Surveying the Civilian Reform Landscape

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This paper provides a thirty-thousand foot view of the various research and advocacy initiatives proposing ways of building US government civilian capacity. The purpose is to flag remaining questions about key distinctions, tensions, gaps, and opportunities presented by the various efforts inside and outside of government.

Recent years have produced dozens of high-profile reports, articles, conferences, speeches, hearings, and initiatives that call for the strengthening the US government's civilian international affairs agencies. As one might expect, these efforts tend to define the problem and devise solutions in varied ways. Some focus on only one aspect of building civilian capacity such as improving foreign assistance, public diplomacy, or post-conflict reconstruction. Others look more broadly at capacities that cut across departments and agencies such as planning, budgeting, and coordination. Some stay at the level of grand strategy, avoiding operational prescriptions and concrete institutional fixes.[1]

One result of these various efforts has been the formation of a community of interest that has authored the reports and articles, populated the commissions, and sought to carry out their recommendations. There is a great deal of consensus within this community on the rationale for making the strengthening of civilian capacity a priority. To paraphrase Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' argument at Kansas State University last November, success in meeting today's challenges depends not only on hard power but on using and integrating America's soft power.[2] Civilian tools have the potential to increase the effectiveness, sustainability, and legitimacy of US government efforts to address twenty-first century challenges ranging from climate change to terrorism.

How Far Does This 'Smart Power' Consensus Extend and How Robust Is It?

On one hand, there is a strong bipartisan agreement on the need to modernize the civilian tools of national power. This consensus spans the political spectrum from Newt Gingrich to John Edwards. The leading presidential candidates and their principal

foreign policy advisers have supported some aspect of building civilian capacity.[3] Research for this paper revealed the common perception of a window of opportunity in early 2009 when the next president can make an unprecedented investment of resources and political capital in order to reform America's civilian agencies. This widely held belief seems to be based on more than merely the wishful thinking of wide-eyed advocates.

On the other hand, there is likely to be steady opposition from constituencies that are dubious of modernizing civilian capacity. Some of these skeptics believe that the Department of Defense remains the best repository of new operational missions, even those better suited, in principle, for civilians. Others argue for retrenchment or at least greater humility in what America seeks to achieve, viewing civilian capacity as an unnecessary expenditure or sign of imperial overreach. Despite the threat that the United States faces from some weak and failing states, these skeptics believe the next president, rather than investing in civilian tools, could simply demand less of our foreign affairs instruments.

This choice becomes particularly stark given looming resource constraints, including the challenge of resetting the military and the growing cost of entitlements. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as economic woes at home will undoubtedly shape this debate. If Iraq comes to be blamed for the nation's economic troubles, this could further weigh on Congress's willingness to spend on civilian instruments of power.

What Fault Lines Exist Within the 'Smart Power' Consensus?

At a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Senator John Kerry insisted on the need for more specifics on building and integrating civilian capacity. The senator railed against Secretary Gates, stating that he "gave a big speech…where he talked about how we got to use all the tools at our disposal, diplomatic, economic, you know, blah, blah, blah. And that's what it has become, blah, blah, blah. It's got to get translated and it's got to get translated rapidly."[4] Once one moves beyond a certain level of generality, however, "smart power" consensus tends to fracture along predictable lines.

First, the various reports and initiatives tend to split among the traditionally stovepiped disciplines. It comes as no surprise that people who work on foreign assistance do not devote much attention to public diplomacy. It is natural for career State Department officials to look first to building State Department capacity. When asked to identify priorities across the US government, where one sits very much determines where one stands; there is no broad agreement on where the most critical investments should be directed. Yet these divergent visions ultimately compete within the same political space. There is unlikely to be more than one major foreign policy reform initiative (if any) in the next president's first 100 days. Few believe that institutional reform will be sellable to the American public on its own merits. Rather, it will probably have to be linked to another larger purpose.

Second, there is an evident tension between modernizing core institutional capacity and building specialized capacity either within or external to existing departments and agencies. One sees this particularly with regard to debates on stabilization and reconstruction. The Defense Department may have made stability operations a core military mission in directive 3000.05, but it remains a specialized function within the State Department and USAID.[5] The Millennium Challenge Corporation and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief were essentially created as institutional "work-arounds" outside of USAID precisely because this status enabled them to gain presidential and congressional support, even though the administration later turned its attention to fixing core foreign assistance functions at the State Department and USAID through the "F" process. Creating additional offices and institutions that have the appeal of "signature initiatives" is more politically viable than broad institutional reform, even though this often compounds the problems of fragmentation and dilution of America's civilian tools of power.

Third, despite bipartisan agreement that our global development efforts must be improved and elevated relative to diplomacy and defense, opposing positions have emerged over how best to organize this aspect of our civilian capacity. The disagreement centers on the degree of integration that will best serve American interests and the priority placed on effective development as an instrument of US power. Many have argued for the creation of a Cabinet-level Department of Global Development that could bring greater

coherence to US assistance efforts and development policy while putting forward a more positive face to the world. Others have called for the creation of a "super-State" Department of Foreign Affairs, arguing that an autonomous aid department would undo recent reforms aimed at integration and actually weaken US assistance. Although there is agreement on all sides on core problems facing US foreign assistance, this debate reflects real differences in prioritization and perspective as well as in analysis of what would sell better to the American electorate and could deliver better results abroad.

Fourth, most of the focus on building and modernizing the US government's civilian capacity has centered on improving the executive branch. There are some, however, who argue that these reforms will be only half-measures unless Congress shares the burden of reform. Congress has traditionally resisted efforts to rewrite authorizing legislation or realign committee jurisdictions, and recent institutional reform efforts within the executive branch have not necessarily resulted in more streamlined reporting and oversight. Reforms that lack true partners in the congressional committees are sure to fall short.

What Is the Priority Need of Civilian Agencies?

There is an emerging view that the most pressing problem may be a lack of civilian officials with appropriate training and expertise. People are the key to making civilian agencies work. More than a few reports hold the Pentagon up as a model for attracting, developing, and retaining America's best and brightest. The model includes a number of core elements that could translate to the civilian side: find leadership that cares about the "troops"; build a personnel float that allows civilians to be trained in skill sets beyond their core competencies—including managing operations and implementation; set up a rotation system analogous to "purple" service in the military where international affairs civilians are incentivized to rotate through the various core functions of their own department, as well as detail postings on Capitol Hill and in other departments. The priority challenge for strengthening the US government's civilian international affairs agencies thus appears to many to be primarily a human resources challenge.

It is impossible, of course, to grow personnel and training programs without the allocation of resources as well as committed leadership. A few contend that the core problem is almost entirely due to a lack of money—that almost all the dysfunction one sees in civilian agencies is the result of chronic underfunding, a condition that could be corrected quickly and resolutely with larger budgets. They argue for exponential rather than incremental increases. Others doubt this premise, arguing that resources mean little if there are still debates over core mission and how best to train staff. There is broad consensus that change will never materialize without sustained dedication from both the president and secretary of state, who must be committed to leaving behind a legacy of institutional reform despite competing priorities likely to be of greater urgency, interest, and political currency. Any fundamental reforms are bound to face overwhelming opposition from within if this highest-level attention is "handed off."

Others make the case that priority attention ought to focus on the connection among strategies, resources, and planning. They criticize resourcing and assistance initiatives that are not grounded in clear strategic priorities and that have no process or criteria to manage inherent tradeoffs between competing initiatives. These efforts tend to argue for building strategic planning capacity in the immediate orbit of the department secretary or the president. A number of initiatives argue for a regularized planning and resourcing exercise akin to the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review for global development policy, foreign assistance, or civilian international affairs agencies as a whole. These recommendations argue that more money, personnel, and committed leadership will not be sustainable over time without the necessary institutional vehicle to make the repeated case for civilian institutions on the Hill.

What Is the Best Way to "Draw Water From the Rock"?

What are the most effective strategies through which civilian agencies can increase and sustain their resource base through the budget process? Everyone has strong opinions on this and rarely do these opinions align. Some Hill staffers argue that civilian agencies must simply ask for more money, or else they should take a cue from the Marines and demonstrate their indispensability in

the field. Senior defense officials argue for growing civilian budgets but not at the expense of military priorities. In those rare times when funds have been transferred from the Department of Defense to the State Department or USAID through new authorities, it is not at all clear whether this has resulted in either a net increase in civilian resources or increased attention to civilian priorities. USAID officials blame the State Department for not prioritizing development. State officials blame the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for gutting civilian requests before they ever reach Congress. And round and round it goes. It is not all doom and gloom though. Congress has demonstrated increasing support for funding a civilian reserve corps with the House's recent passage of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative in H.R. 1084. At the time of this writing, the bill remains before the Senate.

The institutional fixes in play for boosting resources for civilian agencies range from specific and temporary (expanding Section 1207 authorities) to more sweeping and unlikely (reforming the congressional committee structure). Many have called for rewriting the outdated National Security Act of 1947 and Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. There is some consensus that a more integrated and systematic budgeting process that places the 150 budget account requests in the context of national security priorities could gain more traction at the OMB and on the Hill. Few believe this will have great effect though, unless the next secretary of state invests his or her own time in forging relationships with key appropriators and if civilian agencies prioritize relationship-building with congressional staff.

It is worth considering, however, whether a deeper political problem with no institutional fix may be at play. Will civilian agencies be able to increase and sustain their resource base in the face of a political perception that national security begins (and to some, ends) with defense? The charge that members of Congress are failing to make the case for growing the State Department back in their own district—or more likely, not even wanting to try—is a familiar trope. This may or may not reflect an accurate reading of public sentiment. Numerous polls demonstrate many Americans' unease that the United States is no longer the welcomed world leader it once was, and they desire a more balanced engagement overseas. A number of initiatives focus on "grasstops" constituency-building outside of the Washington beltway. One need only look to how new constituencies formed in recent years in response to the global challenge of AIDS or on climate change to recognize that public perceptions are not static and new alignments are possible.

What Are the Main Gaps and Opportunities?

A survey of recent and ongoing efforts to strengthen the US government's civilian international affairs agencies reveals at least ten potential gaps and opportunities. These are:

- **Grand Strategy.** There is still a case to be made for why building civilian capacity is vital to America's grand strategy for the years ahead. This is particularly true outside of the beltway, where substantive debates fall far short of propelling the issue forward. Even in Washington there are real differences over whether US grand strategy should be oriented toward a generation of persistent conflict centered on Iraq and Afghanistan or toward something entirely different from the "long war." Some argue that US grand strategy tends to focus more on threats than opportunities and that the US government is consistently weak at exploiting opportunities. Others worry that US grand strategy is too focused on "getting Iraq right" or that we remain trapped in outdated paradigms. Even if consensus could be achieved on America's overarching international mission, many argue that discussions of grand strategy are only valuable when they are translated into specific, tangible action.

- **Role of Development.** Consensus is still needed among interested practitioners to make the argument that far from being peripheral to stability abroad and to United States' security at home, development is vital to both. Unfortunately, some national security officials continue to disparage development assistance as "No Country Left Behind." There is also a tension associated with the security rationale for development and on the question of whether security is defined in an immediate and operational sense or a longer-term strategic perspective.

- **Cost Comparison.** The argument is often made that investing in civilian capacity is a more cost-effective alternative to investing in certain military resources. This dollars-and-cents argu-

ment needs to be made in a more rigorous way to have real credibility at the OMB or on the Hill. One potential avenue could be looking at the cost of military "shaping activities" conducted by US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in comparison to civilian alternatives or public-private partnerships. Arguments based on specific examples from the field are always viewed as more credible.

- **Getting Beyond State and AID.** Building civilian capacity cuts across issues and reaches into other agencies such as the Departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, and Health and Human Services; the Center for Disease Control; and the intelligence community, yet many of the initiatives pay too little attention to these. In addition, the private sector has a vital role to play in advocating for civilian initiatives, particularly at a time when some private entities have footprints as sizeable as many governments.

- **Working With International Counterparts.** The premise of many initiatives seems to be "let's get our own house in order and then we'll figure out how to work with others." This may be the wrong approach, as early engagement with allies to identify and develop comparative advantages might help shape US internal reforms.

- **A Closer Look at Integration.** The mantra of "a new Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency" overshadows the fact that the military today in some ways may be moving away from integration.[6] Not every task requires the same level of integration, and integration for its own sake ("Little League Rules," where everyone plays) should never be the goal.

- **Contracting.** Most of the attention here has focused on military contracting, but contractors play an increasingly important role in how civilian agencies function. Any conversation about civilian personnel will necessitate a serious look at contractors, what role they play, which jobs are inherently governmental, and whether the right incentive structures are in place.

- **Measuring Success.** It is difficult to measure the success of civilian engagement since it is often a matter of proving a negative (a conflict avoided) or a long-term outcome (a country

on a more moderate path). The burden still falls to civilian agencies to show how such investments would pay dividends toward US foreign policy goals.

- **Don't Overlook the Current Administration.** It is most likely too late for the current administration to do much more than it already has on civilian capacity issues, but there are a number of committed officials and efforts underway inside the government that are ready to address civilian capacity.[7] Outside reformers do themselves a disservice if they dismiss related work being done inside the government. Furthermore, the next administration should not reject all Bush administration initiatives out of hand.

- **Early Consultation With the Hill.** Many of the ongoing initiatives have a Hill strategy, but it tends to be secondary to trying to seed ideas in the presidential campaigns. Hill staffers are quite likely to populate the next administration or will be instrumental to passing any legislation to build civilian capacity. There remains an opportunity to bring together members of Congress and influential staffers to lay a foundation this year that can signal fertile ground to the incoming administration and grease the legislative wheel. This will only work if members and staff are consulted early in the process rather than sold a bill of goods at a later stage.

This paper is a first step toward surveying the reform landscape for strengthening the US government's civilian international affairs agencies. There are real opportunities for like-minded efforts to work more closely together—either because of similar outlooks or complementary approaches. It is neither practical nor useful to try to bring all these diverse efforts under a single umbrella, but expanded information-sharing can increase the likelihood of synergies and ensure that the sum is greater than the parts. On January 20, 2009, the next president will face the daunting task of applying the tools of national power in pursuit of his or her strategic international vision. The next administration need not start from scratch. Much of the work assessed in this paper provides a platform on which we all can stand.

Appendix A
Surveying the Civilian Reform Landscape

Key Recommendations for Strengthening USG Civilian International Affairs Agencies

Recommendations column groups: **Mission & Strategy** | **Personnel** | **Org. Structure & Leadership** | **Strategic Planning & Budgeting** | **Authorization & Appropriation**

Column headers (left to right):
1. Clarify mission & purpose
2. Enhance civilian role in US grand strategy
3. Leverage multilateral organizations
4. Increase private sector involvement
5. Expand education & exchange programs
6. Enhance connections between aid & trade
7. Increase personnel
8. Improve training, education, & professional expertise
9. Improve internal use of technology
10. Examine role & impact of contracting
11. Create new incentives for advancement
12. Improve integration of country teams
13. Form civilian stabilization corps
14. Create new White House coordination
15. Elevate development to a Cabinet position
16. Create an International Affairs Department
17. Strengthen position of public diplomacy within the State Department
18. Create a new public diplomacy agency apart from the State Department
19. Locate regional civilian authority in the field
20. Create capacity to align strategies, resources, & planning
21. Make assistance more strategic & coherent
22. Develop unified budget request for 050 & 150 accounts
23. Develop unified budget process within 150 account
24. Institute a QDR-like planning & resourcing process
25. Restrain the use of presidential initiatives that function as earmarks
26. Eliminate or streamline legislative earmarks
27. Increase funding
28. Review stabilization contingency funding
29. Rewrite outdated foreign assistance legislation
30. Reform congressional committees

Categories:
- 🟧 = Mission & Strategy
- 🟨 = Personnel
- 🟩 = Org. Structure & Leadership
- 🟦 = Authorization & Appropriation
- 🟦 = Strategic Planning & Budgeting

Symbol legend:
- ♣ = Diplomacy
- ♠ = Foreign Assistance & Development
- ♦ = Public Diplomacy
- ♥ = Stabilization & Reconstruction

Selection of Major Study Reports	Source	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Beyond Assistance (2007)	HELP Commission	♠	♠	♥	♠		♠	♠♦	♠♦		♠	♣♣		♠		♠¹	♦			♣♠♦♥	♠	♠	♠♣♦♥	♠	♠	♠	♠♦♥	♥	♠	♠	
A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy (2005)	Public Diplomacy Council	♦			♦	♦		♦	♦				♦			♦		♦		♦	♦						♦				
Changing Minds, Winning Peace (2003)	Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World	♦	♦			♦		♦	♦♣	♦	♦			♦				♦		♦				♠	♦						
The Country Team: Restructuring America's First Line of Engagement (2007)	PNSR Structure Working Group							♣		♣							♣		♠												
Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign (2006)	SFRC Minority Staff	♠♠							♠♠								♠	♠		♠				♠♠	♥						
Embassies Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid (2007)	SFRC Minority Staff	♠				♠	♠				♠	♠♠					♠	♠		♠		♠			♠						
The Embassy of the Future (2007)	CSIS Commission				♣	♦		♠	♣	♠♦		♠	♣									♣									
Final Report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group (2008)	Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy		♣♠♦♥	♣♠	♠		♣♠♥	♣♠♦♥	♣		♣♠♦♥	♥			♦		♣	♣♠♦♥	♠	♣♠♦♥		♣♠♦♥			♠	♥		♣♠♦♥			
Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating US Public Diplomacy (2003)	CFR Task Force	♦	♦			♦	♦	♦		♦	♦				♦			♦		♦			♦						♦		
Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance (2007)	CSIS Task Force	♣♠♥				♠♥	♥			♥		♥	♥								♥	♠	♠♥	♥			♠♥				
On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security (2004)	CGD Commission	♠♥	♣♠♥	♠♥	♠		♠			♥		♠					♠					♥									
Play to Win (2003)	CSIS Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction	♥					♥		♥		♥						♥					♥	♥	♥							
Road Map for National Security (2001)	Hart-Rudman Commission	♠♠		♠♠		♠	♠		♠		♠♠	♠♠²			♠♠	♠	♠♠	♠♠										♠			
Report of the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (2005)	United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy			♦	♦		♦	♦	♦				♦				♦		♦	♦					♦						
Security by Other Means (2007)	Brookings-CSIS Task Force	♠	♠	♥♠	♠	♠	♠♥	♠		♠	♠	♥	♥♠	♠			♠	♠		♠	♠				♥	♠					
Smart Power (2007)	CSIS Commission	♣♣	♣♠♦	♣	♠♦	♦	♠	♣		♣♠♦♥		♣♠♦♥	♠	♦	♣	♣♠♦♥	♠		♣♠♦♥		♣♠			♣♣							
Smart Power: Building a Better, Safer World (2007)	Center for US Global Engagement Working Group	♠		♣		♠		♣♣									♠				♣♣										
A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States (2008)	CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project	♥				♥♠		♥	♥♠		♥	♥					♥♠		♥♠		♥	♥♠	♥♠	♥	♠	♥					
Task Force on Strategic Communications (2008)	Defense Science Board			♦	♦			♦			♦		♦				♦								♦						
A Unified Security Budget for the United States (2008)	FPIF/CDI Task Force	♣♠♥	♣♠	♣♠							♥					♣♠	♠	♣♠♥					♣♠♦♥	♥							
In the Wake of War: Improving US Post-Conflict Capabilities (2005)	CFR Task Force	♥	♥	♥			♥	♥			♥	♥					♥						♥	♥							
The 9/11 Commission Report (2004)	National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States	♣♠♦♥	♣♠♦♥			♦																									

Notes: 1: The HELP Commission did not reach consensus on organizational structure, but a majority of the commissioners endorsed a new International Affairs Department while a minority group of Commissioners called for a new Department of International Sustainable Development;
2: The Hart-Rudman Commission recommended merging USAID into the State Department.

This appendix is part of a paper commissioned by a joint initiative of the **Stanley Foundation** and the **Center for a New American Security**.

Appendix A
Surveying the Civilian Reform Landscape
Key Recommendations for Strengthening USG
Civilian International Affairs Agencies

Matrix Highlights

1. **There is robust consensus within a significant segment of think tanks, members of Congress, and government officials on the need to strengthen the US government's civilian international affairs agencies.**

   - This matrix provides information on key recommendations from 22 major study reports issued from 2001 to 2008. This is a subset of commissions, advisory boards, and working groups, rather than an exhaustive list, selected to be representative of the various subcommunities of interest.

   - The reports covered here address ways to improve US government national security, diplomacy, foreign assistance, public diplomacy, and postconflict reconstruction efforts.

2. **The most widely prescribed recommendations demand leadership from both the White House and Congress. The three most popular are: (1) increase funding; (2) clarify mission and purpose; and (3) improve training, education, and professional expertise.**

   - Other popular recommendations include: make assistance more strategic and coherent; create the capacity to align strategies, resources, and planning; increase numbers of personnel; increase private sector involvement; create new White House coordination capabilities; enhance the civilian role in US grand strategy; and review stabilization contingency funding.

   - The matrix's list of recommendations is just a sampling of the hundreds found in the 22 reports surveyed. Recommendations were chosen if they corresponded to commonly heard suggestions or if there was a critical mass across the 22 reports studied.

3. **Despite the amount of activity in this area, opportunities remain for additional studies, consensus-building activities, and advocacy.**

   - Fewer studies offered prescriptions on organizational architecture compared with the other main categories of recommendations (mission and strategy; personnel, strategic planning, and budgeting; and authorization and appropriation). This may partly reflect lack of consensus on institutional solutions and relatively less focus on the specifics of implementation.

   - Most reports have a majority of their recommendations falling within one area of focus (public diplomacy, foreign assistance, stabilization and reconstruction, and diplomacy). This may indicate an opportunity for like-minded efforts to work together across traditional boundaries.

Appendix B
Surveying the Civilian Reform Landscape
Ongoing Initiatives

Initiative	Categories
A New Roadmap (American Friends Service Committee)	♣♠
America's Role in the World Working Group (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University)	♣
American Security Project	♦♣
Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense (The Henry L. Stimson Center and the American Academy of Diplomacy)	♣♠
Cohen–Nunn Dialogue (Center for Strategic & International Studies and the Howard Gilman Foundation)	♣♠♦♥
Connect US	♣♠♦♥
Foreign Assistance Reform Project (Brookings)	♠
Impact '08 (Center for US Global Engagement)	♠♣
Initiative for Global Development	♠
InterAction Task Force on Effective Foreign Assistance	♠
Managing Global Insecurity (Brookings)	♣♠♥
Modernizing US Foreign Assistance (Center for Global Development)	♠
Project on National Security Reform	♣♠♦♥
Project on Resource Allocation for National Security	♣♠♥
Smart Power (Center for Strategic & International Studies)	♠♦♣
Smart Power Project (Center on Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California)	♦
Stabilizing Fragile States Project (Bipartisan Policy Center)	♥
Sustainable Security Program (Center for American Progress)	♠
The Stanley Foundation/Center for a New American Security Initiative	♣♠♦♥
US Foreign Aid Reform Campaign (Oxfam America)	♠

This appendix is part of a paper commissioned by a joint initiative of the Stanley Foundation and the Center for a New American Security.

Symbol	Meaning
♣	= Diplomacy
♠	= Foreign Assistance & Development
♦	= Public Diplomacy
♥	= Stabilization & Reconstruction

Other Relevant Activities

The above is only a partial list of ongoing initiatives. Numerous books, journal articles, and conferences on modernizing America's civilian international affairs agencies have also been produced and led by individual experts. Our purpose in focusing on commissions, task forces, major studies, and ongoing projects is to highlight those efforts that have sought to establish a certain degree of consensus within the expert community. Most of the individuals who have authored books and articles have participated in these broader, cumulative efforts.

The current administration has also launched a number of efforts to address gaps in the capacity of civilian international affairs agencies. These include the creation of new institutions, offices, and business models such as the US Global AIDS Coordinator, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, the Director of US Foreign Assistance, and the Office of Global Communications in the National Security Council, as well as other reform efforts such as the transformational diplomacy initiative, the President's National Security Professional Development Initiative, USAID's Development Leadership Initiative, and the proposed Civilian Stabilization Initiative.

The number and variety of ongoing activities inside and outside government, focused on strengthening civilian international affairs agencies, serve to underscore the existing momentum to address this set of issues. They also point toward broad recognition of the critical need for policy and operational tools suited to meet the challenges facing us now and in the years ahead.

Endnotes

[1] Appendix A provides a chart of some of the prescriptions found in recent major commission reports and task forces.

[2] Secretary Gates argued at Kansas State University for developing tools that provide for economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services, training and equipping indigenous militaries and police forces, and strategic communications. See *http://www.defense link.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199*.

[3] The following examples are not meant to be comprehensive: John McCain stated that he "will energize and expand our post conflict reconstruction capabilities so that any military campaign would be complemented by a civilian 'surge'," and that he "will ask Congress for a civilian follow-on to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act." (See John McCain, "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom: Securing America's Future", *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2007.) Barack Obama has stated that "we must integrate our diplomatic, information, economic and military power," and that he will "call for a National Strategy and Security Review, to help determine a 21st century interagency structure to integrate the elements of our national power." (See his speech, "The World Beyond Iraq," Fayetteville, NC, March 19, 2008.)

[4] Hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Strengthening National Security Through Smart Power—A Military Perspective*, March 5, 2008.

[5] In the State Department it is housed in the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and within USAID in the Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau.

[6] Consider, for instance, the recent offer by the Marine Corps to fight principally in Afghanistan, leaving Iraq to the Army.

[7] See Appendix B.

The Center for a New American Security

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) develops strong, pragmatic, and principled national security and defense policies that promote and protect American interests and values. Building on the deep expertise and broad experience of its staff and advisors, CNAS engages policymakers, experts, and the public with innovative fact-based research, ideas, and analysis to shape and elevate the national security debate. As an independent and nonpartisan research institution, CNAS leads efforts to help inform and prepare the national security leaders of today and tomorrow.

About the Project

"What an Engagement Strategy Entails" addresses the weak condition of the United States' civilian international affairs agencies. An impressive range of specialists have highlighted the importance of diplomacy, aid and trade, democracy promotion, and public information for US national security. Becoming more effective in all of these areas, however, will require a major upgrade of the associated government infrastructure, which in turn will need a political push from top leaders. This project will look at that problem in its largest dimensions and context.

The Stanley Foundation

The Stanley Foundation is a nonpartisan, private operating foundation that seeks a secure peace with freedom and justice, built on world citizenship and effective global governance. It brings fresh voices and original ideas to debates on global and regional problems. The foundation advocates principled multilateralism—an approach that emphasizes working respectfully across differences to create fair, just, and lasting solutions.

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