. The sovereignty that several states have already ceded to the international community in the area of nuclear security, particularly those countries that have given up nuclear material or voluntarily requested peer reviews and shared information, were brought up to demonstrate that political will could shift in this direction in the future.

Participants generally agreed that while nuclear security is a sovereign responsibility, this does not preclude the need for multilateral cooperation and action. It was suggested that a more useful frame may be to consider the space between national responsibility for and international governance of nuclear security as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, with legally binding, compulsory responsibilities as a long-term ideal end state and a more short- to medium-term focus on practical actions that facilitate movement toward that goal. Viewing sovereignty as restricted by certain extraterritorial responsibilities toward the integrity of other states was also offered as a basis for considering the relationship between national and international obligations.

It was suggested that states should approach governance at both the political and technical levels. Several participants voiced support for practical steps as bottom-up actions that could address gaps and foster responsibility. The United Arab Emirates was mentioned as an example of a country building nuclear security culture at the state level while taking into account the lessons learned by other countries from past accidents and incidents, such as Fukushima, and making technical improvements to account for some of the recognized gaps. Another initiative helping states identify gaps to be addressed and where assistance might come from is

the IAEA's Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans. While these assessments are a more piecemeal approach drawing on an array of resources outside of the agency to support state efforts, they do contribute to progress. Involving outside resources also reduces some of the resource burden on the IAEA because it directs states needing assistance to other sources to help close the gaps.

Characteristics of a Strengthened Global Nuclear Security System

Several characteristics of a strengthened system of global nuclear security were discussed, although consensus was not reached on the advisability of moving forward on each point. The characteristics include:

- Putting greater emphasis on the security of non-civilian materials, especially in the NSS process.
- Accelerating the sharing of best practices through existing institutions and organizations like the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) and the Centers for Excellence or IAEA Nuclear Security Support Centers.
- Identifying and implementing internal assurance measures to build confidence at the national level.
- Identifying and implementing international assurance measures to increase trust between states.
- Minimizing stockpiles of weapons-usable materials and the number of locations where they are stored.
- Building stronger security culture at the national level by increasing capacity through mechanisms like training and peer reviews.
- Increasing technical cooperation.
- Enlarging the responsibilities of the IAEA, with adequate resources to match.
- Effectively implementing existing commitments.
- Strengthening coordination of policymakers with nongovernmental stakeholders, such as industry and civil society.

Particular attention was paid to the idea of internal and external assurance measures, including the feasibility of providing them at the international level without violating sovereignty and confidentiality. The following assurance measures were discussed, as

well as their potential impact on improving nuclear security. Some of these measures are already practiced, but could be expanded upon and enhanced.

- **Information sharing.** This could include actions such as the publication of nuclear security regulations by states, thus increasing confidence that a regulatory framework is in place. A point was raised that these activities at the bilateral or regional level are more conducive to certain geographic areas. In Asia, for example, where there are protracted interstate rivalries, this could be more difficult.
- **Peer reviews.** Conducted either by the IAEA or through negotiated bilateral state arrangements, peer reviews should be encouraged and expanded. It was noted that more states are requesting International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions from the IAEA, and while there is no obligation to follow through on the recommendations, it could be an indication that states are, at least, more willing to evaluate their own internal security measures. One proposal was that the results of IPPAS reviews could be made public in a limited manner, thus acting as an international assurance. It was brought up, however, that processes such as peer reviews have debatable effectiveness due largely to the lack of penalties for failing to implement recommendations and the willingness of the state in question to follow up.
- **Certifications.** Developing a baseline certification targeted at nuclear security workers could improve nuclear security culture. WINS and the IAEA were discussed as bodies with experience and training modules that could be drawn on to develop and promulgate a set of standards that could act as a baseline for nuclear security culture.
- **Bilateral cooperative programs.** Several participants discussed various forms of bilateral cooperative programs, which they thought could be seen as an assurance measure and/or a first step by like-minded countries toward more binding international norms. In the latter concept, it was suggested that bilateral efforts between trusted countries could slowly grow to include multiple countries at regional levels and eventually comprise an international standard for soliciting peer reviews and assurances. The nuclear cooperation agreement between Brazil and Argentina, which includes inspections and information sharing to

ensure peaceful use of nuclear material, and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which navigated sensitive national security concerns in the United States and Russia to allow for unprecedented shared access to nuclear facilities and weapons technologies, were mentioned as possible models for these bilateral relationships.

Inspections were discussed as an assurance measure to work toward, but participants generally concurred that getting agreement to mandatory inspections without a treaty would be difficult to achieve, and that national security concerns are still too great of an impediment to traction in this area in the short term.

It was discussed that the concept of providing assurances in relation to nuclear security may be more politically palatable than the idea of transparency. Transparency, it was noted, has different connotations across cultures that make some states wary that national sovereignty could be infringed upon. Deliberately noting that confidentiality can be maintained as transparency or accountability is developed was offered as a different lens for framing moves toward greater transparency without compromising national security.

While the practices discussed as potential assurance measures were generally viewed to be positive steps that would improve nuclear security, the concept and definition of assurances as a mechanism for strengthening global nuclear security was questioned, as was how or if these steps should be incorporated in a more binding global governance system in the long term. Concerns were raised that assurances may focus too narrowly on the medium term. An additional point brought up was that international assurances are an objective to work toward that must be further defined, not a means of accountability. A clearer objective also would contribute to determining the practical actions that could be considered as assurance measures to strengthen nuclear security.

Several participants thought that the relatively universal acceptance of nuclear safeguards and safety could be looked to for ideas on how to overcome national security concerns in an improved nuclear security governance system. Concern was raised, though, that while some of the nuclear safety mechanisms are widely accepted, their success should not be oversold.

The nuclear security recommendations offered by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network were suggested as a potential model for building discussion on a global governance framework. The network's Statement on Nuclear Security includes four recommendations: universalize existing treaties, develop binding nuclear security standards, increase reporting and accountability, and strengthen the role of the IAEA.

Maintaining Momentum

Identifying the drivers to create the political will and space to elevate the issue of nuclear security and fundamentally address the identified gaps within the system was also discussed. The transformative nature of a catastrophic event was brought up as the driver that would most motivate states to pursue a more binding international convention or framework. While some participants expressed the view that a catastrophe could serve as an impetus toward an international security regime, the point was also raised that the Fukushima accident did not lead to mandatory safety inspections. In the aftermath of the accident, mandatory inspections were debated, but the political will was not there to institute such a requirement.

Several participants, however, voiced the opinion that strong leadership can serve as a substitute to catastrophe. The role of the United States as a leader was referenced in this context. It was generally recognized that President Barack Obama's participation facilitated high-level attention at the first two summits, and a determination of the direction that the United States sees the NSS process going could be indicative of what level of political will and momentum will remain after the summit process. Capitalizing on high-level political participation, however, requires a more definitive understanding of what the highest priority outcomes of the summit are and an understanding of the post-summit direction of nuclear security. It was noted that summits are most successful when the goal or outcome is clearly defined.

The Impact of the Nuclear Security Summit Process

A number of observations were offered regarding the general efficacy of summit processes. Specifically, the point was made that the NSS process should be seen as having facilitated several important advances within nuclear security. First, the NSS process has bridged the disconnect between slow development of

and the urgent need for international responses to a global problem that has significant cross-border dimensions. The NSS process has also brought attention to the fundamental problem of developing an international nuclear security regime when political authority rests at the state level, while recognizing the need to move to governance that is more binding, comprehensive, and robust. In addition, the NSS process articulated a fundamental problem for moving forward, namely that there are differences between the distribution of decision-making authority in multilateral institutions and capabilities for problem solving in the real world. Finally, in connection with the summit process, participants raised the question of whether there is an artificial division between an incident of nuclear terrorism by a non-state actor and the intentional use of nuclear weapons by a state.

Setting an Agenda for 2014

Participants recognized that with the third summit in the Netherlands likely to be the final one, there needs to be a balance between identifying additional practical actions that could be taken and setting an ambitious agenda that would give leaders political cover in the event of a future catastrophic nuclear terrorist incident. It was noted that for the Netherlands summit, there must be early focus on identifying agenda items, and specific related actions, given that much of the low-hanging fruit has already been addressed. In addition, to achieve measurable results and stimulate continued practical action after the summit, the agenda should focus on identified gaps that are serious and for which there is political will to deal with. Many actions could be taken that would marginally improve nuclear security, but the must-haves can't get lost in a sea of nice-to-haves.

A number of recommendations were offered on potential agenda items for the summit and deliverables that could be offered by participating states. Despite the group's discussion of the debate over the scope and definition of nuclear security, participants generally agreed that within the NSS process, the expanded agenda from Seoul, which includes radiological materials security, should be kept for the Netherlands summit.

The number of states invited to the 2014 summit was also discussed, with the majority believing that the same states that participated in Seoul should be invited to the 2014 summit. The view that universalization would be better served by

including more states in the post-summit process was also offered. It was noted that some IAEA member states felt excluded from the nuclear security dialogue because the summit process frames nuclear security in global terms but includes only a subset of states. Several participants offered the view that a more concerted outreach after the summit process could rectify this perception of exclusivity.

It was also suggested that the work plan from the Washington summit and the Seoul communiqué, supplemented by the larger goal from President Obama's 2009 Prague speech, define the agenda and serve as the basic metrics for measuring progress on the four-year goal. Full consensus was not reached, however, on what those metrics should specifically consist of or how they should be tracked and reported on at the summit and beyond.

The following deliverables were suggested for the summit:

- If needed, further encourage the universalization of existing legal instruments, particularly the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM.
- Connect the practical actions of the NSS process to existing international institutions, such as the IAEA, that are seen as natural heirs to some portion of the NSS process and strengthen their capacity to work in these areas.
- Encourage closer cooperation of the technical community among summit participants to prevent states from feeling as though the summit process was designed to prevent access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
- Commit to tangible action on the minimization of fissile materials, including noncivil materials.
- Strengthen assurance measures within states and between states by committing to use of mechanisms such as peer reviews, IPPAS missions, and best-practices sharing.
- Enhance security culture by improving training, developing communities of practitioners, and strengthening research and development networks.
- Facilitate movement toward a convention on high-intensity radiological source security based

on possible proposals from the July 2013 IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security.

- Integrate industry perspectives into the policy discussion leading up to and beyond the 2014 NSS.
- Strengthen interaction with civil society leading up to and beyond the 2014 NSS.
- Share gift basket ideas earlier in order to better capitalize on areas where states might work together to address issues when consensus cannot be reached, including a possible gift basket related to improving nuclear security governance.

The view was shared that at the Washington and Seoul summits, too great a focus was placed on unilateral commitments. While these should still be encouraged before the Netherlands summit, the emphasis by the Sherpas ahead of 2014 should be on larger goals and the post-summit system. Emphasizing gift baskets could be a way to increase focus on these areas by capitalizing on the willingness of like-minded states to move beyond unilateral actions.

Participants generally agreed that in the Netherlands, states should report on progress made toward their previous summit commitments. Although a specific mechanism or style of reporting was not recommended, it was expressed that the free-form reporting style used by the majority of states at the Seoul summit made it difficult to capture the aggregate progress since the 2010 summit. It was also noted that some states may be hesitant to do this in a scorecard-type method, as it could make them feel pressured to take steps they are not ready for.

Looking Past the 2014 Summit

There was consensus among roundtable participants that if the Nuclear Security Summits, as biennial heads-of-state-level gatherings, do not continue beyond 2014, the momentum garnered from top-level attention must be capitalized on, and the work must continue in a different configuration. Participants generally agreed that it would be useful for government officials involved to recognize the culmination of the summit process well before it takes place, as this would facilitate discussion about the future of the nuclear security policy discussion within the effort to craft the agenda for the Hague summit. A clear articulation of the goals of the post-summit process is most likely to lead to continued development of a nuclear security architecture.

While it was recognized that no diplomatic approach would be as effective at driving improvements as the NSS process, a number of options, singularly or in combination with others, were discussed as potential vehicles to continue the nuclear security discussion post-2014, including:

- Continue holding summits with heads-of-state involvement, but extend the interval between summits to four or five years. While this option is attractive in that it maintains high-level political engagement, participants acknowledged that the process would likely suffer from flagging leader interest and diminishing returns. Summits, several participants noted, are most effective when leadership is required for a quick resolution, particularly for issues that cross boundaries that make it difficult to negotiate at the ministerial level. If no common interest is perceived, summits also will make less progress, and, one participant noted, at those times, heads-of-state involvement can be a drawback because it leads to weak outcomes. Along these lines, it was suggested that a one-off heads-of-state summit could be convened if high-level political attention was required because, for example, progress was made on a framework convention.
- Expand the agenda of the NSS process to include a wider array of nuclear issues that could appeal to a greater number of states and reinvigorate the process, such as a greater focus on nuclear safety or disarmament. The disadvantages of this approach are that the emphasis on nuclear security would be lost, and the forum could become too divisive.
- Graft the current agenda and goals of the NSS to an existing summit process, such as the G-8 or the G-20, and incorporate nuclear security into the agenda on a biennial or triennial basis. Both of these forums, however, present difficulties. The G-8 membership is far from large enough to encompass the nuclear security issue, and even its Global Partnership initiative doesn't have full overlap with the NSS-participating countries. The G-20, established to deal with the global economic crisis, is not ready for a mandate extension.
- Create a troika comprising the summit hosts—the United States, South Korea, and the Netherlands—or a slightly larger group, and empower it at the 2014 summit to manage the future nuclear security discussion. Given its large stockpiles of nuclear materials, Russia was

specifically mentioned as a potential candidate for inclusion in this steering group.

- Downgrade the political level of the summits to the ministerial level or one of special envoys of heads of state. While not as powerful a driver as a heads-of-state-level process, it could maintain some of the momentum gained from high-level political attention if it is clear what the summits intend to achieve. The point was made that in the long term, without an end state being defined, it would be difficult for high-level political representatives to carry the process. Another potential difficulty with this approach is that where nuclear security is nested within existing government structures differs widely from state to state. As a result, determining the proper representative for a meeting at the ministerial level could be difficult. Sustainability of the process, even at this downgraded level, also was questioned. Another permutation of this idea was to depoliticize the post-NSS process and create an expert body to move forward.
- Form bilateral or regional groupings of like-minded states at the 2014 summit that commit, through gift baskets, to mutual exchanges of information, sharing of best practices, and other assurance measures to advancing nuclear security principles and norms. As a bottom-up approach of leading by example, these relationships could then encourage others to take similar steps.
- Strengthen and expand the capacity of the IAEA to manage nuclear security, but without dictating the NSS process and goals to the agency.

Conclusion

The likely culmination of the NSS process in 2014 creates one last opportunity to capitalize on top-level political attention and to set a strong post-summit course for nuclear security. Although it remains unclear under what auspices nuclear security will be advanced after 2014, careful and creative consideration must be given to this question in the lead-up to the summit. To fully take advantage of the high-level political engagement of the summit process, a clear articulation of the future of nuclear security beyond the Netherlands summit should be prioritized before it takes place. A number of options exist for post-summit nuclear security work, and they will need to be carefully and thoughtfully considered by summit participants and relevant international organizations to ensure that the best successor for the process is identified.

While the timing may not be ripe for pursuing a legally binding global regime, there are a number of practical actions that can be undertaken to both universalize the goals of nuclear security and close the gaps in the existing patchwork of regulations. It should be recognized that the NSS process is only one component for addressing nuclear security, and that to move toward a global regime, deliberate thought must be given to the development of global norms and the capacity of existing intuitions. Sustained outreach is needed to universalize the actions required to close the gaps in the current system of conventions and initiatives. This will ensure that nuclear security remains a priority area for action, and that the momentum generated by the NSS process continues to decrease the global threat posed by nuclear terrorism.

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