

# Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide

## How to Keep From Overselling or Underestimating the United Nations



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The policy choices that the United States makes regarding the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations rest on a set of assumptions on whether our aims in the world can be achieved through sheer power, set international structures, or a combination thereof. The bedrock for policy, therefore, is an assessment of the capacities and limitations of these structures. In other words, our appraisal of the United Nations' potential impact helps determine what we seek there. These questions raise others about the very nature of the international system and whether it is a brutal Hobbesian struggle or subject to some sort of regulation.

International organizations are premised on their ability to make the realm of nations more, rather than less, orderly. In US domestic politics, this is often portrayed as an all-or-nothing proposition. The United Nations' treaties are worthless, goes the argument, because they cannot stop those who are bent on ruthless destruction. So what's the use of such bodies?

US policymakers will always face controversial and difficult decisions for the US stance at the United Nations. But if some of the rancor can be drained from the surrounding political debate, it would be easier for officials to focus on the merits of the proposed courses of action. The place to start is with a set of realistic expectations that neither oversells nor underestimates the value of international organizations.

Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote in his March 2005 report on UN reform *In Larger Freedom* that “sovereign states are the basic and indispensable building blocks of the international system.” Sovereignty no longer gives national governments license to commit grave abuses within their borders, and nonstate actors have grown in their impact, both harmful and beneficial. Nonetheless, the secretary-general's point stands—even in the networked 21st century, nation-states remain the essential constituent elements.

## Is the System Legal or Political?

In what sense, then, are international organizations supranational? There is some truth to the skeptical view of international organizations' ability to enforce compliance. They are not able to halt and punish transgressors in the same way governments can enforce laws within their own borders. This statement is not a claim about the standing of international law and treaties; it is instead a practical observation that international norms work differently and have limits.

Lacking an extensive justice system such as the United States has domestically, the international system's judgments and sanctions are not based as directly and consistently on the presentation of legal argument and precedent. Some international mechanisms function in a legal mode. The International Court of Justice, for example, operates in its recognized sphere of jurisdiction. The World Trade Organization, likewise, adjudicates disputes between nations on the basis of agreed trade rules, and its verdicts have met with remarkable compliance. By and large though, the court of world opinion is not actually a court.

Despite this, the concept of international law tends to loom large in the debate over multilateral politics, which points toward

The Stanley Foundation's Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide project brings together pairs of foreign policy and national security specialists from across the political spectrum to find common ground on ten key, controversial areas of policy. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Stanley Foundation. The series is coedited by Derek Chollet of the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Tod Lindberg, editor of the Hoover Institution's journal *Policy Review*; and Stanley Foundation program officer David Shorr.

the need for a more realistic working concept of the international system—namely the realm in which nations clash, cooperate, and establish mutual expectations. The international system does not feature overarching judicial authority, but it can often function as a rules-based order that defines some boundaries for commerce, military action, and respect for human rights. A depiction that squares these realities could help focus the policy debate on appropriate expectations for international organizations and what the United States seeks from them.

The domestic rule of law itself, it is worth noting, is not completely mechanistic. Its rules and precision serve as a gyroscope for law, order, and liberty, yet it must also be flexible to deal with new situations, resolve internal tensions, and adapt to shifting political realities. What differentiates the international level is that it has less of the former and more of the latter.

Domestically, statutes, their legislative history, and judicial precedents form a dense web of rules, keeping latitude and discretion to a relative minimum. There are also explicit norms at the international level, to be sure, but order is maintained in a more dynamic way. As noted, the international system lacks an extensive judicial apparatus; instead, diplomatic interchange is necessary and prevalent. Rather than being adjudicated by jurists, then, international norms are given effect through formal intergovernmental decision-making bodies and the underlying political interests and commitments.

Just because the collective decisions of governments are mainly political in nature, this doesn't mean they are always merely advisory. The United Nations Security Council has a legal as well as a political function. Chapter VII of the UN

Charter establishes the Security Council as authorized to establish binding international legal obligations needed for international peace and security, with the authority not only to compel actions by member states but also to mandate military action or other sanctions to give force to its decisions. Of course the council will only act according to the decisions of the national governments that comprise it, subject to the veto power of the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom.

The lack of consistent enforcement of Security Council resolutions and other international norms that we consider important is a shortcoming of today's

and papering over differences has allowed problems to fester rather than be resolved.

The coauthors differ in their diagnoses of the obstacles to stronger enforcement and on the question of whether the United States bears a special onus to surmount them. For David Shorr, overcoming international suspicion and mistrust of the United States itself is essential. He views international resistance to the US calls for stronger enforcement steps as stemming from a perception that the superpower is driven by its own likes and dislikes rather than on behalf of the global community. Therefore, the United States must persuade others that enforcement is not merely a pet concern.

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international system, due largely to a current political fractiousness among nations that hinders progress toward greater security for all. Politically, the United States is often the most insistent voice diplomatically that some norms be enforced. Nonetheless, even with its indispensable and preeminent military assets, enforcement is still difficult without the legitimacy that stems from broad international support.

The challenge is to steer a course that avoids either precipitous confrontations with violators or paths of least resistance; the pressure applied to states at the center of international attention must be serious and sustained. The difficulty for the United States is the inconclusive drift that occurs when pressure is not maintained. From the Darfur genocide to the prewar economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein, the approach of going along, getting along,

Alternatively, Mark Lagon believes that other countries resist enforcement because of their economic and political interests, and will support enforcement of norms when there is a cost or penalty for not doing so. He does not take at face value that other nations are truly concerned about US proposals for multilateral enforcement being self-serving, but instead views those nations as merely motivated by their own perceived interests. Lagon believes that where consensus cannot be achieved in the United Nations, US efforts to enforce norms constitute leadership rather than "license." Both coauthors agree, however, that the United States will be better off with a broader and more united front to bring defectors into better compliance with norms.

The broad-based representation and inclusiveness of the United Nations can help bolster international norms. In other

words, the specific form of rules and institutions is not what elicits confidence and support. Norms are strengthened when, through the international community, they are viewed as broadly beneficial, responding to the concerns of member states and meeting their needs. In those instances where nations' interests coincide, the United Nations can catalyze the political legitimization so as to strengthen international cooperation.

And just as the political dynamic is related but distinct from the legal, so too the global political agenda is broader than just the regulation of actions by states. However the world's nations arrange themselves and conduct their affairs, the world community must not only establish and preserve order but also promote progress and further prosperity and freedom—i.e., the global “general welfare” (a good in and of itself and also a foundation of greater peace and security). Accordingly, the world's intergovernmental bodies offer mechanisms to set agendas, agree on fundamental approaches, and decide courses of action and implement programs to deal with the entire range of international problems. The mandates, focus, and priorities of these bodies may not be optimal, but any deficiencies are not essentially architectural. Confidence in the system is a function of its performance in channeling effective action across a wide agenda of needs and concerns.

Both coauthors believe in the importance of an inclusive multilateral agenda that ranges across development and poverty reduction, the threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and terrorism. At the same time, the coauthors have different views of the relationship between such baskets of issues. When the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change issued their sweeping reform platform, it could be seen

as a kind of global grand bargain in which developed and developing countries exchange support for their respective concerns. Yet such a view undercuts the idea of shared commitment by all for all of the goals. The coauthors differ over whether nations' support for the goals on this broad global agenda is essentially a matter of principle or whether it has a quid pro quo dimension to it.

For Mark Lagon, each area of policy has its own principles and norms that serve the collective good, and they are not open for bargaining between areas. In development, the Monterrey Consensus reached in 2002 recognizes the mutual obligations of developed and developing nations alike and among them emphasizes the importance of market reforms, rule of law, attraction of private capital, unfettered trade, and development assistance (without a rigid target level). In the area of security, keeping WMD from being acquired anew by states (especially those with illiberal governance) or by terrorist networks is a crucial norm. Likewise, halting terrorist attacks on civilian populations is a norm—with no exception for national liberation or attacking Israel. A bargain whereby the North transfers official aid to the South in exchange for cooperation in fighting proliferation and terrorism ignores the basic interest the South itself has in the aforementioned principles and norms.

As David Shorr sees it, the nations of the world can share an interest in all of the world's many problems, but not the same levels of interest in the various challenges. In Ethiopia, for example, the government faces a much greater threat from the spread of AIDS than the spread of WMD. Shorr would thus approach the tension over development versus traditional “hard” security not as a matter of principle but an opportunity for nations, at an

especially fractious time, to build bridges through mutual support. Over time, he expects that such exchanges of help will build rather than undermine a sense of common purpose. The coauthors' different approaches to diplomacy and persuasion extend to other contexts, which will be addressed below.

The term *international system* is a broad category extending beyond the United Nations as a particular organization. Even though the United Nations itself is a system made up of various organs, it is not the only vehicle through which nations can cooperate. There is an abundance of intergovernmental fora with diverse memberships and portfolios.

for the “right tool for the job” in pursuing our aims—based on capacity, legitimacy, and membership—and should continually push for greater effectiveness and impact on real-world problems.

The comparative advantage of the United Nations, for instance, is the universality of its membership and the range of issues and mechanisms it encompasses. As the sole global political forum in which every nation has a voice, it enjoys the greatest breadth of participation. Whatever its shortcomings and dysfunctions, the United Nations will not be replaced without a radical reshuffling of the geostrategic order, a shift that cannot and should not be anticipated. The Community of Democracies,

## *Building the Community of Democracies as a potential replacement for the United Nations is impractical for the near term.*

The availability of multiple outlets for international cooperation is highly useful as we seek a more secure nation and world. Indeed, this diversity both reflects and helps with the broad 21st-century security agenda. There are instruments of a political, financial, legal, or technical nature to deal with arms control, health and disease, poverty reduction, terrorism, telecommunications, trade, air traffic, meteorology, and more. Some of these fora are more inclusive, while others are less so. Regional and subregional organizations focus on the challenges of “the neighborhood.”

US policy toward international organizations should always draw on the strengths and avoid the weaknesses of these various bodies. Complementarity among intergovernmental organizations is not only possible but also vital. We should always look

for example, can serve as a complementary or catalytic caucus within the United Nations, but is unlikely to replace it as a forum for action.

The presence of so many authoritarian regimes in the community of nations should not be taken complacently; it is a serious problem, both for the capacity and even legitimacy of the United Nations, and even more so for the people who live under their repressive rule. With all the work still to be done to promote democracy, it is worth noting that as a result of the global spread of democracy in recent decades, democracies now constitute a majority of the UN membership, with the organization itself playing an increasing role in democracy's spread. Let us hope this trend continues.

Meanwhile, efforts to position the Community of Democracies as a potential replacement for the United Nations are unlikely to bear fruit. To begin with, the negotiation of a new global constitutional order, even just among democracies, would be an enormous and complex undertaking. The failure to reach agreement in 2005 over changes to the composition of the UN Security Council is an indication of the difficulty. Nor should it be assumed that democratic allies would be supportive; even many of the United States' friends would be resistant to any effort to ostracize nondemocracies in framing a new construct. That said, an effort by democracies to function as a strong coalition within the United Nations would be highly constructive as an effort of those governments that rest solidly on the rule of law to strengthen the United Nations' ability to achieve its noble goals. Furthermore, over time, if the Community of Democracies proves to serve particular functions (such as in areas of human rights and democracy promotion) with greater capacity or legitimacy than the United Nations, then the United States should welcome it.

### **Sovereignty and Responsibility**

The United Nations' universal membership is both a source of its legitimizing role and a hindrance to its problem-solving role. All member states have a voice and sovereign equality. They formally have equal say on budgets and programs. At the UN's founding, the realist victors of World War II, with eyes wide open, decided that universality permits an all-inclusive, accepted forum for dialogue that would promote peace, prosperity, public health, and pluralism. In practice, though, such international deliberation, with all voices equal, can make for more brakes than engine, and more heat than light.

By wise design, the founders created a key exception to pure equality of member states to deal with the most sensitive issues of war and peace: the UN Security Council. There is persistent tension within the United Nations about enlarging both the Security Council's permanent and elected membership to be more inclusive and to better fit the power realities of the early 21st century more than the mid-20th century. Hopefully, deserving candidate nations that have been true to UN ideals will eventually be brought into the council (e.g., Japan) without it swelling to a size that would make it even more difficult to forge agreement on situations—like Iraq or Darfur—over which it has struggled in recent years. Yet this battle is unlikely to be resolved soon. In the short run, the existing council should reinforce its credibility, particularly through taking effective action regarding situations such as those in Iran and Sudan. Meanwhile, fora such as the G-8+5, G-20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation can be key gathering points for major, middle, and rising powers.

The UN Charter begins with the words "We the peoples," thereby indicating the organization's obligations not only to member states but also to their citizens. While the UN General Assembly is more broadly representative than the Security Council, the universality of the General Assembly and some other bodies is not inherently democratic since sovereign equality takes no account of democratic governance or the popular will of the citizenry. Universality allows for dialogue and for less powerful nations to air real or perceived grievances. However, in some arenas, equal standing for repressive governments with free ones undercuts the organization's purposes. To have non-free states on the new Human Rights Council standing hypocritically in judgment of others does not serve the aim

of advancing what the UN Charter calls “fundamental freedoms.” In this particular respect, the design of the new council has by no means corrected the failures of the discredited body it was fashioned to replace, the Commission on Human Rights. David Shorr views the reforms as incremental improvements at best, and in Mark Lagon’s view, not even that. Both regard the early regular and special emergency sessions of the council as entirely too dominated by focus on and criticism of Israel and a cause of great concern for the future. Even a progressive such as Shorr would question the usefulness of the council if the pattern persists; conservatives like Lagon are that much closer to reaching a conclusion.

war crimes, and other mass atrocities and (2) the Security Council should act to fill the protection vacuum. Seen as a political norm rather than a mechanistic legal trigger, the second dimension is a significant step forward in the United Nations preparing itself to better address future cases of the man-made bloodletting seen in Cambodia, Rwanda, the Balkans, and Sudan. It still will require political will, as slow Security Council action on Darfur demonstrates, but RTP will encourage that will.

Such human rights atrocities are the focus of a relatively new international mechanism: the International Criminal Court (ICC). The coauthors differ over the likelihood that

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Conceived as a responsibility, sovereignty is not solely a matter of status in the world body but also the upholding of the fundamental ideals affirmed in the UN Charter within a nation’s own borders. There is a presumption in favor of noninterference in the United Nations, yet this is not as absolute as Star Trek’s “Prime Directive” against interference in the strange new worlds visited by Captain Kirk and his crew. It is a positive development indeed that the United Nations now recognizes situations in which national sovereignty loses its legitimacy: most notably, when a government commits or allows genocide, war crimes, or other mass atrocities.

One of the great successes of the UN 60th Anniversary World Summit of September 2005 was the affirmation of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (RTP). RTP has two noteworthy parts: (1) states must protect their citizens from genocide,

Americans might be prosecuted through the ICC and whether the court has sufficient safeguards against politicized prosecutions. Lagon considers it necessary to seek alternative venues for prosecution that have greater political accountability and oversight—domestically or via prudently constituted international tribunals. Shorr believes the safeguards built into the ICC, including deference to capable domestic justice systems, are sufficient and that there is greater legitimacy and efficacy in a permanent court compared with ad hoc tribunals. In any case, the United States did not stand in the way of the Security Council’s referral for prosecution of Sudanese genocide perpetrators when no other avenue was available, and the coauthors agree that referral had the benefit of a Security Council trigger rather than a self-starting ICC prosecution. The United States has an enormous stake in continuing to be at the forefront of accountability for atrocities as it has been since the Nuremberg Trials.

Another dimension of domestic governance, the promotion of democracy, has also been a growing area of UN activity. The Secretariat's Electoral Assistance Division does useful work to monitor elections and train people to conduct them. The UN Development Programme embraces democracy promotion, considering political liberalization not just a product of economic development but an enabler of it. The UN Arab Human Development Reports authored by Arab scholars have been landmark assessments of deficits of political freedom, knowledge, and women's rights in the Arab world. The new UN Democracy Fund proposed by President Bush helped fill a void within the United Nations by fostering vital civil societies through grants to nongovernmental organizations. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his deputy secretary-general, Malloch Brown, realized that democracy facilitates both peace and economic prosperity as two major aims of the United Nations and has to be a focus of its work. It is to the credit of the United Nations that it balances non-interference in sovereign affairs not just with a concern for extraordinary catastrophes but with more steady efforts to nudge along democracy. This is very helpful with some of the steps that can be pursued more easily under a UN umbrella than through bilateral efforts.

### **Working Within the System—Doing Business at the United Nations**

The United States has been a long and consistent champion of UN reform since its earliest days. By now, "UN reform" is itself a hackneyed phrase. For some, it evokes images of our CPA-style concerns about funding, and suspicion that the United States seeks to radically rein in the United Nations. But the best objective for reform is a United Nations that better lives up to its founding aims and its potential. It should be aimed at a United Nations that

delivers not *less* for its member states, but *better*; "renewal" is thus a more apt term than "reform." Developing countries are often at the front lines of ground-level programs to promote peace, development, and human rights, and thus have a large stake in a United Nations that delivers more reliably. Americans and the rest of the world community should look at reform in this larger sense of institutional renewal and tangible progress on the ideals of the Charter.

The question of how often the United States should press its positions insistently in international negotiations offers a window into the different diplomatic approaches discussed above. Progressives and conservatives alike seek effective outcomes and appreciate the need to stand firm on priority bottom-line needs and forthrightly wield American influence to achieve them. But what about the steady flow of issues that arise in international organizations—should consensus building or tough bargaining be the primary mode of American diplomats?

From David Shorr's vantage, it is possible on most issues to accommodate the reasonable concerns of others while preserving the essentials. The goodwill accrued along the way yields leverage to seek support on other matters or to fend off pressure on bottom-line US concerns. Shorr is concerned about the best as the enemy of the good and sees value in the decisions that can be reached by compromise, imperfect as they may be. For one thing, he views decisions with broad and genuine ownership as more durable than those reached through grueling diplomatic struggle.

Mark Lagon's approach is to be ambitious in reinforcing the United Nations' own ideals, be frank, uphold standards, and aim



high, as a higher priority than moving to forge confidence-building consensus. Reluctant to lower our sights, he prefers to hold out in negotiations, a strategy he believes will improve final outcomes. While both coauthors share an impatience with lowest-common-denominator diplomacy, as seen in the General Assembly and elsewhere, Lagon as a conservative is especially on guard against watered-down decisions. Vigilant on a wide array of issues, he is reluctant to make compromises he views as flawed that would severely undercut the value of an agreement.

These diverging approaches extend to the coauthors' differing assessments of US influence at the United Nations. Mark

the coauthors about putting increasing portions of UN financing on a voluntary basis, a move viewed by Lagon as promoting accountability and efficiency and seen by Shorr as unilateral cherry-picking.

Despite these differences, though, it is clear to both that requiring consensus among the 192 nations obstructs optimum administrative *and* policy decision making. The administrative micromanagement of the UN staff by the entire membership is merely the absurd extreme. The broader problem is the lowest common denominator for policies and programs set by the member states when there is no accounting for their qualitative differences (regime-type, population-size, and level of economic contributions).

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Lagon believes the one-country-one-vote system in a body of 192 nations diminishes American clout completely out of proportion to our power and our financial support of the United Nations. Lagon believes weighted voting based on stakeholders' economic strength and contributions would be the more appropriate procedural basis for a greater range of multilateral decisions; it would promote stronger resource stewardship as well as policy prudence. As David Shorr sees it, the United States is never viewed by others as just another country. Whatever the voting system, the United States' preponderant power is palpably apparent, and pressing for further advantage only provokes resistance. Moreover, the permanent US veto in the Security Council is more than fair compensation for the more egalitarian General Assembly. There is likewise a split between

But to suggest that promotion of structural changes is not the most fruitful course is not tantamount to throwing up one's hands in resignation. Beyond current earnest efforts to work within existing structures to improve oversight and accountability, administration and personnel practices, and the regular review of whether programs have outlived their usefulness, the most important matter is to tackle the poisonous *politics* of the United Nations. The tensions between the North and South in the United Nations are pronounced. The divide takes many forms: debates about the centrality of aid to development, political versus economic rights, Security Council enlargement, and disarmament by nuclear haves versus nonproliferation to nuclear have-nots.

These debates may or may not be made more acute by US unipolar power, squabbles over Iraq, and globalization. Still, much could be achieved if the rigid alignments in place since the Cold War era changed. The problem is not so much that the UN *institutions* have not kept pace changing with the world's problems, but rather that *political groupings* within the world body have not. The United Nations works like a legislature, with individual actors (states) often developing their positions within blocs and caucuses. To the degree that the bloc system of the G-77, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the regional blocs freeze in place arguments, it must be loosened. If this could be accomplished, the developing world might see the United Nations' reform and renewal as a benefit rather than a threat to its equities.

The United Nations' nature as a political body is the source of both its strength and weakness. States remain the central actors in world politics, and they are in the strongest position to mobilize resources and make a positive difference for the world's people. The United Nations and its Charter call on states' leaders to use their collective political power for the highest ideals. Yet too often it is political gamesmanship in the United Nations that distracts from this vital work. The United Nations is a stage to air real and perceived grievances, with developing nations accorded an equal voice to great powers, and dictatorships an equal voice to democracies. Moreover, a number of member states that are cooperative partners of the United States at a bilateral level use the United Nations as a stage to demonstrate their independence from the United States, safe in the knowledge that such grandstanding will not elicit the retribution that vital bilateral matters would.

## Realizing the United Nations' Potential

It is silly to deride the United Nations as "politicized," because it is inherently a political body. The United States should energetically engage the players in this legislature-like body. Successes depend on seeking support diligently and adroitly and forming different groups of partners on different issues. Yet marked success will involve working overtime to improve the mindset and conduct of politics at the United Nations. States' leaders face a basic choice regarding the United Nations' role and future: is the United Nations an instrument for cooperative problem solving or a debating society? Cooperation depends chiefly on political will, rather than changes in institutional arrangements unlikely themselves to alter international politics. For all of its difficulties, a great deal can be accomplished through the United Nations when governments close ranks behind it: pressuring Syria over the Hariri assassination, caring for millions of refugees, providing a mandate for a coalition to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, improving airline safety and security, immunizing children and helping get them into school.

The simple fact is that the world community needs vehicles for actions on which they can agree. But they have to muster the political will to agree. So in addition to being a vehicle for implementing solutions based on common interests, states should muster the political will to use the United Nations as its founders intended: as a forum to explore where their interests intersect. A frank expression of nations' interests to each other without facilitators speaking for them will help the United Nations play that role, if the temptation for polemics can be set aside.

Progressives and conservatives can agree on a compromise course in multilateral policy involving two key dimensions. First, instead of focusing on structural changes, a more effective United Nations requires a change in the “culture” of the United Nations and its rigid blocs and caucuses. The politics of the United Nations could be more flexible. It would be helpful to ask questions like: Why do developing nations allow a few prominent bloc leaders to speak for them all despite their diversity of economic conditions, cultures, and interests? Why are some transregional blocs in the United Nations far more cohesive than the transregional democratic bloc? Why do regional blocs all too often shield their most repressive states from frank appraisal by the international community? Why is the Warsaw Pact still intact as a bloc in the United Nations? Why are Near Eastern, South Asian, and East Asian states all part of the same bloc? Here is where the Community of Democracies could play a role, not by replacing the United Nations, but by joining an expanded array of alternative caucuses within the United Nations.

Second, while renewal of the United Nations to better serve its founding purposes and deal with 21st-century problems is crucial, expectations for the United Nations need to be adjusted. Ardent proponents and critics of the United Nations both make the mistake of suggesting we should expect it to do what it cannot. Some problems will be endemic to universal membership or divergent political, economic, and military interests of member states. Other multilateral institutions will at times serve some functions better. “Minilateral” solutions might be preferable to multilateral ones when an organization narrower in membership or mission offers better capacity to solve problems, be it the African

Union, the Organization of American States, the World Trade Organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nation, the North American Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or any number of others. The United States should examine alternatives, not to retire or replace the United Nations, but to turn to them when they offer comparative advantages.

In short, the United Nations is unique in breadth. We should work hard to make it more legitimate and deliver better. But the United Nations is part of a rich fabric of multilateral options that are not mutually exclusive. Multilateralism is not an end in itself. Yet multilateral means can often best serve the common good.

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