



The Responsibility to Protect at Ten: The Challenges Ahead

It has been ten years since one of the largest-ever gatherings of heads of state and government endorsed the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). At the 2005 World Summit, they pledged unequivocally to protect populations by preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement. They further agreed to help states, including those under stress, meet these obligations, to strengthen the early warning capacities of the United Nations, and to respond in a timely and decisive manner, under the provisions of the United Nations Charter and through the Security Council, if national authorities are manifestly failing to protect populations from these four crimes and peaceful means are inadequate.¹

Few, if any, international proclamations have been met with such a shrill mix of awe and disdain. Never again, some declared, would tyrants be able to commit mass violence against their people behind an inviolable wall of secrecy and sovereignty. Opponents contended that R2P represented a radical departure from the core principles of sovereignty and noninterference that had framed the international order since the days of Westphalia. Skeptics pointed to how vague and qualified was the commitment to undertake a forceful response to unfolding mass atrocities. Some suggested that the 2005 declaration represented no more than “R2P-lite” compared to the original formulation, with its emphasis on rules for the use of force, by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001.²

How far has R2P advanced in conceptual, political, institutional, and operational terms over the past decade? To what extent have the highest hopes of its enthusiasts and the worst fears of its detractors been realized? Is it gaining acceptance, and, more importantly, is it making a difference in terms of preventing mass atrocity crimes and protecting populations? How close is the principle to reaching maturity, and what are the toughest challenges ahead? This Policy Analysis Brief offers some initial and partial responses to these wide-ranging inquiries.

In Search of Conceptual Clarity

R2P had a complicated parentage. It was introduced to the world twice in four years, once independently and once by world leaders. Though the 2001 and 2005 versions of R2P had much in common, there were enough differences to confuse publics and delegates alike. Much of its first decade has been spent refining its content and rebuilding a common understanding



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not only of its substance but of how it differs from earlier notions of humanitarian intervention, with their emphasis on the unilateral use of force. A prime vehicle for this purpose has been the annual cycle of reports by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon followed by debates or informal interactive dialogues in the General Assembly from 2009 to the present (six to date).

The first of these reports called for a strategy of early and flexible response tailored to the specific circumstances of each situation.³ It posed three pillars: (1) the primary protection responsibilities of the state, (2) the parallel responsibility of the international community to assist the state in meeting its protection responsibilities, and (3) the international responsibility to respond in a timely and decisive manner, using whatever tools under Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter are available and appropriate, when the state is failing to meet its responsibilities to protect populations from the four crimes. The report also introduced the notion that nonstate armed groups bear the same protection responsibilities as states, and that assistance measures under pillar two may include the consent-based use of military assistance or intervention against such armed groups when they commit atrocity crimes. Subsequent reports have enlarged the areas of common understanding regarding early warning and assessment, regional and subregional collaboration, the range of possible actions under the third pillar, measures by states and other actors to enhance prevention, and opportunities for assistance and capacity building under pillar two.

Some norms do little more than codify existing patterns of behavior, while R2P, like other human rights and humanitarian norms, has an aspirational quality in that it challenges governments, groups, and individuals to do better and to aim higher.

The search for common understanding has been enhanced by the work of a number of nongovernmental organizations and think tanks devoted to R2P, including the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, and the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. There is an extensive and lively debate about R2P in academic circles and publications as well. Many governments have also made efforts to inform parliaments, the media, and publics about the contents and purposes of R2P. Although, as addressed in the next section, R2P remains a contentious concept in several respects, the scope of confusion about the principle and the three-pillar strategy for its implementation has narrowed substantially over the last few years.

Despite—or because of—this progress, three conceptual questions need to be addressed as R2P turns ten:

1. Given that R2P already has had three major conceptual iterations—in 2001, 2005, and 2009—is there either room or appetite for a fourth at this point? No. Conceptual clarity has largely been achieved. Advocates and skeptics are largely talking about the same conception of R2P. The remaining points of contention, quite properly, have less to do with theory than with practice.
2. With the conceptual development of R2P at a mature phase, should the annual cycle of reports by the secretary-general and informal interactive debates in the General Assembly be continued beyond 2015? Probably not. These exchanges have helped enormously to refine the principle, to explore related policy options, and to engage member states, the Secretariat, and civil society in the doctrinal evolution of R2P. Now, however, the exchanges risk becoming routine, with actors on all sides repeating pat phrases and reassuring pieties. The substantive returns could well decline over time, since the most pressing and contentious questions have already been addressed.
3. Is it time to consider making R2P a formal item on the agenda of the General Assembly? Yes. Making R2P the subject of an annual debate in the General Assembly would be a sign that it has arrived as an established function of the organization. Though the interactive and inclusive qualities of the current

cycles would be lost, as only the secretary-general and the member states could participate, the outcome of a formal debate could include measures to regularize the post of special adviser and to provide greater support to the Joint Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. Even if such steps could not yet command a consensus in the General Assembly, they would attract wide support, as votes in the Fifth Committee have demonstrated year after year. Without greater material support, the transition from the conceptual to implementation phases of R2P's development cannot be completed, and it will be harder to show results on the ground, instead of just in conference halls.

In Search of Political Acceptance

If measured on the basis of encouraging discourse in the General Assembly and the frequency of references in Security Council resolutions and statements, the quest for broad acceptance of R2P has progressed impressively over the past five or six years. No delegation questions any more the desirability of curbing mass atrocity crimes. None publicly doubts the sincerity and seriousness of the secretary-general's efforts to give atrocity prevention a higher place among UN priorities and programs. No one who looks at the record can claim that the Security Council has abandoned R2P in the wake of the controversies over the use of force in Libya in 2011 and the efforts to shift its purpose from human protection to regime change. Indeed, as the Global Centre and the International Coalition have documented, the Security Council has accelerated its references to R2P in its resolutions since then.⁴

There are healthy signs, as well, that the shift from the conceptual to the implementation phases of R2P's evolution is well under way. Over the last few years, debates and programming—whether in the United Nations, governments, or civil society—have increasingly focused on implementation and dissemination. Though many academics and a few member states still want to debate theory, most have turned to the more critical question of practice, of how R2P principles can make a difference in preventing the four crimes and in protecting people. As discussed below, the most imminent and existential challenges lie in the realm of implementation of agreed principles.

Despite these promising signs, there are reasons to believe that the political project that R2P embodies—the campaign to get states, groups, and individuals to not only accord a higher place to curbing atrocities but to act promptly and decisively to protect threatened populations—is still at an early phase:

- Advocates remain too defensive. In the early days, the conceptual confusion gave us little choice but to be constantly explaining what R2P was and, even more pointedly, what it was not.

- In trying to make R2P invulnerable to criticism, there has been a tendency to overemphasize its preventive side and underemphasize its responsive side. Artificial lines have been drawn between prevention and response and between pillars one and two and pillar three of the secretary-general's implementation strategy. In practice, these distinctions tend to become blurred as one grapples with a small range of politically acceptable tools to address specific situations.
- The goal should not be to tame R2P principles to such an extent that all states are comfortable with them all of the time. Some norms do little more than codify existing patterns of behavior, while R2P, like other human rights and humanitarian norms, has an aspirational quality in that it challenges governments, groups, and individuals to do better and to aim higher. Without some level of discomfort and dissatisfaction with current practice, we will never get better at prevention and protection. We should not forget that R2P was created because the status quo was not acceptable: horrific crimes, with hundreds of thousands of casualties, had unfolded with no one taking responsibility or acting effectively to prevent or curb them. R2P was to embody a new political dynamic for change, one that would affect attitudes, priorities, policies, and practices. This edge should not be dulled or lost.
- For all of the ongoing efforts at the national and regional levels, the R2P project remains overly United Nations-centric and within the United Nations, too New York-centric. An insufficient number of national and local policymakers, opinion leaders, and educators are aware of R2P and of its implications for their societies. As a result, support for R2P is as shallow as it is broad. Implementation will require deeper and more sustained political commitments at all levels.

To change hearts and minds, and not just win debates, proponents will need to address four acute political challenges:

1. The selective application of a universal norm. Big powers—and occasionally smaller ones as well—have sought to apply R2P principles in inappropriate circumstances or have invoked them inconsistently, depending on political considerations. Such behavior is hardly unprecedented, as a similar pattern has affected the application of human rights norms over the years. Nevertheless, it is incumbent on peer governments, international officials, and civil society leaders to publicly reject such departures from consistent practice before they undermine the credibility of the norm.
2. Responsibility before, while, and after protecting. Following the use of force in Libya, Brazil was right to underscore the need for responsibility while protecting. At the same time, the ensuing instability in Libya points to the need to take greater responsibility before and after protecting as well. At every level—global, regional,

subregional, and national—the resources devoted to developing a proper assessment of situations before intervention and to a candid understanding of the likely effects of intervention are too often insufficient. As discussed below, early engagement by the international community often helps, but, as in South Sudan, it is no guarantee of good results. Clearly the interface between R2P and post-conflict peacebuilding also needs much more conceptual and operational work.

3. Moral ambiguity. Initially, the model for R2P was that of “bad” governments committing atrocities against “good” people. The moral choices could not have been clearer. The political appeal of intervening in situations in which both sides have committed atrocities, such as the Central African Republic and South Sudan, is less compelling. In Syria, the ardor for responding robustly ebbed markedly when extremist groups with sectarian agendas joined the struggle against the repressive government of President Bashar al-Assad.
4. Making a difference. As discussed below, proponents can point to some quiet successes, such as in Kenya, Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, and Côte d’Ivoire; and more robust operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and Somalia seem to be achieving some positive results. Yet the failures of international policy, including efforts to protect populations, have been far more visible. It is early to have reliable measures of how R2P is faring in terms of making a difference on the ground, where it counts, but the record is no doubt mixed. As long as R2P remains a work in progress—that is, for the foreseeable future—proponents will need to make an informed, sober, and differentiated argument about R2P’s utility as a tool for policy and practice.

There is some urgency to efforts to make support for R2P as deep and sustainable as possible. Those who had dismissed R2P as a passing fad have clearly been proven wrong, but the durability of support will be tested by a number of upcoming political transitions. In less than two years, for instance, the United Nations will have a new secretary-general and the United States a new president. It cannot be assumed that their successors will devote as much attention to these matters as Ban Ki-moon and Barack Obama have. The same may be true elsewhere.

In Search of an Institutional Voice and Home⁵

Neither the 2001 report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty nor the 2005 World Summit addressed the question of what kind of institutional structures or entities would be needed to give operational expression to the prevention and protection goals embodied in R2P. At the United Nations, a part-time special adviser for

the prevention of genocide was appointed in 2004, with a mandate stressing information collection and early warning.⁶ When Ban Ki-moon became secretary-general in 2007, he decided to make the genocide prevention post full time, to raise it to the level of under-secretary-general, and to appoint a second special adviser to focus on the conceptual, political, institutional, and operational development of R2P. He decided, as well, that the two special advisers would share a small joint office and support staff. This has enhanced the opportunities for collaboration between the two special advisers, who routinely release joint statements on situations of concern. But it has also led to some anomalies:

- The higher-level, full-time, paid post is devoted to the narrower mandate of genocide prevention, while the broader and more ambitious R2P mandate is carried out by a part-time, unpaid special adviser.
- Genocide prevention is an essential and important component of R2P, not vice versa. Moreover, of the four crimes encompassed by R2P, genocide is the rarest. To give it precedent over the other three is to imply, wrongly, that they are of lesser importance in terms of saving lives and protecting populations.
- There is a risk that the R2P post could become an academic ghetto in the midst of the vast UN bureaucracy. Given the emphasis on drafting and conceptual development, the first two special advisers on R2P—this author and Jennifer Welsh—have had academic as well as policy backgrounds. This probably has made sense to date, but as R2P becomes more operational, a wider range of candidates might be considered in the future.
- Rather than differentiating the posts by function, both have been given headquarters-oriented mandates, though a growing portion of their work is field based, in capitals, or in collaboration with regional and subregional partners.

The next secretary-general might usefully consider revisiting the first arrangement proposed to the Security Council by Ban in August 2007.⁷ He suggested expanding the mandate of the existing post to cover both genocide and other mass atrocities and to change its title to special representative (SRSG), while making the R2P post a paid one (on a when-actually-employed basis). The special representative, in keeping with an emphasis on prevention and early engagement, would spend considerable time working with other special representatives, governments, regional and subregional organizations, and civil society on implementing pillars one and two of the secretary-general’s strategy. The R2P special adviser would focus more on providing conceptual and policy advice to the secretary-general, other UN officials, member state delegations, and civil society groups at headquarters. This post could remain at the assistant secretary-general level, while the special representative post would continue to be at the

under-secretary-general level, in part for protocol purposes in capitals and in working with other, field-based special representatives.

In theory, R2P should have a close and symbiotic relationship with related issues on the United Nations agenda, such as conflict prevention and humanitarian affairs. This has been largely true in practice. However, in specific situations, these different perspectives have often led to distinct policy choices. It should be recalled, for instance, that in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the prevailing preference in the world body—the cultural tendency—was to champion conflict-resolution efforts over drawing attention to unfolding atrocities. The author, when serving as special adviser, found on several occasions that those engaged in conflict management and mediation were, understandably, reluctant to have public statements made at sensitive times about possible atrocities.

In Sri Lanka, the premium given to gaining or maintaining humanitarian access and space trumped public warnings about possible atrocities during the final phases of the civil war. It is striking that in the three cases over the last two decades in which candid reviews of UN failures were undertaken—on Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Sri Lanka—the organization’s timidity and hesitation to speak out about possible atrocities were underscored.

These experiences should be borne in mind should consideration be given—perhaps on efficiency or coordination grounds—to having the Joint Office be absorbed by one of the larger departments or to having the special adviser’s direct access to the secretary-general and the member states be compromised in any manner. If nothing else, the special adviser should be charged with asking the questions and posing the scenarios that the mandates of other ranking officials would preclude. Our knowledge of when and where atrocity crimes might occur is limited, but we do know that we will not get the right answers if we fail to ask the right questions.

In regional and subregional arrangements and in national governments, the situation is similar. Unless someone is mandated to worry about atrocity crimes, they are not likely to get the urgency or level of attention that effective prevention demands. When everyone is responsible, no one is responsible. Capitals usually have more immediate, and more political, priorities. That is why the movement to appoint focal points in capitals, as well as in regional and subregional organizations, deserves strong and sustained support. Facilitated by the Global Centre, the effort has led to the establishment of focal points in about 45 capitals. In some capitals, interagency mechanisms, such as Washington’s Atrocity Prevention Board, are identifying ways in which a wide array of agencies can help in forwarding all three pillars of the secretary-general’s strategy.

Ultimately, however, the success of R2P will depend on raising the place of atrocity prevention in the hierarchy of national priorities. This cannot be accomplished by executive branch action alone, which is more likely to reflect than mold public and parliamentary attitudes. In that respect, the interest that the Inter-Parliamentary Union has demonstrated in R2P is most welcome. So, too, are the educational efforts encouraged by groups such as the Auschwitz Institute, the International Coalition, the Asia Pacific Centre, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, and many other partners.

This is seminal, if underappreciated, work. Civil society, educators, and an informed media are critical to fostering a long-term shift in conceptions of national interest so they encompass mass atrocity prevention as a moral imperative of 21st-century civilization. We witnessed a similar trajectory as international human rights norms were incorporated in national legislation and embedded in societal programs

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in place after place over the second half of the last century. It was hardly a linear process. Opposition was fierce, skepticism was rampant—especially among self-appointed realists—and success was never assured. R2P is being asked to complete the same journey in a fraction of the time. When the reorientation of public values and priorities is completed, however, the critical foundation stones will be in place for assuring the sustainability of R2P principles, whatever the temporary setbacks along the way.

In Search of Operational Effectiveness

From such a historical perspective, it would be grossly premature to pass judgment on the effectiveness of the initial efforts to prevent atrocities and protect populations over R2P's first decade. As noted above, there is reason to believe that, with a boost from the R2P movement, atrocity prevention has gained increasing attention in public and academic discourse and in policymaking circles over these years. From the outset, gaining awareness was envisioned as an essential first step for R2P. Translating attention into effective action has proven to be—to no one's surprise—a more uneven and problematic challenge. The etiology of atrocity crimes is contested by scholars as well as by practitioners. Each situation has unique characteristics, so, from the earliest days, the secretary-general has rejected the notion that some magical, one-size-fits-all template could be applied from one crisis to the next. Policymaking at the United Nations, and no doubt elsewhere, has been a learning process. The good news is that this process—the search for better answers—continues.

Some preliminary conclusions about factors favoring atrocity prevention can be drawn from common elements of those situations in which international diplomatic engagement seems to have made a difference over these years.⁸

1. It helps if local, group, and national leaders are willing to listen to international appeals and are concerned about how their reputations could be affected by escalating violence. When they do not care what others think, have very different value systems, see their choices in existential terms, or are highly resentful of external interference, the range of options for international action narrows markedly. For international decision makers, intimate and nuanced understanding of the motivations and perceptions of local actors is as critical as it is rare.
2. When a credible case can be made that impunity is not an option and that referral to the International Criminal Court or an ad hoc tribunal is a likely outcome, then moral and political appeals will have more bite. This, too, however, seems to vary from one situation and one set of actors to the next. Some perpetrators do not believe that international groups either can or should be able to hold them accountable, and many feel that their actions are justifiable or even necessary for the preservation of themselves or their sectarian communities.
3. It matters whether the leaders of neighboring countries and regional organizations are ready to echo international messages and to take steps to discourage further atrocities. Global-regional cooperation and communication can be very helpful in fostering actions that are, and appear to be, in sync. Bad actors seem to be especially skilled at splitting techniques. In this author's experience, collaboration with regional players worked exceptionally well in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, and not so well in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya, where regional and subregional bodies pushed in opposing directions at times.

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4. If major trading, economic, political, or security partners are capable of making and are prepared to make perpetrators pay a significant price for bad behavior, they will weigh their options differently. Such partners can, of course, act as spoilers instead, whether publicly in the Security Council or quietly in capitals. Countries with leverage can make the jobs of international officials mandated to curb atrocities either relatively easy or completely impossible.
5. Early and quiet international engagement is more likely to be persuasive than are appeals or demands that come only after local perpetrators have already started down a violent path from which retreat would be difficult. Once local leaders are committed to such a course, the personal and political stakes of trying to turn back can be quite high. International actors may not be in a position to offer the kinds of security, political, and economic guarantees that could be persuasive to those who have calculated that violence is their best option for dealing with those they fear or despise.
6. Likewise, prospects of making a difference rise if there are neutral or sympathetic elements of civil society, government, and the private sector with which to work. In countries and societies under stress, the influence of such groups is likely to ebb as tensions rise and politics become more polarized over time. Again, this argues for early engagement, especially in places where leaders and groups are not fully and irrevocably committed to mass violence as a political choice. We have seen a number of such cases in recent years, along with those in which leaders and groups have been irrevocably committed to mass violence.

None of this is rocket science. But these factors do underscore the critical importance of sober and nuanced assessment of each situation, on its own terms and at an early stage. Without proper assessment, early warning is of little use and may trigger flawed decision making.

Assessment, of course, is not equivalent to identifying a surefire solution. In the case of Syria, for instance, the downward spiral of events was predictable and predicted by many. It was a situation in which none of the six factors noted above broke in the right direction. We could see readily enough what was happening and how horrendous the consequences would be for the people of Syria, but we could not find a way to stop it. Not every problem has a solution, at least in the short term. In the case of South Sudan, on the other hand, my impression is that international observers did not anticipate how quickly the new government would implode and the violence would escalate, though the intertribal differences were well known. Ironically but fortunately, the UN peace operation there is one of those with a strong R2P mandate from the Security Council. Those external actors with leverage, moreover, are motivated to try to put the political puzzle back together.

It may be true that the international record of preventing atrocity crimes has been much better in the easier cases than in the hardest ones—indeed, such a tautological conclusion should be expected. Yet it is also possible that some situations did not move from the “easier” to the “harder” column precisely because there was timely and effective international engagement. However one casts the balance sheet, three conclusions are evident: (1) prevention sometimes works, (2) prevention sometimes fails, and (3) because of this second point, we must learn to do better in protection, as well as in prevention.

Conclusion

For all of the conceptual and political progress that R2P has made over the course of its first decade, there are two global trends with very worrisome implications for the larger atrocity prevention project.

One is the growing surge of forcibly displaced people, which has—for the first time in the 70 years of the United Nations’ existence—surpassed 50 million.⁹ Of the four R2P crimes, ethnic cleansing may not have the longest legal pedigree but it surely has generated the most contemporary headlines. Sadly, much of the forcible displacement has been along sectarian lines and has resulted from crimes against humanity and/or war crimes.

The second, and related, trend is the emergence of nonstate armed groups with virulently sectarian agendas and a penchant for committing atrocity crimes as a tactic for terrorizing populations. Groups such as Islamic State, Boko Haram, Al Qaeda, and Al Shabab commit mass atrocities as a matter of doctrine, publicity, and identity, flouting international norms as a way of demonstrating their capacity to undermine international and national authority.

These two developments underscore the continuing relevance of R2P principles. Sadly, these principles will be needed, if anything, even more in the future. With tens of millions of people condemned to living for years or even decades in camps because of their identities, the task of preventing further cycles of sectarian violence will become even more pressing. The parallel convergence of the human protection and counterterrorism agendas in the Security Council, capitals, and elsewhere is already posing awkward conceptual and political challenges for supporters of R2P. The decision to include armed groups in the secretary-general’s 2009 implementation strategy is appearing increasingly prescient, but the confluence of human protection and counterterrorism concerns mixes human rights and security concepts and constituencies in a way that may not be entirely comfortable for either side of the equation.

Both developments, however, do promise to put a more human and individual face on R2P. The initial R2P paradigm put a premium on the actions and responsibilities of states and

intergovernmental institutions because the question being addressed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty commissioners was how to protect populations threatened by ruthless governments hiding behind the legal walls of state sovereignty. Their answers, naturally, were state-centric. They need to be complemented by a larger and more bottom-up vision of R2P that privileges the responsibilities and agency of individuals and groups as well.¹⁰ For at every step of the way, collective responsibility starts with individual responsibility. That is one lesson from R2P's first decade that will serve it well in the coming ones.

Endnotes

¹ Paragraphs 138, 139, and 140 of the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit are devoted to R2P. It was adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/1 and first reaffirmed by the Security Council in Resolution 1674 (2006), as well as in many subsequent resolutions and statements.

² The independent commission, cochaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, former foreign ministers of Australia and Algeria, respectively, first articulated the principle in its path-breaking report *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). The research director for the commission, Thomas G. Weiss, made the "R2P-lite" comment in "R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit," *Wisconsin International Law Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 3, p. 750.

³ *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, A/63/677 of January 12, 2009.

⁴ According to the Web site of the Global Centre, there have been references to R2P in 25 Security Council resolutions since Resolution 1973 (2011)

authorizing the use of force in Libya was adopted. The most recent was Resolution 2206 (2015) of March 3, 2015, on South Sudan.

⁵ The discussion in this section and the following one on operational challenges draws from the author's experience as the United Nations' first special adviser on R2P. Some of these points are addressed in more detail in Edward C. Luck, "Getting There, Being There: The Dual Roles of the Special Adviser," in *The Oxford Handbook on the Responsibility to Protect*, ed. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

⁶ See annex to letter from Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the president of the Security Council, S/2004/567, July 13, 2004. The following year, the Outcome Document of the World Summit, in paragraph 140 of its section on R2P, expressed full support for that mission.

⁷ Letter from Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the president of the Security Council, S/2007/721, August 31, 2007.

⁸ These informal reflections should be read in the context of the very useful list of societal and institutional inhibitors of atrocity crimes included in the 2014 Report of the Secretary-General, *Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibilities: International Assistance and the Responsibility to Protect*, A/68/947-S/2014/449, July 11, 2014, pp. 11–15, para. 43–58.

⁹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR Global Trends 2013: War's Human Cost* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2014).

¹⁰ The notion of an individual responsibility to protect, which was raised in the secretary-general's 2009 implementation report, is developed more fully in Edward C. Luck and Dana Zaret Luck, "The Individual Responsibility to Protect," in *Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention*, ed. Sheri Rosenberg, Tiberiu Galis, and Alex Zucker (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

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