



Multilateral Counterterrorism: Harmonizing Political Direction and Technical Expertise

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In 2004, Anne-Marie Slaughter described a burgeoning “new world order,” one in which the traditional role of states as unitary actors in the multilateral system is being disaggregated. In Slaughter’s view, national governments are now delegating greater responsibility than ever to specialized technical experts.¹ Because this interaction moves away from the customary interplay of national policy positions representing entire governments toward a networked dynamic among professional peers, Slaughter portrays “*trans-governmental*” diplomacy as often replacing classic *inter-governmental* multilateralism. To be sure, intergovernmental diplomacy endures as the prevailing dynamic in many areas of multilateral affairs. Yet some issues have a strong technical dimension that has boosted the role of specialists.

Multilateral cooperation on counterterrorism offers an especially good window into the respective roles of agenda-setters at the top political levels of government and the working-level experts whose command of intricate practicalities is so essential to implementation. As multilateral counterterrorism has drawn over one hundred international agencies, councils, and offices into the effort, clear and effective collaboration between the two levels has become that much more important.² Each level plays a critical role. At the intergovernmental level, the involvement of major multilateral bodies reflects the intense concern among political leaders. From the United Nations Security Council

and the General Assembly, to the Group of Eight (G-8) and numerous regional and subregional organizations, representatives of national government policies provide legitimacy and set agendas. On the technical level, transgovernmental networks of experts and practitioners, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), focus on developing counterterrorism standards and best practices.

Traditional intergovernmental multilateralism has shown a growing consensus on the need for a more holistic approach to countering terrorism. The United Nations General Assembly has unanimously adopted a global counterterrorism strategy that articulates roles for stakeholders with relevant expertise that extends beyond traditional counterterrorism efforts, such as border control and tracking terrorist financing, to including skills in addressing so-called conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including underdevelopment, education, lack of good governance, and economic, social, and political marginalization. G-8 leaders recently reiterated this approach by noting that:

it is critical to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and, in particular, that governments promote the rule of law, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic values, good governance, tolerance and inclusiveness to offer a viable alternative to those who could be susceptible to

terrorist recruitment and to radicalization leading to violence.³

The G-8 leaders also stressed the importance of working with the UN system and extending the “global multilateral counterterrorism umbrella.” Now that more stakeholders have been added into the mix, the umbrella is broader. But will that help or hinder G-8 efforts to strengthen the international community’s collective counterterrorism efforts, particularly among actors working at the transgovernmental and intergovernmental levels?

This paper will assess the challenge of harmonizing intergovernmental and transgovernmental counterterrorism actors within a large and varied effort focused on countering and preventing terrorism. It will look at each level and suggest some ways to improve their coordination.

The synchronization of international objectives in the global strategy has created an opening for better technical and political multilateral coordination on both levels. Two significant risks, however, remain. First, having the international community focus on a short list of priority areas—such as countering violent extremism in Yemen—poses the risk of diverting resources and attention from other regions where political violence could also threaten future international peace and security. Input from technical experts is essential to keep those who set the agenda from putting all the attention on a narrow set of current hot spots and, thus, missing opportunities to *prevent* future hubs of terrorism from emerging.

The second risk is that duplication of efforts, overlapping mandates, and weak information sharing and coordination among the international, regional, and subregional levels will exert a drag on effectiveness. As leaders emphasize holistic responses to the threat of terrorism and enlist partners from an ever-widening range of fields such as education and development, the already daunting chal-

lenge of coordination may become even more difficult. By indiscriminately recruiting every actor with a plausible counterterrorism connection, the efforts within the United Nations run a significant risk to their effectiveness on the ground. This paper concludes with recommendations to mitigate both of these risks.

Complex Threat, Complicated Countermeasures

The threat of terrorism has evolved over the past decade, so the tools to counter that threat have had to adapt accordingly. From 2001 to 2006, the narrower approaches to counterterrorism focused primarily on killing and capturing terrorists, with relatively little attention given to stopping the recruitment of future terrorists. More recently, though, countries such as the United Kingdom and The Netherlands have seen a growth in radicalization and recruitment among their own residents, with some actually committing or attempting terrorist acts. Officials in the United States, who had previously been skeptical of potential radicalization on their own soil, have now also awakened to this frightening reality. A recent report for the successor group to the 9/11 Commission noted that “our long-held belief that home-grown terrorism couldn’t happen here has thus created a situation where we are today stumbling blindly through the legal, operational, and organizational minefield of countering terrorist radicalization and recruitment occurring in the United States.”⁴

The resulting perception of an increasingly pervasive threat of terrorism—both abroad and at home—has led more nations to adopt strategies placing greater emphasis on longer-term *prevention* in addition to shorter-term law enforcement and security efforts. The need for cooperation at the multilateral level is also recognized, and along with it, transgovernmental level technical training and support activities.

With counterterrorism now aimed simultaneously at domestic and international threats and at both current and future terrorists, the

effort is by necessity multilevel. It involves preventing educational, religious, and cultural institutions and the Internet from being used as platforms for incitement and recruitment. It also focuses on the conditions that are conducive to the spread of terrorism, engaging religious moderates, educators, and institutions, and introducing reintegration programs for former terrorists. Military and law enforcement activities are complemented by “softer” social measures intended to blunt the allure of violent extremism. The emphasis on prevention has spawned nontraditional measures such as capacity building or development assistance.

A similar evolution in thinking has occurred at the international and formal multilateral levels with bodies from the G-8 to the United Nations. For example, G-8 partners such as the United States highlight the value of multilateral bodies such as the United Nations—and especially of the comprehensive strategy—for effective counterterrorism. In a recent General Assembly speech as part of the second review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, US Ambassador Susan Rice noted that, “[w]ith its four pillars, the Strategy’s Plan of Action provides an essential framework for a holistic response to terrorism. The United States considers each pillar to be essential, and they are all reflected in our own new National Security Strategy.”⁵ Stressing such linkages between UN and US strategy has, in turn, smoothed the way for others to work even more closely with the United Nations counterterrorism program.

Multilateral Counterterrorism's Two Levels: Ships Passing in the Night?

While the UN response to terrorism has a long history—with over a dozen universal conventions and numerous General Assembly resolutions condemning terrorism—it was not until September 2001 and a series of unprecedented Security Council resolutions that counterterrorism rose to the top of the UN agenda.⁶ Since then it has evolved from a focused effort dominated by the Security Council to a system-wide effort, not only

mobilizing the organs of the UN itself, but harnessing nontraditional counterterrorism activities and external partners such as regional and subregional organizations as well as civil society. As the UN counterterrorism framework has expanded, so have the number of actors involved and, therefore, the challenges of coordination.

The Intergovernmental Level: Setting the Agenda

The day after the attacks of September 2001, both the Security Council and the General Assembly adopted unanimous resolutions condemning the acts of terrorism and mandating all states to bring the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of the attacks to justice. The resolutions also established new committees to monitor how states were following through on those obligations and to help strengthen states’ counterterrorism capacity.⁷ However, several states outside the Security Council, not least the G-77, expressed concern that the council had assumed the role of a global legislature, imposing the will of the few on the many, without sufficient input from the latter.

The unanimous adoption of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in September 2006 helped to counter this perception. The strategy also sought to unite disparate UN entities under a single framework to improve coordination and recalibrate the effort away from being so security-focused and dominated by the Security Council.

Although the substance of the UN Strategy is rather anodyne—notable for its absence of a definition of “terrorism”—it is remarkable for its expansion of the global counterterrorism framework beyond law enforcement and security to add respect for human rights and the conditions that help spread terrorism. The four pillars of the UN Strategy include measures to: (1) address the underlying risk factors for terrorism, (2) prevent and combat terrorism, (3) build government counterterrorism capacity, and (4) ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law. According to the strategy, the spread of terrorism is

spurred by unresolved conflicts; dehumanization of victims of terrorism; lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights; ethnic, national, and religious discrimination; political exclusion; socioeconomic marginalization; and lack of good governance. The strategy highlights several ways for stakeholders to avoid these conditions, including intercultural and religious dialogue, education, public awareness, progress on the Millennium Development Goals, meeting the needs of victims, and conflict prevention and resolution.

Regional and Subregional Bodies

Outside the UN system, numerous regional and subregional bodies have also entered the counterterrorism field. Multilateral institutions at this level have unique knowledge and expertise of local conditions and can build trust and political will, enhance information sharing, develop approaches tailored to cultural and other contextual issues, and undertake region-specific initiatives that complement and augment global efforts. A number of regional and subregional organizations have adopted counterterrorism treaties to boost their members' capacity to cooperate in the investigation, prosecution, and extradition of terrorist suspects. When equipped with proper resources and mandate, they have been effective transmission belts between what is adopted at the global level and the states trying to implement that framework. For example, some regional bodies, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and some organizations in Europe have developed impressively holistic counterterrorism strategies and programs. Many other regional bodies have been less successful, doing little more than paying lip service to the need for a more holistic approach. Unfortunately, this is occurring in parts of the world, such as West Africa, the Sahel, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East where the threat may be the greatest and where member states are often the most lacking in their capacity, and in some cases in the political will, to confront the threat.⁸

Technical Implementation at the Transgovernmental Level

In addition to the aforementioned entities working at the intergovernmental level, transgovernmental cooperation is quite active in addressing discrete issues related to terrorism at a more technical operational level. The FATF, for example, has identified best practices to combat money laundering and thwart terrorist financing; these practices are widely recognized as global standards for these areas. Although the FATF is an ad hoc coalition of 36 members based on strict membership criteria, it is replicating its efforts by helping establish FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) in all regions, including Africa and the Middle East.

In response to mandates handed down from the intergovernmental level, technical bodies have proven quite valuable to counterterrorism. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has turned its Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) and Global Programme against Money-Laundering into highly effective capacity builders, giving technical assistance to help countries join and implement the universal instruments against terrorism. This assistance has included legislative drafting and training for criminal justice professionals. TPB has delivered country-specific assistance throughout the world, extended aid to other countries via regional and subregional workshops, and trained hundreds of lawmakers and criminal justice officials on ratification and implementation of the universal treaties against terrorism. UN specialized bodies, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Customs Organizations (WCO), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) have also developed, adopted, and disseminated counterterrorism-related standards. These bodies have provided training and other forms of assistance in their specialties and, likewise, advised states on how to uphold global counterterrorism norms.

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), among other

things, provides technical assistance to states to help write counterterrorism legislation that is human-rights compliant. It also convenes expert meetings and seminars to help clarify member states' human rights obligations in relation to counterterrorism.

In addition to these standard-setting bodies, several other UN bodies and programs have contributed materially to the disruption of terror networks at an operational level. For example, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has a particularly wide-ranging counterterrorism program. It collects, stores, analyzes, and exchanges information about suspected individuals and groups and coordinates the circulation of alerts and warnings on terrorists, dangerous criminals, and weapons to police among its 188 member countries.

To deal with underlying conditions, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has developed programs to promote interreligious and cultural dialogue and encourage moderate perspectives in educational, religious, and cultural institutions so that they cannot be used as platforms for incitement and recruitment. Like UNESCO, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has programs that, while not primarily focused on counterterrorism, nonetheless contribute to the effort. With field offices all over the world, UNDP has maintained a long-term presence in almost all developing countries, which allows it to play an essential role in support of strategic linkages, such as civil society and the private sector. UNDP supports UN member states in constructive engagement with disaffected groups prone to violence and promoting political inclusion as a means of helping to address grievances. Although it remains reluctant to do so, UNDP also has a potentially significant role to play in emphasizing the inherent linkages between development and security and ensuring better coordination between development assistance and counterterrorism capacity-building efforts.

There have also been efforts at the trans-governmental level to integrate UN efforts to help member states implement the global strategy. The strategy, for instance, called for the institutionalization of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), which then included two dozen entities across the United Nations. The CTITF now includes some thirty entities, ranging from the Interpol to the World Health Organization, which is indicative of the coordination and harmonization challenges transgovernmental actors confront as they work under a broadened definition of what constitutes "counterterrorism." In this way, the strategy and the task force serve as an operational bridge linking inter-governmental political decisions to their implementation at the technical, trans-governmental level.

The G-8 also set up an important framework for counterterrorism cooperation. The G-8's Lyon/Roma Anti-Crime and Terrorism Group consists of a series of subgroups staffed by experts from each of the G-8 capitals. Participation in the subgroups is sufficiently informal and flexible that it harnesses experts on a wide array of subjects and has delivered results—especially in the realm of counterterrorism standards or best practices (in line with the theory of transgovernmental cooperation)—more quickly than formal multilateral bodies. To complement this standard-setting work, in 2003 the G-8 created the Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) to coordinate the delivery of counterterrorism capacity-building assistance by G-8 participants and others. An initiative taken at the 2010 G-8 Summit lengthened the term of the chair of CTAG (Canada will be in the chair until 2012), intending to bring more sustained focus to the CTAG's efforts.

Since 2003, the CTAG has struggled to fulfill the role originally envisioned for it. The CTAG has been hampered by several factors, including a lack of reliable needs assessments to determine how to allocate assistance; the absence of a permanent secretariat to support

the CTAG chair; and reluctance among G-8 partners to share information about their own counterterrorism assistance priorities. However, there are now positive signs that its renewed relationship with the United Nations and focus on regional donor meetings is yielding better results with a more strategic focus. This includes spurring donors to work collectively to set priorities both for countries of focus (such as the Sahel and Yemen) and thematic specialties, including transportation security and countering extremist ideology.⁹ Articulating these priorities helps to ensure that urgent issues receive the attention and resources they deserve. The discipline may have gone too far and taken too much attention away from other potentially valuable contributions, particularly in regions that could present the next security threat if capacity needs go unmet. Although the G-8 noted that its strategic priorities are designed to “change on an agreed basis when and as member states deem appropriate,”¹⁰ more could certainly be done to establish a division of labor among the G-8 and its partners to tackle current and emerging threats at once. This would help to reduce duplication of funding for capacity-building projects by asking some partners to focus on areas not on the strategic priorities list, such as the Horn of Africa subregion.

Improving Coordination and Cooperation

As the counterterrorism agenda set by inter-governmental bodies has broadened, and as the field of relevant transgovernmental actors implementing that agenda has mushroomed, the implementers are in danger of losing sight of what others are doing or have done. Given the number of players involved, the enormity of the task, and the limited resources available, effective coordination is crucial. Efforts at coordinating these myriad actors—whether through the United Nations CTITF, the G-8’s CTAG, or other mechanisms—must heed the limitations of merely slapping a counterterrorism label on the work of so many different bodies. Indeed, some of them only ever so remotely engage in substantial counterterrorism work.

This is not to deny the value of efforts directed toward addressing underlying conditions that contribute to terrorism’s spread. Strengthening public institutions, broadening citizen participation in governmental processes, and more effective delivery of services—especially to underprivileged and marginalized groups—are central to improving governance, and are all integral to the UN Strategy’s holistic approach. International security actors have also realized that the counterterrorism measures will not bring sustainable benefit without accompanying attention to governance and development. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan frequently pointed out, “the three freedoms which all human beings crave—freedom from want, freedom from war or large-scale violence, and freedom from arbitrary or degrading treatment—are closely interconnected. There is no long-term security without development. There is no development without security.”¹¹

Development actors, including relevant UN bodies, have nonetheless been reluctant to forge the partnerships needed to treat security and development in a holistic fashion. The adoption of the UN Strategy, with its inclusive framework and explicit reference to the Millennium Development Goals, provides an opportunity to forge greater consensus among stakeholders in governments, multilateral bodies, and civil society. One of the main achievements of the strategy is its emphasis on the link “between the traditional development agenda: poverty reduction, social development, rule of law programmes and the fight against terrorism.” This nexus between development and security has also been addressed by the United Nations Nonproliferation Committee established under UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which is raising awareness about the connections between building capacities to enhance the enforcement of export controls and securing trade as means for stimulating more economic activity in developing countries.

The UN Strategy also emphasizes the need to improve the coordination and coherence of

the UN system itself on counterterrorism. Unfortunately, the strategy does not adequately address this problem. It calls for more cooperation within the United Nations, but its provisions are largely directed to individual parts of the UN system. It does not home in on the coordination and effectiveness gains that could be achieved by streamlining overlapping mandates or eliminating redundant programs.

The strategy's main recommendation regarding organizational architecture focuses on the CTITF, currently comprising 30 UN entities plus Interpol, spread across the four pillars of the strategy and the fields of development, education, security, rule of law, and human rights. Yet there are serious practical limitations on how much coordination the CTITF can bring to the efforts of its constituent entities. With representatives from every UN body or program involved in counterterrorism, it fosters a tendency to protect existing mandates and resource allocations against encroachment or abolition. In addition, almost every CTITF representative takes instructions from his or her superiors in headquarters, with limited room to maneuver. Further, each CTITF member can only devote limited time and energy to the task force due to his or her preexisting full-time job responsibilities. Moreover, the head of the CTITF office has no authority over the other task force members who report to separate parts of the UN system. Thus, he or she cannot require different members to contribute information or time to the task force or impose a decision on unwilling task force members.

Playing to Strengths and Coordination's Limitations

As the counterterrorism agenda has grown, it is important to think practically about the challenge of coordinating all of these activities under the rubric of counterterrorism. As mentioned above, development and other actors have their own institutional imperatives, and coordinating mechanisms such as the CTITF lack the power to compel them to cooperate. There is indeed good reason for many nontraditional counterterrorism actors,

such as UNDP, to be wary of coordinating activities under the counterterrorism label. It is understandable that many within the UN system believe that counterterrorism objectives should not replace the traditional core aims of development activities, interfaith dialogue, educational reform, promotion of good governance, or humanitarian activities. Merely appreciating their contribution to countering terrorism should be enough.¹²

On the other hand, the danger that counterterrorism mandates will displace core organizational missions should not be exaggerated. The specter can too easily be used as an excuse not to coordinate. For example, within the UN system, there is little evidence that the work of CTITF members is greatly affected as a result of their being "coordinated" through the task force. What sort of coordination is it when agencies just exchange information about activities and programs that those agencies undertake anyhow?

Therefore, the basic purpose of coordination itself must be clarified. Extending coordination arrangements to the maximum number of players, which has been somewhat of a trap for the UN CTITF, is an unproductive, if not counterproductive, approach. It makes more sense to help different actors make their counterterrorism contributions as synchronized and mutually reinforcing as possible. Supporting development agencies' youth education work is better than creating new counterterrorism programs. This would foster capacity and avoid provoking aid agencies' sensitivities about associating their mission with counterterrorism.

If coordinated action is the goal, the most realistic approach is to focus on targeted efforts in priority countries and regions (e.g. West Africa and the Sahel) and discrete projects with clear overlap between counterterrorism and other goals (e.g. criminal justice reform). In areas more broadly relevant to counterterrorism it may be enough simply to acknowledge that those efforts contribute to the goal of undermining support for violent

extremists. As noted, the G-8 has developed strategic priorities and is intent on working with the United Nations and other partners to address those priorities on the ground. Hopefully, this approach will help to marshal the necessary resources and involve actors with special expertise in a coordinated manner. Given that the G-8 has a rotating presidency and represents only a small number of the wealthiest nations in the world, the role of the more inclusive United Nations as a partner will be essential.

The Way Forward

Multilateral counterterrorism over the past nine years has gained a new strategic framework and, along with it, broader international support and perceived legitimacy. Having a comprehensive global strategy has helped alleviate the reluctance that western powers' security-related demands can stir, and has facilitated counterterrorism activities in more intergovernmental bodies. With a wider range of activities spread across numerous multilateral institutions, the trend might appear pointed toward the ideal of a finely tuned and fully integrated transgovernmental machine propelled by expert-level officials throughout the world. But this vision is no more practical than a perpetual-motion machine, and a pragmatic approach to counterterrorism cooperation must lower its sights.

The first step is to keep from collapsing down to too narrow a focus. At the moment, the G-8's strategic priorities have spurred a frenetic clamor to help build capacity in a few of the hottest hot spots such as Yemen and the Sahel. This carries a risk of duplicating the expenditure of resources in these areas, while capacity gaps go unaddressed in other regions that represent either a current threat, or show early signs as hubs of terrorist recruitment. To alleviate this problem, a more coherent division of labor needs to be established, guided by metrics that direct the G-8 and its partners not only toward current threats, but also toward emerging ones. In this respect, helping to build the capacities of a greater number of regional organizations

should be given more attention. The goal should be to equip those organizations to help the United Nations and the G-8 and other donors assess gaps that open current vulnerabilities as well as early signs of potential future weakness. There also needs to be a more concerted effort among donor states to coordinate and reduce duplication of efforts so that efforts can be extended to regions that may not make the G-8's short list.

The second risk is that poor coordination not only allocates resources inefficiently but actually hinders multilateral counterterrorism efforts. As we have seen in recent years at the United Nations, coordination can consume time and effort without contributing value. Entities such as UNDP and UNESCO stand as examples of agencies whose work could be undermined by overemphasizing the connection to counterterrorism. As efforts to implement a more holistic approach to countering and preventing terrorism continue to develop, more attention is needed to ensure that technical practitioners working at the transgovernmental level are not impeded by well intentioned intergovernmental agenda-setters.

Endnotes

¹ See Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

² The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force has thirty UN entities, plus INTERPOL, involved in its efforts to implement the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. An array of regional bodies is involved, including African Union (AU), European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Arab League, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Other regional level entities and subregional organizations also play an active role; these include the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO). There are groups of common interest, financial or cultural, such as the G-8 Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) and the Commonwealth Secretariat. There is also an extensive list of specialized functional organizations that play an important role in counterterrorism, dealing with issues from aviation to weapons of mass destruction. If organizations are included that work on other nontraditional counterterrorism elements noted

in Pillars I and VI of the UN Strategy, including the Millennium Development Goals, conflict prevention, inter- and intra-faith dialogue, human rights, peace-keeping, peace building, conciliation, and mediation, the number of entities that have a role to play exceeds one hundred.

³ G-8 Leaders, “G-8 Leaders Statement on Countering Terrorism” (Muskoka 2010 G-8 statement, 26 June 2010), <http://g8.gc.ca/9938/g-8-leaders-statement-on-countering-terrorism/>.

⁴ Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat: A report of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group,” (Washington, D.C., 10 September 2010), <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20Final%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf>.

⁵ Ambassador Susan E. Rice, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations (statement at the United Nations General Assembly Review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, New York, N.Y., September 8, 2010), <http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/146902.htm>.

⁶ For a more detailed discussion of the United Nations response to terrorism before and immediately after 9/11 see Alistair Millar and Eric Rosand, *Allied Against Terrorism: What’s Needed to Strengthen Worldwide Commitment* (New York: The Century Foundation, 2006).

⁷ The Security Council’s main counterterrorism-related bodies are the Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor and support implementation of Resolutions 1373 and 1624, the Non-Proliferation Committee focused on Resolution 1540, and the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee devoted to Resolution 1267. Staff bodies of experts also have been created to support each committee, including the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), the 1540 Group of Experts, and the Al-Qaida/Taliban Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (Monitoring Team). Adjustments in the working methods of those bodies have resulted in some closer coordination, but as recently as December 2009 the Security Council called upon those core UN counterterrorism committees and the expert bodies to improve cooperation with one another. Paragraph 43 of Resolution 1904 “*Reiterates* the need to enhance ongoing cooperation among the Committee, the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), as well as their respective groups of experts, including through, as appropriate, enhanced information-sharing, coordination on visits to countries within their respective mandates, on facilitating and

monitoring technical assistance, on relations with international and regional organizations and agencies and on other issues of relevance to all three committees, *expresses its intention* to provide guidance to the committees on areas of common interest in order better to coordinate their efforts and facilitate such cooperation, and *requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the groups to be co-located as soon as possible;... .” United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1904*, S/RES/1904, New York, December 17, 2009.

⁸ For a more detailed explanation of the role of regional organizations in this context see: Eric Rosand, Alistair Millar, Jason Ipe, and Michael Healey, “The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Regional and Subregional Bodies: Strengthening a Critical Partnership,” (Washington, D.C.: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, October 2008), http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/strengthening_a_critical_partnership.pdf.

⁹ In the spring of 2010, the G-8 produced a set of strategic priorities guided by the Roma/Lyon Group (R/L) threat assessment. Copy on file with the author.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, “Statesmanship, confidence-rebuilding required for UN capable of coping with today’s crises, Secretary-General tells UN Association of United Kingdom” (Central Hall, Westminster, United Kingdom, 31 January 2006), www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10332.doc.htm.

¹² For more discussion of this issue and additional recommendations related to the implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy in this regard see James Cockayne, Alistair Millar, and Jason Ipe, “An Opportunity for Renewal: Revitalizing the United Nations counterterrorism program” (Washington, D.C.: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, September 2010).

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